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Abstract 
The thesis follows a multidisciplinary approach, and adopts a critical methodology – rooted 
in techniques of discourse analysis and genealogy – in an effort to draw attention to the 
problems with continuing to assess Iran’s strategic preferences within the parameters of 
ethnocentric paradigms of strategy. In this regard, it offers a critique of ontologies found in 
IR, strategic theory, and areas of Iranian Studies, and reconsiders the impact of Islam on 
Iran’s nuclear trajectory based on a critical approach to understanding military jurisprudence 
from the perspectives of hermeneutics and epistemology. 
This thesis deconstructs some of the common portrayals of Iran’s nuclear policies presented 
in today’s academic and policy discourses. Specifically, it focuses on how the prospect of 
Iranian policies being guided by religious scholars is narrated by experts and commentators 
that confine Iranian strategic agency within one of two categories: Islamic fanaticism, or 
secular realism. Both of these approaches are situated within specific epistemological 
boundaries which the author critiques as the ‘deterrence parameter’.  
In addition to deconstructing the prevailing narratives and discourses surrounding Iran’s 
nuclear programme – and the epistemic parameters which discipline them – the author offers 
an Islamic framework as an alternative lens for analysing Iran’s policies towards nuclear 
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) if we are to assume that religion 
does have some impact on Iranian policy-making. This framework is formed of three 
interrelated levels: Qur’anic ontology, secondary sources, and theology. It also draws from 
previous instances where Muslim theologians and jurists have confronted weapons capable of 
mass destruction in light of concepts such as maslahah (public interest). The author applies 
this framework in assessing the verdicts of Islamic scholars on nuclear weapons and other 
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WMD in an attempt to provide a counter-narrative for where Iran’s strategic preferences 
emerge from and where they may go in the future.  
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Introduction 
*** 
[I]ntelligence failure is inevitable, and intelligence organizations should therefore investigate 
and try to understand those phenomena that inductive logic cannot describe.
1
 
*** 
(Mis)reading Iran and its Nuclear Programme 
According to a US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in 2007, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
possessed neither a nuclear weapon nor an active nuclear weapons programme.
2
 In December 
2015, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that while it believed Iran had 
engaged in "a range" of experimental activities related to nuclear explosive devices before 
2009 – the precise time that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu painted as a “hinge 
of history” for preventing Iranian nuclear weapons development3 – "these activities did not 
advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies".
4
 Yet the logic that absence of evidence 
does not equate to evidence of absence – now popularly associated with Donald Rumsfeld 
                                                          
1
 Kjetil Anders Hatlebrekke & M. L.R. Smith, "Towards a New Theory of Intelligence Failure? The Impact of 
Cognitive Closure and Discourse Failure", Intelligence and National Security, Volume 25, Issue 2, 2010, pp. 
147-182, p. 180. 
2
 National Intelligence Council, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities”, National Intelligence Estimate, 
November 2007, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160319134715/http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/international/2007120
3_release.pdf, p. 6 in PDF document (no page numbers). 
3
 Jeffrey Goldberg, “Netanyahu to Obama: Stop Iran – Or I Will”, the Atlantic, March 2009 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160324144334/http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/03/netanyahu-
to-obama-stop-iran-or-i-will/307390/ [Accessed 09.06.16] 
4
 “Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Report by 
the Director General”, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2015/68, 15 December 2015, p. 15. 
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after remarks he made in 2002 as US Secretary of Defence
5
 – has ensured that doubt 
surrounding the 2007 NIE also clouds today’s threat assessment of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran’s nuclear programme.6 The assumption that Iran is driven to obtain nuclear weapons still 
permeates much of the academic literature and policy discourse on Iran’s strategic 
preferences.
7
  
It is here that imagination plays an important role in the threat assessment of Iran’s nuclear 
programme. During what has come to be known as the Iranian ‘nuclear crisis’ – a period 
roughly between 2002-2015 of intensified international political and economic pressure on 
Iran centring on the extent to which its nuclear programme is deemed a security threat by the 
United States and its allies – there has been a tendency towards defining the Islamic Republic 
of Iran’s strategic preferences according to the normative assumptions of either realism or 
orientalism. In realist accounts, with roots as much in the more strategic-focused literature on 
nuclear weapons strategy and deterrence as it does International Relations (IR) scholarship, 
as well as a broader trend of philosophical realism in the social sciences and analysis, Iran is 
conceived as a ‘rational actor’ that seeks a nuclear weapon in order to maximise its own 
                                                          
5
 “Press Conference by US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld”, 06 June 2002, North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20151206142806/http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_19772.htm?selected
Locale=en [Accessed 11.06.16]. See also O. Boyd-Barrett, “Media and War Propaganda”, in Julia Hoffmann 
and Virgin Hawkins (eds.), Communication and Peace: Mapping an Emerging Field, Oxford: Routledge, 2015, 
pp. 100-101. See also Jason Jones, The American Rhetorical Construction of the Iranian Nuclear Threat, 
London: Continuum, 2011, pp. 144-145. 
6
 See Jason Jones, The American Rhetorical Construction of the Iranian Nuclear Threat, pp. 144-145. For a 
more general discussion of this assessment, see also Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, “The Iran “Threat” 
in a Kafkaesque World”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 42, No. 1, Autumn 2012, pp. 24-45. 
7
 This type of literature is distinct from a more complex literature which considers Iran’s strategy as one of 
“hedging”: between acquisition and restraint. See Wyn Bowen and Matthew Moran, “Living with Nuclear 
Hedging: the Implications of Iran’s Nuclear Strategy”, International Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 4, July 2015, pp. 687-
707; Patricia Lewis, “Iran and Nuclear Restraint: Lessons from Elsewhere”, Chatham House Research Paper, 
July 2015. 
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security in an anarchic international system and deter military aggression.
8
 Permitting a 
tendency towards strategic ‘mirroring’ in analysis and commentary, neither Islam nor any 
other ethical concerns here define or shape Iran’s strategic preferences in any meaningful 
way, and Iran is constructed as a ‘like unit’. As a like-unit, Iran is deemed capable of being 
deterred from obtaining and using nuclear weapons. 
On the other side of contemporary discourse, orientalist accounts concur that Iran is driven to 
acquire its own nuclear weapons capability, but for different reasons. They argue that it is 
precisely the nature of religious belief in the Islamic Republic – and specifically, the 
involvement of clerics in policy-making – which pushes Iran towards a nuclear weapon. Here 
Iran is not a ‘like unit’, and instead seeks nuclear weapons due to its inherent irrationalism, 
and specifically the assumed religious fanaticism of its leadership.
9
 “For the mullahs, norms 
against proliferation are of little practical consequence.”10 It is in this space that a ream of 
powerful orientalist images, discourses and narratives about Iran and its motivations as an 
‘Islamic Republic’  coalesce, and the Iranian ‘nuclear threat’ is born.11 
Both perspectives of Iran’s strategic preferences ultimately assume that Iranian nuclear 
proliferation is in some way inevitable or – given the geostrategic landscape of the region – 
                                                          
8
 See for instance Kenneth N. Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean 
Stability”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 4, July-August 2012, pp. 2-5.  
9
 See for instance Clifton W. Sherrill, “Why Iran Wants the Bomb and What it Means for US Policy”, 
Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, March 2012, pp. 31-49. 
10
 Ibid, p. 43. 
11
 See the burgeoning niche of ‘airport fiction’ exploring this scenario: Larry Bond, Exit Plan, New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2012; Jack Higgins, The Death Trade, London: Harper, 2014; Gerald Seymour, The Corporal’s 
Wife, London: Hodder Paperbacks, 2014; Farsheed Ferdowsi, Mushroom in the Sand, Livermore: WingSpan 
Press, 2009. One notable trilogy from this niche, boasted by the author Joel C. Rosenberg to have been read by 
senior Israeli and US political and military officials, is the ‘Twelfth Imam Series’, which includes the books The 
Twelfth Imam, Carol Stream: Tyndale House Publishers: USA, 2010; The Tehran Initiative, Carol Stream: 
Tyndale House Publishers: 2011, and Damascus Countdown, Carol Stream: Tyndale House Publishers: USA, 
2013. 
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highly likely. In doing so they privilege two levels of analysis; namely those of  ‘unit-level’ 
phenomena in what are constructed as Iranian ideology, religion and culture, or international 
‘systemic’ factors. They are ultimately perspectives which attempt to socially-construct the 
Islamic Republic of Iran’s strategic agency within the narrow epistemic parameters of 
Eurocentric thinking concerning strategy and military affairs, within which ‘rationality’ and 
‘pragmatism’ are considered uniquely secular artefacts.  
These epistemic parameters are naturalised in discussions, and while Iranian strategic 
preferences towards nuclear weapons are today judged according to Eurocentric boundaries 
of inquiry, the Iran nuclear ‘debate’ gives the impression that the decision to obtain or not 
obtain nuclear weapons in Iran will hinge on factors that go beyond social-construction of 
threat – namely, the international system and Iran’s own position of existential security, or an 
Islamic ‘essence’ governing its policy-making processes. In either of these accounts, the 
unique agency of the individual cleric – or Muslim writ large – is lost in an attempt at 
collectivising their actions under the broad categories of realism or irrationalism.  
For their own part in this regard, many media outlets in Western states have reinforced the 
perception that a peaceful resolution to the ‘nuclear crisis’ with Iran hinges on the capacity of 
the West to neutralise its capacity to enrich uranium beyond certain percentages, outside of 
an already extremely rigid monitoring arrangement with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA).
12
 If Iran’s nuclear programme is not curtailed in this way, we are told that a 
military confrontation between a hostile Iran and a defensive United States is inevitable: 
                                                          
12
 See Jonas Siegel and Saranaz Barforoush, “Media Coverage of Iran’s Nuclear Program: An Analysis of U.S. 
and U.K. Coverage, 2009-2012, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (School of Public 
Policy, University of Maryland), April 2013; Gareth Porter, Manufactured Crisis: The Untold Story of the Iran 
Nuclear Scare, Charlottesville: Just World Books, 2014; and especially Jones, The American Rhetorical 
Construction of the Iranian Nuclear Threat.  
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[t]ime is always running out on diplomacy, a military operation is always around the corner, and 
Iran is always just months away from decimating Israel and holding the world hostage with a 
single nuclear bomb that it isn't even making. The clock, we hear ad nauseam, is ticking.
13
 
The extent that we – as analysts, academics, policy-makers, and ultimately ordinary members 
of the public –  should be concerned about Iran’s nuclear programme depends on the kinds of 
assumptions we make about the intentions and mind-sets of Iran’s leaders. We in the West 
are privy to little insight into the worldviews and ideologies of those holding power in the 
Islamic Republic today, but often accept – tacitly or explicitly – certain orientalist imaginings 
of the thought-processes of Iran’s ulama which confirm our own sense of identity (e.g. 
empiricist, rational, ‘strategic-minded’). Here we are reminded of Edward Said’s observation 
that orientalism “makes sense” because it  
depends more on the West than on the Orient, and this sense is directly indebted to various 
Western techniques of representation that make the Orient visible, clear, “there” in discourse 
about it.
14
 
At both the levels of policy and academic discourse, the perception of Iran as an Islamic-
revolutionary state gripped by clerics, hard-line factions and paramilitary groups – all 
influenced by religion – render assessments that Iran’s civil nuclear programme is a cover for 
weaponisation extremely plausible. Yet that such discussions have for so long hinged on an 
only cursory engagement with what are a plethora of ways that religion can potentially 
impact Iran’s strategic doctrines forces us to ask what kinds discourses regarding Islam and 
the Islamic Republic have in this absence come to govern the assessment of Iran’s nuclear 
                                                          
13
 Nima Shirazi, “Iran's Ever-Ticking Nuclear Clock: Countdown to Nothing”, Wide Asleep in America, 22 
November 2014, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160324143334/http://www.wideasleepinamerica.com/2014/11/iran-nuclear-
ticking-clock.html [Accessed 11.06.16] 
14
 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, London: Penguin Books, 2003, p. 22. 
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programme today under the banner of empirical analysis. In such a context, the tendency to 
construct Iran’s leadership as the ‘other’ – in accordance with orientalist presentations of 
Iranian culture and Islam – or as being driven by exactly the same strategic preferences which 
drive secular ‘Western’ states, is striking.  
Closer to policy, ‘experts’ and pundits belonging to an array of influential lobby groups 
including United Against a Nuclear Iran (UANI) and the American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee (AIPAC), as well as neoconservative think-tanks such as the Gatestone Institute 
and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, have provided their own social construction 
of the Iranian ‘threat’ in this void, and offered extensive commentaries on why the collective 
mentality of Iran’s leaders means that it will inevitably produce (and use) nuclear weapons15.   
Let us look at the religious dimension of this problem, and then at its more mundane aspects. 
Are the clerical elite and their praetorians--the Revolutionary Guards Corps, the thuggish 
Basij, and the killers of the Ministry of Intelligence--still running a revolutionary enterprise 
within which they see themselves as the ideological vanguard of the nation and Islam? Yes, 
absolutely.
16
  
They are joined by Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who likewise exploits a 
common lack of understanding of how Iran’s leadership think and feel: 
                                                          
15
 See Denis MacEoin, "Iran's Supreme Leader: "Death to America": Which Word Does America Not 
Understand?", the Gatestone Institute, 22 March 2015, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160324143536/http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5428/breaking-iran-supreme-
leader-death-to-america [Accessed 09.06.16]  
16
 Reuel Marc Gerecht, “The Myth of Moderate Mullahs”, the Weekly Standard, Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies, 19 March 2007, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160324144024/http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/the-myth-of-
moderate-mullahs/ [Accessed 09.06.16] 
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[y]ou don’t want a messianic apocalyptic cult controlling atomic bombs. When the wide-eyed 
believer gets hold of the reins of power and the weapons of mass death, then the entire world 
should start worrying, and that is what is happening in Iran.
17
  
We are reminded however of many examples where non-Muslim leaders of states have 
couched their decision-making and political worldviews in religious terms. ‘Cold Warrior’ 
Ronald Reagan was of the opinion that nuclear war would take place in his lifetime, and 
couched this view in not only nuclear pessimism, but also Christian eschatology: 
[w]hen I look at the ancient prophets, the holy book, and the signs that predict Armageddon, I 
ask myself will we be the generation that will witness this war? Believe me, these predictions 
are in accordance with the era we live in.
18
 
Former US President George W. Bush made frequent references to his religious beliefs when 
outlining his foreign policy vision,
19
 and supposedly remarked to the Palestinian National 
Authority’s Foreign Minister in 2003 that God commanded him to go to war in 
Afghanistan.
20
 More symbolically, but important nonetheless when one considers the close 
analysis of the use of religious symbols in the Islamic Republic of Iran (for example, the 
names given to its satellites or missiles),
21
 Russia’s nuclear arsenal is has its own ““spiritual 
                                                          
17
 Goldberg, “Netanyahu to Obama: Stop Iran – Or I Will”. 
18
 Grace Halsell, Prophecy and Politics: The Secret Alliance Between Israel and the U.S. Christian Right, 
Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1986, pp. 48-50. 
19
 Amy E. Black, “With God on Our Side: Religion in George W. Bush’s Foreign Policy Speeches, Presented at 
the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago”, 2002. 
20
 Ewen MacAskill, “George Bush: ‘God Told Me to End the Tyranny in Iraq”, the Guardian, 7 October 2005, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160324144430/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/oct/07/iraq.usa 
[Accessed 09.06.16] 
21
 See for instance the prominent neoconservative Michael Ledeen in “Iran in Orbit”, Wall Street Journal, 09 
February 2009, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160324144247/http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123414344863961949 [Accessed 
09.06.16], where he writes that “[e]erily, the rocket that carried the telecommunications satellite into space was 
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patron-protector” (namely, Saint Seraphim of Sarov).22 Furthermore, the Patriarch of the 
Russian Orthodox Church is tasked with blessing the nuclear ‘command & control’ briefcase 
(cheget).
23
 Even in the United Kingdom, the Polaris nuclear missile system had its own 
prayer – written by Captain Michael Henry – that included the lines:  
Lord thou command us saying ‘thou shall not kill’. Thou knowest that we prepare ourselves 
constantly to kill, not one thousand, and that by this preparation we believe we help to 
preserve peace among nations. 
24
 
While remarks, views and rituals such as these pose certain problems for secularism in the 
West, they are rarely securitised in the same way that the presence of religion in Iran’s 
strategic preferences is. When Netanyahu speaks of the ‘wide-eyed believer’ in Iran in the 
context of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), we as an audience immediately understand 
which supposed elements of the Islamic faith will come to motivate Iran’s policies.  
At the heart of these discussions regarding Iran’s nuclear intentions and the role of religion in 
defining its strategic preferences is the assumption is that its status as an Islamic Republic 
forces it to behave differently in the nuclear realm compared to secular, ‘rational’ states, or 
even those whose leaders might be influenced by Christianity. Iran’s religious system of 
governance, which permits the country’s religious (ulama) to exercise varying degrees of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
named "Safir" (message) and the satellite itself "Omid" (hope). In short order we can expect to hear Iranian 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announcing the imminent return of the Mahdi.”  
22
 Christopher Marsh, Religion and the State in Russia and China: Suppression, Survival, and Revival, London: 
Continuum, 2011, p. 260 
23
 Ibid, p. 260. 
24
 James Jinks and Peter Hennessy, The Silent Deep: The Royal Navy Submarine Service Since 1945, London: 
Penguin UK, 2015, p. 264. 
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power in the policy-making process, is recognised implicitly
25
 (and sometimes explicitly
26
) as 
a key variable distinguishing Iran’s actions from those of other states.  
The extent to which Iran’s leaders are therefore impacted by religious ideas or ideology – and 
the ways that we choose to characterise this impact in our own discourse – therefore has a 
unique bearing upon assessments of whether the country will conform to or waver from 
existing models of deterrence and nuclear proliferation. Here, in the spirit of Ken Booth’s 
Strategy and Ethnocentrism, which argues that “threat assessment is not concerned just with 
‘capabilities’ and ‘intentions’”, but also images which allow us to perceive and misperceive 
these capabilities,
27
 I argue that ‘mad mullahs’, as opposed to a threat assessment based 
strictly on nuclear physics, verification or even the analysis of Iranian military and political 
institutions, are the primary factor underpinning the conclusion that Iran’s nuclear 
programme represents an objective threat to international stability. 
On the other end of the spectrum, the view that religion plays only a negligible role in 
defining Iran’s strategic preferences in the nuclear realm and beyond likewise offers very 
little insight into the origin and movement of these strategic preferences beyond a Eurocentric 
narrative which considers secular Anglo-European-North American sources for strategic 
preferences to be primary. One Time journalist, for instance, considers the prospect of 
Ayatollah Khamenei appreciating the works of Leo Tolstoy, Victor Hugo and Honoré de 
                                                          
25
 See for instance the claim that Iran misses vital checks and balances in the command and control process, 
where the Supreme Leader’s decisions would be central, in Frederick W. Kagan, Deterrence Misapplied: 
Challenges in Containing a Nuclear Iran, Council on Foreign Relations, May 2010, p. 1, and similar claims in 
Shahram Chubin, “Command and Control in a Nuclear-Armed Iran”, Institut Français des Relations 
Internationales, Proliferation Papers 45, January-February 2013. 
26
 See Shmuel Bar, Can Cold War Deterrence Apply to a Nuclear Iran?, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 
Strategic Perspectives, No. 7, 2011,  p. 11. 
27
 Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism, New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1979, p. 17. 
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Balzac as “surprising evidence of intellectual depth”28 as he considers whether or not the 
United States can trust Iran. “This guy is Bismarck with a turban”, contributes Ray Takeyh in 
the same article.
29
 In this regard, realists have been among the quickest to respond against the 
charge that Iran is an irrational actor, but only through accepting a secular narrative of how 
Iranian strategic preferences emerge. Some realists therefore argue that while the Islamic 
Republic likely does seek nuclear weapons, it does so for reasons rooted in what are 
considered objective conditions of global and regional insecurity, rather than religious belief. 
In IR, Kenneth Waltz is perhaps the most famous figure to argue this view, and is joined by 
others.
30
 
That both sides of the discussion focus so heavily on the extent to which Iran is a ‘rational’ 
actor is a reflection of how Iran’s nuclear intentions are constructed with reference to theories 
designed to provide general explanations for why nuclear proliferation occurs, or models of 
how nuclear deterrence to work, rather than theories aimed at unveiling ‘specificity’ in 
strategic preferences, or competing notions of ‘rationality’ or ‘pragmatism’ based on religious 
foundations. While the question of whether Iran is a ‘rational’ realist power, or an ‘irrational’ 
Muslim one, is one of the central concerns in answering the nuclear question today, it cannot 
provide convincing answers concerning what drives Iran’s strategic preferences, and where 
its nuclear programme could head, if we are to take its model of religious governance 
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seriously. As Roxanne Euben concludes in her comparative analysis of Islamic 
fundamentalism and rational actor theory,  
rational actor theory cannot but misinterpret and misrepresent the nature of Islamic 
fundamentalism in the attempt to understand it. This is because rational actor assumptions and 
the rationalist worldview of which they are an expression construct the meaning of Islamic 
fundamentalism in ways that occlude fundamentalists' own conceptions of human nature and 
action.
31
 
Beyond this paucity of critical engagements with the key concepts and approaches in 
mainstream analysis of Iran’s nuclear programme, we also find that there are equally few 
rigorous and coherent positivist models explaining the pertinence of religious law within a 
theocracy with regards to its strategic preferences. In short, there is no equivalent of Graham 
Allison’s Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1971) or Kenneth 
Lieberthal’s and Michel Oksenberg’s Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and 
Processes (1988), in attempts at delineating the interaction between various centres of 
religious power in Iran and strategic preference making regarding nuclear weapons. This lack 
of empirical literature or analysis persist in spite of a widespread assumption that nuclear 
weapons proliferation is best understood and mapped through the lens of positivism, and a 
focus on “variables and stark causal mechanisms”.32 This void can partially be accounted for 
due to the informality of Iran’s power-structures,33 the lack of data available in English and 
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even Farsi, and reluctance of many religious scholars to disclose details of their political 
activities (especially concerning the nuclear issue). Most important perhaps is the difficulty in 
quantifying religious belief in strategic preferences.  
Given this context, qualitative analysis – particularly in the form of critical theory – is 
perhaps best equipped in providing insights into the origin and movement of strategic 
preferences are derived from.
34
 Such studies provide a much sounder basis for tracing the 
potential ways in which ideology, religion and culture coalesce as contributing factors 
defining the Islamic Republic of Iran’s strategic preferences. In contrast, in the discussion of 
Iran’s nuclear programme, the preference for more positivist studies can impede the observer 
of Iranian policy-making from properly grasping potential ideational roots of Iran’s strategic 
preferences, as well as our ability to assess more clearly – beyond orientalist or realist 
ontologies – the role that religion and religious structures of authority can play in determining 
where its nuclear programme will go in the future.  
The inadequacy of these literatures on Iran – as we will see – are nevertheless an opportunity 
to construct a more specialised study of the ideational roots of the Islamic Republic’s 
strategic preferences. This demands that we begin pursuing what Ursula Jasper identifies as 
“alternative models of reasoning and knowledge generation, which complement and enrich 
existing approaches and which enhance our thinking about wider “causes” of nuclear 
proliferation”.35 For Jasper, it is vital that we  
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open the “black box of the state” and try to examine how its identity, role, culture, threat 
perception and so on emerge through an intersubjective, linguistically mediated and 
fundamentally political process of “meaning-making.36 
In the context of reading clerical views related to nuclear weapons, we – as analysts – must 
likewise consider these views on their own terms rather than as an outcome of processes 
taking place at the level of the international system, and reflect critically upon our quickness 
to turn to orientalist caricatures of ‘Islamic’ strategic agency when confronted with religious 
ontologies. The notion that strategic choices rooted in mysticism and an Islamic legal 
framework can nevertheless produce outcomes that are conducive to international security 
and non-proliferation, and are de-escalatory, should begin to be taken seriously in debates 
concerning Iran’s nuclear programme. 
Thesis Rationale and Methodology 
As Martin Hollis and Steve Smith recognise succinctly, “epistemology matters because 
ontological disputes are not always decidable by direct appeal to how the world is […] each 
party needs to give reasons for believing its case”.37 The epistemic boundaries within which 
we situate and ultimately read data – technical or otherwise – are likewise enormously 
important, but too frequently ignored. Discussions cannot continue to rely on the assumption 
that quantifiable data (such as its number of enrichment facilities, centrifuges, and levels of 
enrichment) are a sufficient metric of Iranian intentions, or that our own normative biases do 
not influence how this information is read. As will become clear in this thesis, the Iranian 
‘nuclear crisis’ is a profoundly discursive enterprise, and the dominant discourse often 
reflects our quickness to presume certain things about the origin of strategic preferences in 
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the Islamic Republic. The perceived importance of clerics in Iranian policy-making can be 
read as a force leading Iran towards what the prominent neoconservative Michael Ledeen 
characterises as “the Ayatollahs’ bomb”,38 or an important ally ensuring that Iran – in 
accordance with ethical and religious considerations – does not acquire a nuclear weapon. 
How we choose to bring the variable of religion into the nuclear debate is therefore a crucial 
part of any formal or informal threat assessment. 
This thesis presents an alternative framework for conceptualising strategic preferences 
concerning nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction inside the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, based on a genealogical reading of Islamic laws of war and a closer reading of Islamic 
political theology. It will address one overarching question: what are the implications for the 
trajectory of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear programme if religious discourse and 
religious scholars are assumed to have some impact on its strategic preferences? In 
answering, I consider sources beyond realpolitik which could influence contemporary 
Islamic-scholarly positions in the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the country’s nuclear 
programme, and ultimately shape its strategic preferences. These sources form the basis of a 
non-secular analytical framework for understanding potential religious roots of Iran’s 
strategic preferences today; beyond the parameters of Eurocentric thinking that currently 
discipline the discussion of where Iran’s nuclear programme is headed. The analytical 
framework consists of three levels of analysis: Qur’anic ontology, secondary sources 
(specifically ahadith), and theology. The framework is aimed at encouraging a greater critical 
awareness of the need to divorce any assessment we now make of Iran’s nuclear programme 
from the kinds of normative assumptions that have in the past influenced our reading how 
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culture and religion impact strategic preferences, particularly in the context of nuclear 
proliferation. Here the idea is to trace – as Michel Foucault puts it –   
the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality [...] not in order to trace the 
gradual curve of their evolution, but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in 
different roles.
39
 
In the spirit of understanding this ‘singularity of events’, this thesis will contextualise 
contemporary views on nuclear weapons and other WMD within the flux of Islamic legal 
discourses of warfare in response to pragmatic or expedient considerations of security – long 
assumed in various literatures concerning Iran to be static – but also provide a basis for 
understanding how and why these laws retain their authoritative status. The more critical 
genealogy of clerical views on nuclear weapons and other WMD emerging from this 
framework underpins an argument that we should read today’s nuclear weapon and WMD 
fatawa as dynamic political texts, rooted in potent narratives which construct the Islamic 
Republic of Iran as a vanguard defending the transnational Islamic community’s (ummah) 
security. The focus challenges essentialist accounts of Islamic law, and how Islamic law can 
impact Iran’s strategic preferences.  
Techniques of discourse analysis and genealogy reveal that Islamic scholars conceptualise 
pragmatism and expediency in strategic affairs in light of practical needs of governance 
within their own unique epistemic parameters. These parameters, rather than any pre-
determined Islamic dogmas related to weapons capable of mass destruction, determine the 
Islamic framework and narrative for their views on nuclear weapons. If we choose to believe 
that religion and religious actors are capable of affecting its nuclear policies (which much of 
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the literature, to varying degrees, does), these parameters of legal interpretation need to be 
considered in greater detail – and on their own terms – when theorising the conception, 
temporality and movement of Iran’s strategic preferences today. We cannot simply read 
Islamic sources in isolation from the time and place they are conceived. Therefore, if we are 
to analyse the positions of Islamic scholars on nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction today, we must begin to understand temporality and flux of Islamic military 
jurisprudence itself and the foundations of ‘Shi’i realism’.40 While nuclear weapons 
possession and use within the Twelver Shi’i Islamic legal tradition and political theology 
therefore serves as the central focus of this thesis, it has wider implications for how we 
characterise the agency of religious actors in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
My conclusion is that political and military pragmatism and expediency can have their roots 
in an Islamic belief-system and Shi’i theology, and that this reveals a notion of ‘modernity’ 
and ‘rationality’ in strategic affairs distinct from those found in the West, but not for the 
reasons assumed in orientalist accounts. 
Hypothesis & Normative Framework 
At the outset, it is necessary to outline my own hypothesis and normative claims. This thesis 
is not based on the assumption that Iran’s decision-making and policies towards tactical and 
strategic doctrines of war are entirely derived from a monolithic and homogenous set of 
beliefs and practises known as ‘Islam’. I therefore do not intend to establish or prove a linear 
line of causality from the use of Islamic traditions or reasoning by Iran’s ulama to policy 
outcomes related to Iran’s nuclear programme. Nor is it my intention to test the hypothesis 
that Iranian nuclear policies are directly impacted by clerical opinion using methods of 
quantitative analysis. Islamic legal sources cannot be said to linearly impact nuclear policy in 
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modern Iran, and I do not utilise any positivist methodologies in an attempt to prove or 
disprove the ‘Islamicness’ of Iran’s foreign and security policy-making. As will become clear 
in the course of this thesis, the flexibility of Islamic law renders the task of discerning 
absolutely whether or not the production, possession or use of nuclear weapons is ‘haram’ 
nearly impossible. Rather, I provide a study for those concerned with understanding the 
‘specificity’ of strategic preferences in the Islamic Republic from the perspective of religion, 
the moment at which they can move or change, and the conditions (both external and internal 
to Islam) which can potentially prompt this change. By the end of the study the reader should 
have a firmer grasp of the transience of laws and discourses within Islam concerning weapons 
capable of mass destruction (and nuclear weapons in particular), as well as the ontological 
currency these laws and discourses might have in the Islamic Republic of Iran today. In sum, 
I endeavour to demonstrate to the reader that a distinctive mode of reasoning is deployed in 
Iranian public life, and consequently that debates on the future of Iran’s nuclear programme 
occur either in part or in whole within an Islamic epistemological public sphere. 
My hypothesis is that as Islamic law adapts to the specific conditions of a particular time and 
place, it will naturally contain few absolute positions towards weapons of war or revolutions 
in military technology. Yet this does not render monolithic constructions of ‘Islam’ as a 
framework for military strategy irrelevant. On the contrary, analysts must also consider the 
prospect of the Islamic Republic’s own policies and strategic preferences concerning nuclear 
weapons being equally malleable – dependent on context, and therefore subject to change – 
but that this can be attributed as much to the epistemological boundaries of Islamic theology 
and law as to the ontology of secular realpolitik. To be clear, while I accept that realism and 
neorealism might be of use as paradigms – today, or in the future – for viewing certain 
outcomes related to Iran’s nuclear programme, my claim is that seemingly ‘realist’ policy 
outcomes could nevertheless be arrived at through utilising Islamic reasoning. I therefore do 
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not intend to critique the predictive accuracy of realism/neorealism concerning the future of 
Iran’s nuclear programme. My contribution to the debate over Iran’s nuclear programme is 
instead a more thorough study of strategic thinking (rather than strategic outcomes) in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. In this regard, I concur with Amr Sabet that “[b]eliefs and ideas 
play an important role, tangible though sometimes less visible, in the ordering organization, 
and interpretation of “data,” beyond the mere justifications of pure interest”.41 I consciously 
adopt this approach in both assessing the limits of existing nuclear strategy, theory and 
discourse, as well as establishing the roots of Islamic normative approaches to weapons of 
warfare and jihad. Given the eagerness of many academic and non-academic experts to 
reference Shi’ism, Islam or Iranian culture in assessing the Islamic Republic’s nuclear 
options, my contribution is a more rigorous (and critical) investigation of the potential 
normative sources of strategic preferences in Iran rooted in Islam.  
The critique in this thesis shares some of the concerns of post-colonial theory – namely, its 
agenda for identifying and critiquing Eurocentrism in IR,
42
 and ultimately the aim of 
dislodging Europe or the United States as definitive reference points for understanding (and 
universalising) policy processes in the ‘Global South’.43 At the point of constructing and 
employing an analytical framework for assessing views on nuclear weapons today, the 
approach in this thesis diverges somewhat from a post-colonial approach through it being 
inspired by a recent attempt in the field of Islamic Studies
44
 to draw attention to the 
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confluence of the secular and religious in knowledge production within nonetheless ‘Islamic’ 
epistemic parameters. Shahab Ahmed’s critique of Hamid Dabashi’s exclusivist definition of 
what is precisely ‘Islamic’ is of note as an allusion to what is meant by this: 
[Dabashi] takes the position that the term “Islamic” is disqualified from qualifying any 
universal, because to qualify a universal by the term “Islamic” is to obliterate its universality. 
It is hard to grasp this last point: do we lose the universality of the term “intellectual” by 
qualifying it as “Marxist intellectual” […]? If these are meaningful qualifiers, (why) is 
“Islamic” not?  
In the context of the present thesis, it is warranted to explore how Islam has governed 
strategic thinking and military affairs for Muslim societies across the centuries as a 
hermeneutical framework rather than as a strict plan of action – inspiring leaders from the 
Prophet and the four Caliphs, through the Twelve Imams, up to Khamenei today. As such, 
essentialist paradigms for the impact of Islam upon strategy and military postures – such as 
orientalism or realism – are blind to how Islamic legal discourses distinctly emerge and 
change, and how these processes are conceptualised and normalised by Muslims themselves. 
In line with Foucault’s observation that with the consolidation of any episteme, “there are a 
good many partial groups, regional compatibilities, and coherent architectures that might 
have emerged, yet did not”,45 I attempt to politically trace some of the views regarding 
nuclear weapons today in order to highlight a range of other views which could have 
emerged, but have not yet done so. When these views are put into the context of foundational 
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views – whether found in Qur’anic ontology, ahadith, or theology – concerning weapons 
capable of mass destruction found within Islam, it appears that what today appear to be 
hegemonic interpretations evolved nonlinearly. Earlier views appear to be sometimes 
contradicted by more modern readings of Qur’an and sunnah. Yet these modern views 
reinforce an authoritative source of ‘military jurisprudence’ and strategic preference-making 
in what are disciplined by Muslims as the epistemic boundaries of Islam. Despite 
contemporary focus on veracity of legal proclamations and the temporal nature of a fatwa, 
these boundaries remain salient for politicians and clergy alike in the Islamic Republic, and 
therefore must be taken on their own terms. Our task is therefore to “[d]etermine the possible 
points of diffraction of discourse”,46 namely, through analysing the political and social 
conditions within which certain forms of military jurisprudence related to mass destruction 
became hegemonic, and came to endure – to varying degrees – as if they were dogmatic 
‘Truth’.  
A number of concepts and terms that are presented in this thesis are also worth defining and 
qualifying at this stage. The first is ‘strategic preferences’, which can be defined as the policy 
decisions designed around particular strategic objectives, as well as the epistemological 
framework within which these choices are legitimised, and the ontological concepts that are 
drawn upon in order to cement this legitimacy. My focus on the more neutral concept of 
strategic preference differs from the notion of ‘strategic culture’ – defined by Jack Snyder in 
1977 as “the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual 
behaviour that members of a strategic community have acquired through instruction or 
imitation”47 – which has come to reify and essentialise certain strategic courses on the basis 
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of outward cultural or religious characteristics that are portrayed in ahistorical terms.
48
 For 
the purposes of this thesis, analysis focuses on the processes within which certain strategic 
preferences are conceived and legitimised, rather than an explicit normative claim that these 
strategic preferences objectively reflect “early or formative experiences of the state, and are 
influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural, and cognitive 
characteristics of the state and its elites”49 – a research agenda which we will see is executed 
poorly in orientalist analyses of Iran’s nuclear programme (see Chapter Two). 
The second is the ‘state of exception’. This study accepts Giorgio Agamben’s definition – 
and theorisation – of the state of exception as any “attempt to include the exception itself 
within the juridical order by creating a zone of indistinction in which fact and law 
coincide.”50 For Agamben, a state of exception is unique in that it creates a space for 
seemingly unlawful action within the parameters of a legal framework: a constitution, for 
instance, or for our purpose the Qur’an and other sources of Islamic law. 
Finally, the category of WMD is used distinctly from the category of ‘weapons capable of 
mass destruction’ in order to convey a difference between weapons technologies encountered 
within military jurisprudence, and the more modern forms of chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear weapons technologies. 
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Primary Research and Fieldwork 
Between 1
st
 and 30
th
 December 2013, I embarked an initial period of fieldwork in Qom and 
Tehran. The Joint Plan of Action between Iran and the P5+1 was signed on 24 November 
2013, a few days prior to my arrival in Tehran. Prior to travelling to Iran, and in particular 
Qom, I had secured permission from a senior religious scholar and principal (possessing the 
‘rank’ of Ayatollah) – himself closely affiliated with the Supreme Leader, and the son of a 
prominent 20
th
 century marja al-taqlid – to conduct my research at one of the Holy City’s 
universities. Though it was made explicit to all parties that I would be conducting research in 
an individual capacity as a doctoral researcher from the School of Oriental and African 
Studies (SOAS) in 2013, my occupation as a research assistant at the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs (Chatham House) presented immediate problems upon my arrival in 
Qom. A few months prior to my arrival, news stories published by the Iranian state-owned 
Press TV – one of which mentioning my primary supervisor by name –had also alleged a link 
between SOAS and British security agencies.
51
  The timing of my arrival also posed 
problems, given the securitised atmosphere in Iran following a sequence of losses by the state 
security apparatus: the unexpected election of Rouhani in summer of that year, the first 
bilateral talks between Iran and the United States in September, and the conclusion of an 
interim nuclear deal which would result in the suspension of uranium enrichment. As another 
cleric in Qom admitted to me at the time, “doing this research at this time in Iran, I feel sorry 
for you”.52 Despite my own efforts to stress that I was present in an independent capacity, and 
not conducting research on behalf of Chatham House, I was instructed by my interlocutor in 
Qom that if I wished to continue my research on this sensitive subject, I would have to 
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consent to an interview with the Ministry of Intelligence. Based on my risk level – namely, 
my presence in Iran on an Iranian passport, dual British-Iranian nationality and heritage, 
difficulties in communicating with potential interrogators, and my affiliation with both SOAS 
and Chatham House – I declined to the interview with the Ministry of Intelligence and opted 
to continue my research in Tehran. 
In Tehran I secured a number of interviews with academics and policy-makers. Most that I 
spoke with in Tehran remained coy on the nuclear issue however, and discussions often 
focused on theoretical aspects of pragmatism in the Islamic Republic, or the symbolic stature 
of Iran’s nuclear programme, rather than on the technical dimensions of clerical opinion. 
Among the insights that I gained while in Tehran was that academics and policy-makers were 
less keen on talking about ‘security’ as an abstract concept than they were on ‘defence’, taken 
to imply objective definitions of Iranian interests and policy-formation (especially in the 
context of understanding the Supreme Leader’s views).  
Though my fieldwork in Iran did not yield the primary material I had first anticipated, the 
experience nevertheless transformed both the scope and nature of enquiry in the present 
thesis, providing insights which went on to shape my own assessment of religious discourse 
in Iran as it relates to nuclear policy. Even if I had obtained my desired interviews with 
religious scholars on nuclear weapons and Iran’s nuclear programme, emerging scholarship 
on the issue has highlighted the continued need for a more critical perspective on what these 
verdicts and views represent theologically and politically. Specifically, my assessment of 
religious discourse – both in how these views are interpreted by compilers like Steve Ditto, or 
policy analysts such as Mehdi Khalaji – was that a non-reductionist approach to Islamic law 
was necessary if we are to gain insights into the political currency of these views (beyond 
ethnocentric typologies), and speculate on the direction of Iranian policy-making in this area.   
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Primary research in this thesis focuses predominantly on the deconstruction of the two 
dominant ontologies for viewing the agency of religious scholars in the nuclear field – 
orientalism, and realism – within a broader critique of the epistemic parameters within which 
discourse is often situated (namely, a regime of truth I label the deterrence parameter). I then 
offer an alternative framework for viewing the views of religious scholars concerning nuclear 
weapons and other WMD based on three levels of analysis: Qur’anic ontology, secondary 
sources, and theology. Finally, I subject the collated views of religious scholars concerning 
nuclear weapons and other WMD to this framework in order to provide fresh insights into 
what these religious views mean, and what they can tell us about the trajectory of nuclear 
policy in Iran. 
Literatures Reviewed 
The literature critically engaged with in this thesis can be categorised into three forms: 
primary sources detailing the views of religious scholars concerning WMD or weapons 
capable of mass destruction (examined in Chapter One); literature detailing or exemplifying 
the paradigms of orientalism (examined in Chapter Two) and realism (examined in Chapter 
Three); and both primary sources of Islamic jurisprudence (e.g. the Qur’an, or ahadith) and 
secondary literature from the field of Islamic Studies in the construction of a non-secular 
framework for analysing Iran’s strategic preferences (see chapters Four and Five). Given that 
the central arguments of this thesis hinge on discourse analysis and techniques of 
deconstruction, the ‘literature review’ component of this study takes place over the course of 
its entirety (with perhaps the exception of Chapter Five). Nevertheless, in terms of outlining 
the gaps in and weaknesses of existing literatures which this thesis attempts to plug – or 
indeed the strengths of such literatures – the literature review component is most acutely 
evident in chapters Two and Three, which critique literatures drawn from the fields of IR, 
The Nuclear Policies of Iran: Islam and Strategic Thinking in the Islamic 
Republic 
32 
deterrence theory and Iranian Studies, as well as policy discourse (namely, in the forms of 
political punditry, journalism, state policies, and think-tank analysis). 
Thesis Objectives & Chapter Outline 
The primary objectives of this thesis (addressed in more or less sequential order) are: 
1. To introduce some of the contemporary views of Iran’s ulama concerning nuclear 
weapons and other WMD found in primary and secondary sources. 
2. To demonstrate and argue the need for an alternative framework for analysing the 
origin and trajectory of strategic preferences towards nuclear weapons in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, in light of a deconstruction of existing literatures,  and critical 
engagement with two dominant paradigms for viewing nuclear weapons. 
3. To identify and deconstruct some of the normative and historical sources for 
contemporary Muslim thinking on nuclear weapons and other weapons capable of 
mass destruction in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and determine the limits of how 
ethical and legal parameters of warfare contained in Islam are capable of constraining 
Iran’s strategic preferences related to nuclear weapons. 
4. To provide an alternative framework for analysing the Islamic Republic’s strategic 
preferences concerning nuclear weapons based on a closer examination of Islamic 
sources and Shi’i theologies of warfare (pre- and post- Iranian Revolution). This can 
become a basis for framing contemporary assessments of how Iran’s clerics might 
shape the country’s nuclear policies.  
5. To assess the contemporary views of Iran’s ulama concerning nuclear weapons using 
this analytical framework, and beyond the paradigms of orientalism and realism. 
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In Chapter One I briefly introduce the views of Iran’s ulama concerning nuclear weapons and 
other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and provide some context for the intellectual and 
social milieu within which these views came to emerge from.  
In Chapter Two and Chapter Three, I argue that the epistemic boundaries which discipline the 
study of nuclear weapons proliferation and deterrence according to Eurocentric definitions of 
actor rationality – which I refer to as the ‘deterrence parameter’ – generate a structural theory 
of nuclear proliferation which inevitably either relegates the Islamic Republic to being an 
alien and irrational theocracy, or a ‘like-unit’. Specifically, I make the case across these two 
chapters that situating Iran’s nuclear programme within pre-existing models of proliferation 
and nuclear strategy are inadequate. As will become clear, a high proportion of the evidence 
surveyed in these two chapters derives from policy discourse and commentary – 
predominantly in the form of editorials, op-eds and news articles. While these chapters do 
consider academic literatures on the topic, the focus on public discourse highlights more 
clearly the inadequacy of utilising existing paradigms for understanding Iran’s strategic 
preferences. In many instances encountered in academic literature, representations of Iran 
were more understated than they were assertive in the sense that they referred to pre-existing 
forms of knowledge about Iran and Muslims which owe as much to the internalisation of a 
long history of orientalism within Anglo-European-American social sciences, as they do the 
expression (and normalisation) of these ideas at the level of public discourse by influential 
journalists and think-tanks. It is this type of public expression which permits certain images 
of Iran and representations of the Islamic faith to be taken as self-evident in the course of 
more academic discussions of its nuclear programme (or nuclear proliferation more 
generally), and therefore unworthy of in-depth critique. 
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In Chapter Two specifically, I focus on the impact of orientalism on threat assessment in the 
context of Iranian strategic preferences and its nuclear programme. Here I demonstrate that 
threat assessments of Iran and its nuclear programme draw heavily from prevailing images of 
Iranian and Islamic irrationality. These images are conjured by experts and commentators in 
order to posit that Iran – by virtue of being an Islamic Republic – would not be deterred from 
either obtaining or using nuclear weapons.  
In Chapter Three, I focus on how the epistemological boundaries of the deterrence parameter 
and its resultant ontologies running counter to those of orientalism – such as  deterrence 
theory and realist nuclear strategic discourse concerning nuclear proliferation – engender a 
similarly unsatisfactory assessment that religion plays a negligible role in defining Iranian 
strategic preferences. It is in this realist account that religion is constructed more as the 
indigenous legitimation of otherwise universal strategic drivers of military policy. This 
chapter places the analysis in Chapter Two of existing literature on Iran’s nuclear programme 
and post-Revolutionary strategic and foreign policies choices within a much wider analysis of 
the discourses surrounding nuclear weapons use, deterrence and proliferation, as they are 
constituted within specific epistemic boundaries of Eurocentrism. I use Benoît Pelopidas’ 
critique of  ‘automaticity’ in what he labels the nuclear “proliferation paradigm”53  as a 
device for framing my own critique of how many theorists, analysts and policy-makers 
consider Iran’s nuclear strategies as an inevitable outcome of international systemic factors 
and realpolitik, and ultimately avoid engaging with the religious aspects of its strategic 
preferences on their own terms. This device also allows for me to highlight the types of views 
that are challenged by my critical reading of Islamic views on nuclear weapons and other 
WMD. These views, I will argue, can devalue the normative construction of nuclear weapons 
as being necessarily the most ‘modern’ of weapons available to states, and as a marker of 
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high civilisations. In line with Nick Ritchie’s definition of ‘devaluation’, these religious 
views can help “diminish the perceived positive effects of the possession and operation of 
nuclear weapons”.54  
Taken together, these two chapters highlight the inadequacy of the most prevalent approaches 
to understanding Iranian strategic preferences related to nuclear weapons. They offer few 
insights into the origins and direction of Iranian strategic thinking beyond ethnocentric 
polemics related to how best to situate the ‘other’ in the global nuclear order, and in 
particular, what Iran’s clerics might think about nuclear weapons. I argue in these chapters 
against situating Iran’s strategic preferences concerning nuclear weapons solely within 
traditional theories of nuclear weapons use, proliferation, and deterrence, or conventional 
discourse. Consequently, most accounts of Iran’s nuclear programme are unable to 
incorporate religion – and particularly Islam – outside of the variable of ‘irrationalism’.  
Given the inadequacy of the two dominant approaches at understanding Iranian strategic 
preferences, and given that the Qur’an and sunnah of the Prophet and Twelve Imams are 
obviously silent on whether nuclear weapons specifically are permissible or impermissible in 
Islam, Chapter Four provides an Islamic framework for analysing how military jurisprudence 
is formed and shaped. I introduce three levels of analysing Islamic views regarding weapons 
capable of mass destruction, both past and present: Qur’anic ontology, secondary sources, 
and theology. Some of the historical case studies examined here centre on incidents 
catalogued in Islamic scripture, ahadith or other secondary historical accounts which affirm 
when and where weapons capable of mass destruction were used, when and where they were 
not, and the verdicts concerning these weapons by the leading religious authorities of the 
time. The chapter offers a glimpse into how and why the Islamic legal parameters which 
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regulate the conduct of war change as a response to revolutions in military technology, or 
strategic imperatives. The chapter pays close attention to the Islamic laws which govern the 
use or non-use of weapons capable of mass destruction.  
I draw from these examples and Muslim sources in constructing an analytical framework for 
assessing the significance of contemporary Islamic views on nuclear weapons and other 
WMD in Iran, and ultimately how strategic preferences might look if Islam has an impact on 
the Islamic Republic of Iran’s policy-making process. This analytical framework will be put 
to use as I deconstruct Iranian views on nuclear weapons and other WMD in Chapter Five. 
This approach also briefly considers points of convergence between the ‘Islamic’ positions of 
clerics, and the views of a key Iranian cultural theorist whose views arguably also impact 
Islamic discourse on nuclear weapons in Iran (namely, Jalal Al-e Ahmad
55
), or at least have 
been consequently narrated as having an impact. By introducing the Sunni legal mechanism 
of maslahah in the 20
th
 century, Shi’i-Islamic scholars such as Khomeini allowed 
contemporary law-making in Shi’ism to take into account the ‘public interest’, massively 
altering the relationship between the ulama and the state.
56
 This accentuated the fatwa as a 
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political text in the Islamic Republic of Iran, contingent on an assessment of strategic 
benefit.
57
 It also introduced an explicit doctrine capable of governing pragmatism and 
expediency at times of war to a revolutionary Shi’i theology of ‘just rule’ and security in the 
age of the Occultation. If fatawa concerning matters of military jurisprudence are to be read 
as political texts today, the fatwa must itself be understood as an outcome of a constantly 
moving assessment by scholars of religious law in the shadow of governance and nationhood 
– a process dissected in an historical context in Chapter Five. For this reason, an analytical 
framework is of greater currency than a normative statement of what is or is not ‘Islamic’ 
military policy, particularly if we wish to understand Instead of narrowing our reading of 
these fatawa, we can use them to help us understand how clerics view international security 
and Iran’s own survival. 
I will argue in Chapter Five that contemporary views among Iran’s ulama challenge the 
essentialist (and ultimately orientalist) view of Islamic laws concerning weapons of mass 
destruction and warfare critiqued in Chapter Three. Both perspectives situated within the 
deterrence parameter – realism and orientalism – imply that there exist primordial sources for 
Islamic laws of warfare, and that these laws will subsequently be rigid and therefore 
unresponsive to changes in the international system. In orientalist accounts specifically, these 
imply that Islamic laws of war encourage expansionism or irrational martyrdom tactics in 
securing wholly other-worldly goals, and that violent conflict between Muslim and non-
Muslim societies is at the least to be expected, and at the most inevitable. This chapter 
therefore also provides an updated theological and political context for viewing contemporary 
legal opinions in Iran concerning weapons capable of mass destruction and nuclear weapons 
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beyond the trappings of orientalism. Finally, with regards to individual scholarly agency in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran on national and international security policy-making, I will place 
these arguments in the context of repeated failure of IR and policy commentary more broadly 
to adequately explain of the impact that Iran’s ulama could have in governing (and ultimately 
restraining) the country’s nuclear intentions, and suggest a new starting point for viewing 
religious influence on Iran’s strategic preferences. Verdicts on nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction should be read in order to understand Islamic parameters within 
which the proliferation, use or non-use of nuclear weapons by the Islamic Republic would be 
legitimised by the ulama. When reading the fatawa of religious scholars in Iran today using 
the Islamic framework developed in Chapter Four, five central themes emerge: 
1. Islamic first principles on nuclear weapons. 
2. Maslahah and the ‘state of exception’. 
3. Deference to the wali al-faqih. 
4. Analogical reasoning. 
5. Tactical and strategic modernity. 
I conclude this thesis with a summary of what the critical approach to understanding Islamic 
laws of warfare and weaponry can reveal about how Islamic law and Islamic ideology can 
potentially impact Islamic Republic of Iran’s policies towards nuclear weapons or other 
weapons of mass destruction. This conclusion section also offers highlights some of the 
contributions of this thesis to the study of Iranian strategic preferences, and recommendations 
for further research in the future. 
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Chapter One: Contemporary Islamic Views on Nuclear Weapons and 
WMD 
*** 
Let me assure you that the Iranian nation seeks to utilize nuclear technology in a peaceful way on the 
basis of its Eastern and Islamic integrity.
58
 
*** 
Introduction 
This brief chapter introduces the perspectives concerning nuclear weapons from among the 
Shi’i ulama. These views are mostly derived from the maraji (singular: marja al-taqlid): 
‘sources of emulation’ to whom the Shi’a look towards for guidance on religious issues. They 
are found in open sources such as official statements in English, Arabic and Farsi,
59
 books 
and articles. While for the most part these perspectives belong to clerics born or based in Iran, 
some views belong to clerics born or based outside the country (namely, from inside Iraq). 
Additionally, religious opinions concerning other WMD – chemical and biological weapons 
in particular – are also included given the proximity of these ethical dilemmas to those 
                                                          
58
 Ali Larijani, “Speech by Ali Larijani, Iran’s Secretary of National Security Council”, Journal of the European 
Society for Iranian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005, p. 131. 
59
 I am indebted to Steve Ditto for his article “”Go, Learn About Atoms": Iranian Religious Discourse on 
Nuclear Weapons, 1962-Present”, June 2013, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160515162421/https://selfscholar.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/irandiscourse5.pdf 
[Accessed 08.06.16], which includes English translations of a number of fatawa from Shi’i ulama concerning 
nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. To avoid duplicating Ditto’s efforts in translation, I have 
relied on these English translations provided by Ditto, but have also included citations of the original Arabic and 
Farsi sources where the original fatawa can be found. 
 
The Nuclear Policies of Iran: Islam and Strategic Thinking in the Islamic 
Republic 
40 
presented by nuclear weapons, albeit on a smaller scale (see more in the following section of 
this chapter).   
In the conclusion, I outline some common themes in contemporary Islamic views on nuclear 
weapons and other WMD. These common themes will be referred to in later chapters as I 
attempt to discern a counter-narrative of the impact that religious agency and discourse can 
have on Iran’s policies towards nuclear weapons. 
Nuclear Weapons as an Ethical and Religious Problem 
At this point it is necessary to briefly sketch the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. 
This will provide a basic point of reference for our analysis in subsequent chapters for how 
Islamic discourse – through appealing to certain ethical and humanitarian principles outlined 
in Islamic sources of law – can influence Iranian strategic preferences today concerning 
nuclear weapons. This section is also necessary in order to provide an account of what 
features of a nuclear explosion renders these weapons so problematic from an ethical or 
religious perspective.  
Out of the cumulative impacts that nuclear weapons cause, probably the most well-known in 
the public psyche – due in large part to depictions of nuclear weapons in popular culture60 – 
is the release of immense levels of radiation. Yet when breaking down the impact of a nuclear 
detonation, the effects of radiation only comprises approximately 15% of the immediate 
impact, in contrast to the blast itself (50%) and thermal radiation (35%).
61
 Moreover, the 
impact of radiation – while devastating – is more of a long-term impact than short to medium 
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term one. Given the scenario of a 5 megaton nuclear explosion in a major city, one expert 
projects the following more immediate damage: 
Within a thousandth of a second, conditions akin to the centre of the sun would be produced 
—100 million °C and 100 million atmospheres of pressure in a fireball, which would rapidly 
expand to 1.8 km across, releasing a massive burst of radiation, heat, light, and blast. […] 
Within a distance of 4.7 km in every direction, winds of 750 km/h and a blast wave over 140 
kPa would crush, collapse, or explode all buildings including those of steel and reinforced 
concrete and turn the debris into missiles with lethal velocity. Glass and steel would melt; 
concrete would explode. Wherever they were, all living things would die almost 
immediately—vapourised, crushed, charred, irradiated.62 
In sum, “[n]uclear weapons are very big, dirty, nasty weapons that go bang and make a lot of 
mess.”63  
Despite the evidence we now have from the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, decades 
of nuclear tests, and more recently the extensive research done as part of the humanitarian 
impacts of nuclear weapons initiative,
64
 exactly what distinguishes nuclear weapons from 
other weapons is still not fully understood in discourse, as evidenced by the now infamous 
‘WMD fatwa’ from Sheikh Nasir al-Fahd. In this fatwa, al-Fahd advocated that Muslims 
acquire nuclear weapons and other WMD with reference to a hadith where the Prophet is 
reported to have said that “God has enjoined benevolence on everything. If you kill, kill in a 
good manner. If you slaughter animals, slaughter in a good manner; let the slaughterer 
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sharpen his blade and put his victim at ease.”65  The rationale used in support of nuclear 
weapons expressed by al-Fahd was therefore that these weapons – by virtue of being the most 
powerful in existence – are more humane than other weapons due to the ease with which they 
can kill.  
Al-Fahd’s view of nuclear weapons can be considered as archaic; evidence of the extent to 
which these weapons have become mythologised since 1945, and how contemporary 
discourse about these weapons often does not reflect their actual characteristics. It is certainly 
accurate that nuclear weapons are unprecedented in the history of military technology in 
terms of the sheer scale of indiscriminate destruction they are capable of causing. One 
estimate has quantified the damage done by all explosives used in every war prior to the 
Second World War as being the equivalent of around 10 megatons (10 million tonnes of 
TNT). By comparison, the largest nuclear test ever conducted – Tsar Bomba – amounted to 
50 megatons: five times as much as all of the explosive force used in all previous wars prior 
to the Second World War.
66
  
At the same time however, these weapons represent an anomaly in the trajectory of 
revolutions in military technology: as weapons have become ‘smarter’, smaller, and more 
precise, nuclear weapons have remained based on outdated technology, cumbersome and 
imprecise. As one nuclear historian writes: 
[i]n the story of evolution, it wasn’t the biggest beasts that ended up ruling the earth. The 
brontosaurus and Tyrannosaurus rex were awe-inspiring creatures. But they proved no match 
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for changing circumstances and smaller, smarter, more adaptable species. Nuclear weapons 
are awe-inspiring weapons. But they seem equally unable to adapt.
67
 
Despite the problems inherent to conflating the massive destruction nuclear weapons are 
capable of causing with modernity, proponents of deterrence – including those surveyed in 
Chapter Three – would argue that Fahd’s characterisation of nuclear weapons is accurate. In 
both views furthermore, it is precisely because nuclear weapons are capable of such 
indiscriminate destruction that they derive their deterrent value. Many realists therefore 
dismiss the ethical and humanitarian critique of nuclear weapons as misguided. It is the 
deterring effect of nuclear weapons they argue, through the promise of mutually assured 
destruction, which provides for the most stable and peaceful balance in the international 
‘system’. States not in possession of nuclear weapons might choose to rely on nuclear 
weapon possessors for their security, but can only ensure their security independently through 
acquiring their own strategic nuclear weapons arsenals. Nuclear weapons, far from being 
unethical, are in this narrative of ‘nuclear necessity’68 one of the most vital tools in 
preventing not only nuclear but also conventional war.
69
  
Although nuclear weapons are unique in terms of the potential scale of their destruction, there 
are certain ethical and humanitarian parallels to be found in early discussions within Islam 
concerning the use of military technologies – some of which cutting edge at the time – that 
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can cause mass destruction. The legality and ethics of using incendiary weapons (naft); 
bio/chemical weapons (i.e. catapulting diseased animals or human corpses into enemy cities 
and garrisons, or poisoning wells); siege weaponry such as the trébuchet (manjaniq); and 
tactical or strategic doctrines of ‘retaliation in kind’; all present questions of an humanitarian 
nature stemming from the mass destruction they can create (see Chapter Four). What is to be 
done, for instance, if Muslims are unable to distinguish between combatants and non-
combatants when attempting to secure a strategic objective? Which ‘referent object’ or ‘state 
of exception’ could possibly be invoked to justify the mass casualties of dozens, hundreds or 
even thousands of individuals who may not be directly involved in an armed conflict?  
Quietism and the Birth of Iran’s Nuclear Programme 
One striking feature of the verdicts and views concerning nuclear weapons and other WMD is 
that they are all relatively recent (from the 1980s onwards). Before considering evidence of 
Islamic views of nuclear weapons and other WMD as evidenced emerging from the ulama 
and certain Iranian politicians, a few words regarding the relatively recent emergence of these 
views are warranted. 
There is not necessarily a direct correlation between the abrupt entry of the ulama into 
debates concerning nuclear weapons proliferation and the victory of the Revolution in 1979. 
Though the systematic engagement of Iran’s seminaries with political and strategic issues has 
become more pronounced recently, Iran’s ulama do have a history of exercising political 
influence when they have believed it to be necessary. Instances or issues which provoked 
Iran’s ulama to use their religious authority to achieve certain political goals have varied 
considerably. During the First Perso-Russian War (1804-13), Mirza Abbas Nuri had sent 
Hajji Mulla Baqir Salmasi and Sadr al-Din Muhammad Tabrizi across Iran in search of 
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fatawa which framed the war as religious duty,
70
 and collated these verdicts into a volume 
titled Risala-yi Jihadiyah (‘Instructions on Jihad’).71 What is of note about this episode is that 
while it highlights the co-option of religious authority by government as a way of lending 
secular legislation and policy a new dimension of legitimacy, it also points to a more complex 
relationship built upon mutual-interest. Algar notes that the war had already been going on 
for a long time before these declarations emerged,
72
 and that religious political agency 
through Islamic law-making might have had less to do with ‘dire necessity’ and more to do 
with intra-dynastic rivalries:  
[i]t appears possible that now with the declaration of jihad, ‘Abbas Mirza sought to turn the 
weapons of religious pressure against his brothers […] [b]y the proclamation of jihad, he may 
have hoped to force his brothers into action, leaving them the choice of openly neglecting 
their religious duties or abandoning their intrigues against him. The ulama for their part could 
have had little objection of jihad against an aggressive infidel power.
73
 
Without implying a linear trajectory of political agency among Iran’s ulama (i.e. from 
quietism to politicisation), a healthy academic literature documenting the existence and 
nature of the clergy’s political activism does exist in the context of a number of important 
historical changes in Iran, such as the Tobacco Protests (1891-92)
74
 and the Constitutional 
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Revolution (1905-11).
75
 Other more historiographical accounts have depicted the role of 
individual clerics in the rise and fall of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh.
76
  
Nuclear technology took on an explicit strategic-military dimension with the bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States in 1945, and provoked immediate ethical and 
humanitarian concerns which demanding religious guidance across different faiths. In the 
United Kingdom for example, the Archbishop of Canterbury was “inundated” with 
communications which urged the Church of England to disassociate itself with these 
bombings.
77
 What we find in the case of Iran’s seminaries is that in spite of a record of 
political activism (and often outspoken opposition), the advent of nuclear technology itself 
(whether in the harnessing of atomic energy for either civilian or military purposes) coincided 
with what was a prolonged era of political quietism which showed little sign of abating.   
Only upon the arrival of Ayatollah Abdolkarim Haeri Yazdi’s to Qom in 1921 did its 
seminaries begin a radical overhaul and experience substantial growth, with some considering 
his arrival as the beginning of the foundation of the ‘modern hawza’ there.78 Many aspiring 
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mujtahidin began to make the choice of studying in Qom rather than Najaf in order to 
complete their higher religious education; among the most prominent being Khomeini, 
Mohammad Reza Golpayegani (later a candidate to succeed Khomeini as Supreme Leader), 
Mohammad Ali Araki, and Abolhasan Rafi’i Qazwini.79  
There is scant recorded evidence that nuclear technology was subject to any in-depth legal or 
ethical debate in the seminaries of Qom in the first decades at least. Given the infancy of the 
hawza in Qom at the time that nuclear technology first emerged, this lack of scholarly 
opinion on the issue is unsurprising. We can however contrast the particular disinterest 
among the ulama towards issues related to nuclear technology with the proactive political 
stance some clerics – such as Ayatollah Kashani – took on oil nationalisation in the early 
1950’s. 80 Future Prime-Minister Mohammad Mossadegh would read out a statement from the 
Ayatollah in June of 1950, declaring that Iranians were to do with their oil supply and 
revenues “as they saw fit”.81  
The silence of Islamic law and discourse concerning nuclear technology early on points to the 
reactive and responsive – as opposed to proactive – nature of ijtihad as a process for 
formulating new Islamic laws. Islamic scholars would engage with the nuclear issue only as 
Iran’s own circumstances changed enough for such questions to be of practical significance 
for the nation, and for the clergy. The early status of nuclear technology as the monopoly of 
the world’s most economically developed states, not to mention the decrepitude of Iran’s 
industrial capacity and scientific research sector at the time, did not permit a natural 
environment within which questions regarding the ethical and religious dimensions of 
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potential Iranian nuclear proliferation were deemed worthy of discussion. As Mohammad 
Gholi Majd highlights in his study of Iran prior to 1945, despite the country’s massive oil 
wealth, the policies of Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah – in addition to a recent history 
of economic exploitation by the United Kingdom and Russia in particular – prevented an 
industrial economy from emerging in that period.
82
 Even recently as Shi’i fatawa have come 
to address emergent areas of science and technology, such as stem cell research
83
 or in vitro 
fertilisation treatment (IVF),
84
 verdicts have generally appeared once there has been a 
diffusion of these technologies to the Muslim world. In both these instances, interaction at the 
level of society using Islamic discourses on kinship and bioethics with these issues these 
issues was something quite different to the legal debate that later addressed both stem cell 
research and IVF. Again, this highlights the formulation of Islamic law as a reactive and 
adaptive process rather than as a pre-emptive one.  In a similar regard, it is understandable 
that Muslim scholars would only produce rulings for Islamic practises in space (i.e. 
instructions for identifying the direction of prayer, etc.) with the advent of Muslim astronauts 
and the space programmes of majority Muslim nations, rather than with the first emergence 
of space technology.
85
 
Even if Qom had been a fully-fledged hawza on equal footing with Najaf by the time that 
nuclear weapons technology was violently unveiled to the world, there are intellectual and 
pedagogical reasons for why it would have still been unlikely that Iran’s ulama would have 
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had much to say at the time concerning the issue. Both the peaceful and military use of 
nuclear technology did leave an impression on many of those that would later go on to lead 
and form the intellectual basis of resistance to the Shah’s regime in 1979. At the time of 1945 
however - whether through their own volition or due to the pressures of the hawza - most 
clerics pursued their research and teaching through the narrow lens of legalism, divorced 
from philosophical and certainly political inquiry. A year after the bombing of in Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, Ayatollah Hossein Tabatabaei Borujerdi took over the ‘leadership’ of the 
hawza in Qom. With Borujerdi’s ascendancy, “the leadership […] of the Shi’a devolved 
entirely on him”, and crucially, to a single religious figure for the first time since the lesser 
occultation.
86
 While this cemented Qom’s proximity at the heart of Shi’i learning and 
jurisprudence, it would be many decades until scholars would give opinions on some of the 
rapid economic and political changes that were underway in Iran. The intellectual 
environment in Qom would remain rigidly conservative, with students forbidden even from 
reading Rumi’s Mathnawi: a book of mystical poetry “which had to be removed with pincers 
from the homes of pious Muslims”.87 One particular anecdote told by Khomeini stands out in 
revealing some of the attitudes towards those studying subjects other than the traditional 
fields of fiqh at the seminaries while he had taught in Qom:   
[l]earning a foreign language was seen as blasphemous; and philosophy and gnosticism were 
considered sinful and polytheistic. In Faydiyyah Madrasa my infant son, the late Mustafa, 
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drank water from a jug; they then washed the jug. This they did because I taught 
philosophy!
88
 
Both the atomic age and the ascension of Borujerdi as marja al-taqlid coincided with 
Mohammad Reza Shah’s efforts to transform the country – through coercion when necessary 
– into a modern state through economic and industrial restructuring built upon closer 
relations with the United States in particular. In 1957, Iran’s government under the Shah 
signed an agreement that would pave the way for Iran’s peaceful use of nuclear energy, and 
set an important marker in the minds of Muslim scholars who would later associate the entire 
programme with the Shah’s regime.89 This agreement “[m]ade possible by the general 
alignment between Tehran’s and Washington’s economic and political interests, and the spirit 
of the American Atoms for Peace initiative, laid the foundations for a nuclear Iran”.90 
Nevertheless, while the United States would support the construction of enrichment facilities 
in Iran, it remained cautious over the prospect that Iran could eventually develop its own 
capacity for reprocessing – a necessary step towards producing weapons-grade plutonium. 
While it bore this particular concern, Seyed Hossein Mousavian argues that the potential 
military dimension (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear programme at this time was not seriously 
confronted by the US.
91
 The agreement led to the US supplying Iran with a research reactor, 
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fuelled by highly enriched uranium, in 1967.
92
 In 1973, the Atomic Energy Organization of 
Iran (AEOI) was created, and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi announced plans for Iran to be able 
to produce 23,000 MW of nuclear power by the year 2000.
93
  In the year that followed, the 
Stanford Research Institute (SRI) published a study which recommended that Iran build 
nuclear reactors capable of 20,000 MWe before 1994, and the Shah upped his goal to 
generate 23,000 MW “as soon as possible”, and by the SRI’s recommended date.94  
Despite the 1960s and 70’s being a being a period of protracted nuclear planning and 
industrial reorientation (the Shah is believed to have wanted to diversify Iran’s energy 
sources),
95
 the clergy still remained all but silent on the issue, despite having commented on 
other areas of the Shah’s policies in this area.96 This silence would remain even by 1974, as 
Pahlavi said – and subsequently denied saying – that Iran would obtain nuclear weapons 
“without a doubt, and sooner than one would think”.97  
Following the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79, Iran introduced a Constitution that outlined in 
broad terms that defence and security policy be based around religious principles. Article 4 
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states that military laws and regulations be “based on Islamic criteria”,98 and Article 3 states 
one of the goals of the Islamic Republic as being to secure self-sufficiency in the military 
domain.
99
 Furthermore, it outlines a specific body – the Supreme Council for National 
Security (SCNS) – tasked with “determining the defence and national security policies within 
the framework of general policies determined by the [Islamic] leadership”.100 In principle, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran would have to at least entertain issues of strategic policy in the areas 
of defence and security from an Islamic perspective. 
Today, in contrast to the clerical quietism concerning nuclear weapons and other political or 
strategic issues at the onset of the atomic age, clerics in Iran show keen interest in the 
direction of the country’s nuclear programme, and there is evidence that they are well-briefed 
on the issue as a result. Familiar ties between religious scholars and prominent politicians 
allows for a unique dynamic of interaction between the hawza and policy-making, including 
that related to national security. In one prominent example, Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli is the 
uncle of Ali Larijani, former secretary of the SNSC, and present Chair of the Majlis; Sadegh 
Larijani, Iran’s Chief Justice; and Mohammad Javad Larijani, Head of Iran’s Human Rights 
Council. Both Ali and Sadegh Larijani are furthermore married to the daughters of two 
prominent clerical families (Ali is the son-in-law of the late Mortaza Mutahhari, while 
Sadegh is the son-in-law of Ayatollah Khorasani).
101
 So embedded are this family within both 
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policy and Iran’s religious institutions that they have been described by Flynt and Hillary 
Mann Leverett as the country’s “revolutionary aristocracy”.102 
Meetings between senior religious scholars, diplomats and foreign representatives are 
common in Iran. In 2013, following the signing of an interim nuclear deal between Iran and 
the P5+1, Germany’s Ambassador to Tehran Michael Freiherr von Ungern-Sternberg met 
with Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi in Qom, and both spoke about the nuclear issue.
103
 The 
frequency of meetings such as this is significant, even though it is unlikely that – based upon 
what has been reported of that meeting in the public domain – Ayatollah Shirazi gave 
anything but an orthodox defence of Iran’s programme as peaceful, or a general declaration 
of nuclear weapons as being haram.
104
 Meetings and consultations on political matters also 
occur habitually between the ulama and Iran’s political establishment. After Rafsanjani’s bid 
to run for President in 2013 was turned down by the Guardian Council, he immediately 
travelled to Qom in order to meet with senior ulama.
105
 Immediately following an interim 
nuclear deal was signed in November 2013, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif visited 
Qom and met with Shirazi, Lotfollah Safi Golpayegani, and Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli. 
Crucially, Zarif opted – according to the Iran-based Tasnim News Agency – to also meet with 
Ayatollah Vahid Khorasani and Seyed Javad Shahrestani: the latter being Ayatollah Sistani’s 
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representative in Iran, and the former the most prominent cleric in Iran not associated with 
Khamenei’s inner circle.106 In April 2014, Ali Larijani met with Ayatollah Abdolkarim 
Mousavi-Ardebili to discuss the nuclear negotiations with the senior cleric,
107
 and also 
briefed Golpayegani about developments.
108
 Khorasani’s statement that Saudi Arabia and 
Israel were the main obstacles which prevented Iran and the ‘Permanent Five’ members of 
the UN Security Council (USA, UK, France, China and Russia) and Germany (the so-called 
P5+1, or EU 3+3) from reaching a comprehensive nuclear deal in November 2014 can be 
interpreted as indication that he enjoys a close engagement with Iran’s nuclear negotiation 
team than his reputation as a ‘quietist’ scholar would suggest.109 The tone of Amoli’s remarks 
during his meeting with Zarif also reveals insights into the role of religious scholars as vetters 
and legitimisers of strategic policy in the Islamic Republic today.  
Having established this context, we may now proceed to consider views of the ulama 
concerning nuclear weapons and other WMD.  
Clerical Views 
The views of Iran’s current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, denote an 
unambiguous opposition to nuclear weapons possession, proliferation, and use under any 
circumstance. Although there has been recent controversy concerning the seeming absence of 
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a codified fatwa for public consumption,
110
 Khamenei has stated his religious opinion 
concerning nuclear weapons on numerous occasions with thousands of witnesses. Contrary to 
popular belief, this itself constitutes a fatwa and possesses even greater validity than a written 
document due to the number of authenticating witnesses.
111
 For chronological purposes, 
Khamenei’s fatwa has been dated by one witness – and member of the Guardian Council – 
Mohsen Esmaeili back to 1990.
112
  
In 2005, Iran issued an official statement at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting that 
included communication of Khamenei’s fatwa prohibiting the production, stockpiling, or use 
of nuclear weapons, pledging that Iran would “never” pursue them.113 Khamenei has 
expanded on his views in the following statement, published on his official website: 
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We are not after nuclear weapons. And this is not because they are telling us not to pursue 
these things. Rather, we do not want these things for the sake of ourselves and our religion 
and because reason is telling us not to do so. Both shar'i and aqli [related to logic and reason] 
fatwas dictate that we do not pursue them. Our aqli fatwa is that we do not need a nuclear 
weapon either in the present time or in the future. A nuclear weapon is a source of trouble for 
a country like ours
114
 
An even more detailed account of the logic behind Khamenei’s views, provided by Esmaeili, 
proceeds as follows: 
When he (Khamenei) arrived at the topic of jihad (religious scholars research the 
characteristics of jihad, its meritorious actions, and forbidden actions in jihad), he talked 
about the issue of “deploying poison” (ilqaa samm) in 20 of the lands of the polytheists 
(mushrikeen), and this is a well known [sic] issue. In the same year, 1369 (1990), His 
Eminence declared his position on nuclear weapons, and deploying poison in Muslim lands. 
Based on the compelling jurisprudential (fiqh) evidence, His Eminence believed that to take 
advantage of destructive and deadly chemical and nuclear weapons, had problems/doubts 
(eshkal) […] We now observe that after twenty years, the Supreme Leader has returned to the 
topic, and repeatedly emphasized that there are problems (moshkel) both jurisprudentially and 
religiously, regarding the ruling of nuclear weapons. The importance here is his consistency 
in decision making.
115
 
If we are to have confidence in Esmaeili’s account, Khamenei’s fatwa possesses a number of 
striking characteristics which should be noted. First, Khamenei both recognises the strategic 
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benefit of using nuclear weapons, but also that there were ‘doubts’ concerning the Islamic 
legitimacy of using these weapons regardless of how they may serve strategic interests. 
Second, his citation of the example of the Prophet having forbade the deployment of poisons 
in the territory of non-Muslims points to some elements of ‘analogical reasoning’ (qiyas) – at 
least in principle, if not as an explicit legal concept – in Khamenei’s own juridical position on 
nuclear weapons. The implications of this will be examined more thoroughly in Chapter 
Four. According to another of Khamenei’s verdicts, he indicates that he does not condone the 
killing of civilians even in the defence of ‘Islam’: 
shedding the blood of a person whose life is inviolate is forbidden, and contravenes the laws 
of the genuine Islam of Muhammad. Thus it does not make sense to say that the preservation 
of the genuine Muhammadan Islam could ever depend on the killing of an innocent person.
116
 
It is worth noting that from the evidence surveyed in this thesis, few religious scholars inside 
Iran have chosen to explicitly challenge Khamenei’s fatwa in public.117  
The distinction made by a separate scholar between two Qur’anic concepts of war – jihad and 
hirabah – is also worthy of some attention. The second of these concepts refers, according to 
Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Taskhiri – a close advisor of Khamenei118 – to “the use of 
weapons, on land or sea, by day or night, to intimidate people, in a city or elsewhere, by a 
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male or female, strong or weak.”119 The term hirabah derives from the Arabic root h-r-b, 
which refers to the act of becoming enraged. As we will observe in Chapter Three, nuclear 
weapons are inextricably linked in both their use and threat of use to intimidation: the 
capacity of a state to instil fear in others that it can inflict unacceptable damage through 
obliterating its population. According to Taskhiri, nuclear weapons – as part of either a 
deterrence strategy, or tactical doctrine – by definition amount to terrorism.  
Other senior clerics inside Iran reinforce a view that nuclear weapons do indeed have an 
intrinsic deterrent value, but also expound a view that nuclear weapons cannot guarantee 
security. Ayatollah Ja’far Sobhani rejects the use of nuclear weapons “even for deterrence 
purposes”, citing “the principles of Islam in regard to human beings and the respect it holds 
for mankind”.120 With reference to the views of Allamah Hilli, Sobhani also contrasts what he 
sees as the Islamic parameters of Muslim strategic and tactical doctrines of warfare with the 
conduct of the United States in Hiroshima and Nagasaki:  
This high degree of mercy and compassion conveys the mercy of Islam, however, the 
superpowers (today) have no qualms bombing oppressed people with napalm bombs, and 
other weapons of mass destruction. And how can it be forgotten what the United States did in 
World War II, when it bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic bombs, which wiped out 
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nearly half a million people and deleted those countries from the map on the pretext of 
accelerating the end of the war, as Truman said in 1945?
121
 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s religious opinions on war more generally appear to differ 
from the absolute verdict on nuclear weapons produced by Khamenei, and the state of 
exception he conceives has potential ramifications for his position on nuclear weapons and 
other WMD: 
[i]f a Muslim country is invaded or overtaken by the enemy, and the territory of Islam and its 
society are feared for, it is obligatory to defend it through any means possible, from wealth 
and lives […] This does not depend upon the presence of an Infallible Imam, or the 
permission of his deputy – defense is obligatory upon every capable person, through any 
means, without restriction or condition.
122
 
Other examples point to Khomeini’s actual behaviour as the Supreme Leader of a state at war 
with Iraq as being much more complex, regardless of the aforementioned state of exception 
he envisioned. Khomeini gave no indication at the outset of the Iran-Iraq war that the Iraqis 
would be held collectively responsible for Saddam Hussein’s aggression – a choice 
irreconcilable with the core principles of nuclear deterrence. On the contrary, he seems to 
indicate that Iran’s response would be wholly proportionate and calculated: 
We always make it a point that our response to their attacks should be such that the Iraqi 
people are not harmed. But in case Iraq oversteps its limits and repeats its aggression, we are 
                                                          
121
 Jaf’ar Sobhani, Rasail wa Maqalat, Vol. 2 [English: Instructions and Articles], Qom: Muassasat al-Imam al-
Sadiq, n.d, p. 148. Republished by e-Shia:  
http://web.archive.org/web/20150820144223/http://lib.eshia.ir/26456/2/148. Translation by Steve Ditto in “Go, 
Learn About Atoms”, p. 16. 
122
 Ruhollah Khomeini, Tahrir al-Wasilah: Vol. 1 [English: Means of Salvation], Najaf: Matb’aat al-Adab, 
1970, p. 485. Republished by e-Shia: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160430143846/http://ar.lib.eshia.ir/21010/1/485 [Accessed 09.06.16],. Translation 
by Steve Ditto in “Go, Learn About Atoms”, p. 15.  
The Nuclear Policies of Iran: Islam and Strategic Thinking in the Islamic 
Republic 
60 
resolved and determined to mobilize the people and order them to fight. It will then become 
clear to the Iraqi people that we have nothing against them and that it is this Saddam Hussein 
who has attacked us on America's instigation. Our response to his attack will have nothing at 
all to do with the people of Iraq who are our brothers.
123
 
Further evidence that Khomeini saw it necessary for Iran to conduct its military operations 
according to Islamic standards can be found in his claim in 1982 that “were it not for their 
Islamic commitment and their desire to protect the innocent and their fear of destroying 
property belonging to the brotherly Iraqi nation”, Iran’s military could have inflicted far more 
damage against Iraq at that particular juncture.
124
 In a 2014 interview with Gareth Porter, 
head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) during the Iran-Iraq war, Mohsen 
Rafighdoost, detailed a series of proposals he made to Khomeini during the war regarding the 
option for Iran to produce and use chemical, biological and nuclear weapons against Iraq. 
Rafighdoost met with Khomeini twice – once in 1984, and once in 1987 – both at critical 
junctures in the war when Iran’s use of WMD could have potentially turned the tide of the 
war dramatically in its favour. Khomeini’s answers were unequivocal in both instances. 
Despite there being a clear existential threat to the Islamic Republic, and potentially 
considerable ‘material’ benefit in using these types of weapons, he refused. "It doesn't matter 
whether it is on the battlefield or in cities; we are against this [...] It is haram [forbidden] to 
produce such weapons. You are only allowed to produce protection [sic]". Porter's interview 
also highlights that proposals for Iran to produce and use WMD had only emerged after 
foreign governments had refused to give Iran the necessary capacity to counter chemical 
attacks. Iran's isolation rather than intrinsic strategic preferences, contingent on the foreign 
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policies of other governments, had therefore initially triggered research into a WMD option. 
The outcome was a report, which was given to Khomeini at a session held with his Chief of 
Staff and son Ahmad.  
When Khomeini read the report, he reacted to the chemical-biological-nuclear team by 
asking, ‘What is this?'". He then instructed Rafighdoost and his research team to focus on 
defensive efforts: "Imam told me that, instead of producing chemical or biological weapons, 
we should produce defensive protection for our troops, like gas masks and atropine".
125
 
After telling Khomeini that his research team had come up with a plan for Iran to develop a 
nuclear weapon, Khomeini stated outright that Iran would not produce a nuclear weapon. 
Perhaps most revealing is the moral reasoning that Khomeini offered of his decision: "If we 
produce chemical weapons, what is the difference between me and Saddam?"
126
 When 
speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in 2012, Ali Akbar Salehi likewise referred to 
both rational and ‘moral’ imperatives for Iran to not pursue nuclear weapons which 
reinforced a specific narrative of Iran’s place in the world as an Islamic Republic. Regarding 
the moral issues at hand, Salehi says that Iran is 
a moral-driven political […] entity. So this morally driven political entity can never, ever 
accept something that would go against its tenets, that would go against its principles, its 
beliefs. And we oppose war. When we had […] Saddam Hussein's war against Iran, he used 
chemical weapons. And now the entire international community recognizes that. We have 
more than hundred people have been inflicted with this chemical weapon. People are still in 
the hospitals, in European hospitals, in our own hospitals, hundred thousand people [sic], 
more than a hundred thousand people. But we did not react -- I mean, we did not react 
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likewise. We didn't use nuclear weapons
127
 against the Iraqi people because this was against 
our tenets. Late imam said, you cannot kill innocent people.
128
 
In addition to these views, certain scholars, such as Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi – a 
marja al-taqlid – have chosen to orient their verdict on nuclear weapons in relation to the 
view of the Supreme Leader. It can be said that Makarem Shirazi’s fatwa highlights a 
dynamic within Iran’s political system (nezam) where certain religious viewpoints pertaining 
to issues concerning the state or areas within the remit of the wali al-faqih – such as warfare – 
merely underpin the wali al-faqih’s guidance as opposed to offering a unique perspective on 
the issue at hand. Makarem Shirazi states that 
[a]s Iran’s Supreme Leader has declared nuclear weapons to be impermissible (haram), I too 
as a source of emulation (marja taqlid), view such arms as impermissible.
129
 
In the same vein as Makarem Shirazi, Javadi-Amoli’s couches his own opinion on weapons 
of mass destruction (and therefore nuclear weapons) on the issue with reference to there 
being an ‘ijma – consensus – on the issue:  
[S]cholars believe that possession and development of atomic weapons and WMDs are not 
permitted and have issued religious rulings in this regard”. He supplants this with the 
comment that “[m]ass killing and genocide are forbidden by divine religions.130 
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These scholars are joined by the more junior Ayatollah Mohsen Faghihi, who argues that the 
Supreme Leader’s fatwa against proliferation represents “a primary edict of Islam and does 
not need any deep arguments”.131 
Ayatollah Mortaza Mutahhari’s position on nuclear weapons was rooted in his belief that 
Muslim states should have to have access to all the modern technologies of the time.  
The use of force against the enemy is required as much as possible. There was a time when a 
few blacksmiths could build the tools needed, using the empirical knowledge of their time. 
But, today it takes more knowledge. The knowledge to build an atomic bomb is necessary. 
You may say, the Prophet didn’t say, ‘O people, go, learn about atoms! […] But, we should 
do this, because it is in the spirit of that rule.
132
 
Mutahhari’s position is notable not only due to his close proximity to Khomeini, but that he is 
remembered first and foremost in Iran as a philosopher rather than a legal scholar (although 
he was accomplished in both fields
133
). We will note here a similarity between this view that 
conceives revolutions in military technology as linear – forcing societies, nations, and even 
civilisations to adapt to them or be existentially threatened – with the modernist thinking 
underpinning certain strands of Sunni-jihadi discourse that opts to conflate the massive 
destructive power of nuclear weapons with military modernity. Quoting the ‘steed verse’ of 
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the Qur’an, which we will observe in greater detail in Chapter Four that Mutahhari also relies 
upon, Ayman Zawahiri believes that: 
It is a fixed and permanent need of human beings to defend against the enemy, and have a 
constant readiness to do so. The Qur’an states, “Against them make ready your strength to the 
utmost of your power…” (8:60) Of course, during that era horse riding and archery were 
necessities of defense, but gradually newer tools of fighting were invented, and today such 
tools are atomic capabilities, aircraft, and advanced missiles. Thus according to the 
unchanging laws of Islamic jurisprudence, which stipulates the necessity of preparation 
against enemies, such tools must be obtained as much as possible.
134
 
Mutahhari held views concerning martyrdom and the necessity of jihad which can be used to 
further illuminate his way of thinking about military affairs. Those who reject both these 
tenants, argued Mutahhari, would be clothed with “a garment of humiliation”135 by Allah. 
Furthermore, 
The people who lose the spirit of fighting and resisting the forces of evil are doomed to 
humiliation, disgrace, bad luck and helplessness […] The Muslim community is a community 
of power and force. Islam is a religion of power.
136
 
Here the complex philosophical underpinnings of Mutahhari’s views about warfare become 
much more apparent. For Mutahhari, while self-sacrifice is an inescapable part of war, Islam 
nevertheless remains a religion of power. This places Mutahhari’s narrative in diametric 
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opposition to the one held by many Sunnis that Muslims – by virtue of their weak material 
and military standing in the modern international standing – are compelled (or indeed 
obligated) to undertaking whatever means necessary through the course of ‘resistance’ in the 
face of a superior enemy. Mutahhari’s view instead denotes an obligation among Muslims to 
be proactive in their military affairs – to see development in this area in order to eschew all 
that humiliates, disgraces, or renders the ummah helpless.  
The relevance of Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah Yazdi’s religious proclamations is more complex 
than those of other scholars, namely as he has not issued a resalah and has therefore not 
announced his qualification as a marja al-taqlid. Strictly speaking, due to his lower rank, 
Yazdi’s verdict is binding only on himself and in theory therefore of lesser consequence. Yet 
Yazdi’s status in Iran and the manner with which he communicates his own view 
nevertheless bears important political functions inside the nezam.
137
 His pronouncements on 
security issues in particular serve an important purpose in Iran as the endorsed views of the 
‘Haghani’ school of Islamic philosophy, and give unique insights into the logic which 
underpins Iran’s war doctrines today. 
Answering a hypothetical question on the permissibility of pre-emptively striking a foreign 
city of a Muslim country in order to prevent further nuclear attacks on Iran – even if this 
course of action would lead to the deaths of civilians – Yazdi’s answer is revealing: 
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In the case of conflict between two Muslim nations, Muslims should assist the oppressed 
against the oppressor. But before the war is waged, initiating attacks for the purpose of 
prevention depends on a permission from [Vali ye] Faqih.
138
 
Yazdi’s most notable comments with a bearing on nuclear weapons can be construed as 
endorsing the Islamic Republic’s adoption of them: 
The most advanced weapons must be produced inside our country even if our enemies don’t 
like it. There is no reason that [our enemies] have the right to produce a special type of 
weapon, while other countries are deprived of it.
139
 
The position of Ayatollah Fazel Lankarani as provided by his office stands out as one of the 
most precise and in-depth of all contemporary fatawa on weapons of mass destruction. He 
starts out in quite general terms addressing basic expectations of Islamic forces at times of 
war. 
According to Islam, war with the enemy has its own principles (usul), etiquette (adab), ethics 
(akhlaq), and rules (ahkam). And, during war, Muslims should uphold these principles and 
rules. For instance, not killing captives, and avoiding and preventing the destruction of the 
enemy’s trees, fields, and water supplies. Also among the rules of war are not using poison in 
the areas of the enemy, and the religious impermissibility of poisoning the residential areas of 
the enemy.
140
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Afterwards, Lankarani offers an all-encompassing statement that Qur’an, ahadith, the 
Ahlulbayt (the family of the Prophet), as well as authoritative biographies of the Prophet and 
Imams, as “the foundation and rules of warfare in Islam” also “prohibit the use of 
unconventional tools of war, such as nuclear and biological weapons.”141 Given the absence 
of WMD during the time of the Prophet and Imams, Lankarani states – in contrast to 
Khamenei – his lack of confidence in deploying analogical reasoning given the lack of 
explicit parallels in military technologies encountered in Islamic law. However, he believes 
there to be certain parallels with unconventional weapons used in those periods:  
It is clear that during the era of the Prophet and Imams, chemical, biological, and nuclear 
weapons did not exist, and there is no tradition about them, but smaller types of 
unconventional weapons were used at that time, that in many ways are similar to today. 
Therefore, no conventional weapons today are a part of this general rule. These included 
poisoning lands; burning trees, fields, and homes; and drowning the enemy, all of which are 
similar to non-conventional weapons today. And, the narration that is reported from the 
Prophet states, ‘The Prophet prohibited deploying poison in the lands of the polytheists.’142 
Lankarani goes further than previous scholars through articulating a case that preoccupation 
with delivery systems rather than humanitarian impact of weapons is problematic from an 
Islamic standpoint: 
The narration about the use of poison does not specify any type of weapon (i.e. delivery 
system), but there is no distinction between them because poisoning air, water, or land is the 
same (i.e. has the same effects). Therefore, although the Prophet only specified poison, it 
refers to any weapon that kills innocents in overseas war zones, including humans and 
animals, and also causes damage to fields and the environment. The prohibition of weapons 
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of mass destruction, and chemical weapons, is an absolute priority, because the use of poison 
(in warfare) is religiously impermissible (haram). The use of an atomic bomb, or chemical 
weapons, is haram. The mention of poison (in the Prophetic tradition) does not mean that it 
does not include property damage as well, it extends to all weapons of mass destruction.”143 
In contrast to the previous scholars analysed, Ayatollah Sadegh Rouhani sits outside the 
nezam by virtue of his belief that the office of Supreme Leader should be divinely appointed 
rather than elected. This renders his views on nuclear energy and nuclear weapons unique 
from previous scholars who do not question the wali al-faqih’s authority. His view is that 
nuclear energy – the quest for which being a noble scientific endeavour – should be used 
within the confines of fiqh, and therefore not encompass weaponisation.
144
 
Ayatollah Sadegh Husseini Shirazi, whose clerical family have opposed the Islamic Republic 
since soon after the victory of the Revolution
145
, is a scholar on the fringes of toleration in 
Qom. Yet Sadegh Shirazi’s verdict evidences against the notion that a fatwa can ever be 
entirely reducible to politics. With another reference to the steed verse, Sadegh Shirazi 
demonstrates some of the recurring normative ideas that influence fiqh concerning warfare 
even as the law-maker finds himself on the outside of the nezam. 
[a]tomic weapons, if used for defense, are necessary, and included in the general rule of 
Islam, from the Qur’an: ‘Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power’ 
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(8:60), whereby Muslims are required to make themselves (equal) in in every respect against 
the enemies of Islam.
146
 
Sadegh Shirazi refers to the same verse of the Qur’an noted by Mutahhari as calling for 
Muslims to hone their military capabilities for defensive and deterrent purposes, and comes to 
the same conclusion despite being on opposite sides of the political spectrum – and indeed, 
power – inside Iran. By citing a direct passage from the Qur’an, Sadegh Shirazi avoids 
recourse to notions of ‘public interest’ (maslahah) or ‘dire necessity’ (darura) – concepts 
which would legitimise some element of the Islamic Republic as a referent object of security 
– but in the process his verdict becomes quite broad. Nevertheless, the judgement of Sadegh 
Shirazi stands given that neither his office nor his family see a benefit in the continued 
survival of the Islamic Republic, particularly in light of other scholars who – as beneficiaries 
of the political system, or proximity to the Supreme Leader – have at least in principle 
allowed for certain acts of warfare to become tolerated in a context where the existence of the 
Islamic Republic is threatened. The placement of this fatwa outside of the proper theological 
parameters of the Islamic Republic’s religio-political dynamic also raises the question of who 
the intended target audience of this fatwa is, given that neither the military nor government 
would realistically heed to its advice. 
How best to characterise the opinions of figures such as Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani is also an 
important point. Though a career politician, Rafsanjani has spent considerable time in the 
seminaries of Qom, retains the rank of Ayatollah, and has chaired both the Council of Experts 
and Expediency Council. Unlike other cleric-politicians, such as President Khatami, 
Rafsanjani also benefits from his reputation as one of the founding personalities of the 
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Islamic Revolution through his close relationship with Khomeini prior to and after the 
Revolution. Rafsanjani has voiced a number of contradictory opinions concerning nuclear 
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and in doing so revealed a hybridity of 
reference points, both secular and ethical, which impact his calculations: 
We really do not seek to build nuclear weapons and a nuclear military system. In a Friday 
prayer sermon in Tehran, I even once said that an atomic bomb would not benefit the 
occupation regime of Israel. Eventually, if one day a nuclear conflict takes place, Israel as a 
small country, will not be able to bear an atomic bomb. It is a small country and all its 
facilities would be destroyed. However, they interpreted this advice as a threat. We really 
believe that there should not be any nuclear weapon in the region and this is a part of the 
principles of our politics.
147
 
In spite of the belief here that nuclear weapons would not serve the interests of Iran, which is 
clearly based upon strategic concerns, Rafsanjani offered another wholly different 
perspective of other weapons of mass destruction in 1998: 
With regard to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons training, it was made very 
clear during the war that these weapons are very decisive. It was also made very clear that the 
moral teachings of the world are not very effective when war reaches a serious stage […] We 
should fully equip ourselves in the defensive and offensive use of chemical, bacteriological, 
and radiological weapons.
148
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Nevertheless, in an interview with CNN Rafsanjani also stated that as Iranians, “[w]e really 
hate the atomic bomb and its purpose […] Islam has prevented us from undertaking such 
adventurism”149 
As with the case of Rafsanjani, President Hassan Rouhani’s own scholarly background in the 
seminaries of Semnan and Qom prior to enlisting in the military and eventually entering 
politics warrants that his opinions be dissected not only as the by-product of a politician but 
also as a cleric. As secretary-general of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) in 
Iran, Rouhani gave a comprehensive statement against nuclear weapons based on multiple 
concerns that invoked economic, ethical, and religious problems with Iran pursuing a nuclear 
weapon: 
Given the high cost of access to nuclear weapons, their production would block our progress 
in other scientific and technological fields. In view of environmental, technological, religious 
and [ethical] reasons as well as the possibility of losing our influence in the region, Iran 
doesn’t intend to produce nuclear weapons.150 
As a point of comparison, we may also consider the viewpoint of one Iraqi cleric, 
Mohammad Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr: father of Moqtada al-Sadr and cousin of Mohammad 
Baqir al-Sadr (the prominent 20
th
 century jurist who theorised a distinct and competing theory 
of Islamic governance to Khomeini, called wilayat al-ummah). 
It has been stated that it is prohibited to use hazardous weaponry, whether against an 
aggressive army, or others. This includes (flooding) with water, (launching) fire, poison, and 
other means that might exist.  This is because of the hadith that the Messenger of Allah 
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prohibited the deployment of poison in the lands of the polytheists. I say: This prohibition 
indicates it is haram, except if there is a great public interest (maslaha adheema) – but that is 
rare. While the hadith only specifies poison, its meaning includes all kinds of hazardous 
weaponry – including nuclear or others – because they kill the innocent along with the guilty, 
and the unarmed with the armed.
151
 
Of note in Mohammad al-Sadr’s fatwa is the connection he makes between nuclear weapons 
and previous “hazardous weaponry”, which again points to some degree of analogical 
reasoning. Similarly, the implications of his explicit reference to a ‘greater public interest’ 
(maslahah al-adheema), a concept which up until recently had been a hallmark of Sunni legal 
theory and military jurisprudence, will be dissected in later chapters. 
Conclusion 
This chapter surveyed a mixture of opinions from religious scholars concerning nuclear 
weapons and other WMD. A number of recurring themes emerge from these views on 
nuclear weapons and other WMD. They include: 
 That there exist Islamic ‘first principles’ prohibiting the intentional targeting and 
killing of civilians.   
 That certain scenarios, considered ‘exceptional’, may allow for civilians to be 
targeted or killed. 
 That these exceptional conditions can be determined with reference to some notion of 
‘public interest’ (maslahah). 
 That Shi’i scholars connect their views on nuclear weapons with foundational legal 
perspectives and discussions found in Islamic military jurisprudence concerning 
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other weapons, tactics and strategies associated with either mass or indiscriminate 
destruction – such as poisons, incendiary weapons or catapults. 
 That, in certain instances, Islamic views concerning nuclear weapons are publically 
rationalised according to the views of other scholars. 
 That there exists a preoccupation in certain accounts with strategic and tactical 
‘modernity’ – the notion that Muslim societies are obliged to develop the most 
modern and advantageous military tools in order to preserve their security.  
Whereas previous studies concerning Islamic viewpoints on nuclear weapons
152
 have found it 
sufficient to present these views to academic and policy audiences with an assumption that 
this information can be fairly or accurately assessed in the context of today’s nuclear debate 
within existing paradigms, I will proceed in the next two chapters to demonstrate – in line 
with a critical theory agenda, and through utilising discourse analysis – that existing ways of 
framing these views are inadequate for projecting potential directions of Iran’s nuclear 
programme. For this reason, a non-secular framework for analysis is required.                                                                                                                                                                   
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Chapter Two: Narrating the Nuclear Strategies of the Iranian 
‘Other’:  Do the Mullahs Love their Children Too? 
*** 
[N]othing is more important than keeping the 'Islamic bomb' out of the hands of Iran. Let it be 
introduced into the Middle East and you can kiss the world we know goodbye.
153
 
*** 
Introduction 
Before deconstructing the views of religious scholars in Iran concerning nuclear weapons 
surveyed in the previous chapter, it is vital to understand how they and their views have been 
represented in popular and academic discourse, and what this reveals about the epistemic 
boundaries of how the threat level of Iran’s nuclear programme is assessed. This chapter will 
introduce common representations of Iranian strategic preferences – and particularly those of 
its ulama – in the media, policy discourse and academia. It will also serve as the first section 
of this thesis’ literature review, focusing here on the prevalence of orientalism in academic 
and policy discourses concerning its nuclear programme. This literature review will continue 
in Chapter Three on the specific topic of realism.  
Focusing on assertions that Iran cannot, by virtue of being an Islamic Republic, be ‘deterred’ 
from acquiring or using a nuclear weapon, or be coerced into certain courses of action 
through communicating certain unacceptable consequences – either in the form of sanctions, 
or the perpetually ‘on-the-table’ option to use of military force – the discursive analysis in 
this chapter provides a glimpse into a much older debate concerning the benefits and pitfalls 
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of defining states as rational or non-rational actors in the nuclear age. This older debate is the 
subject of Chapter Three, and delves deeper into how the discursive focus on ‘rationality’ 
impacts our assessment of Iran’s strategic preferences being influenced by Islam. In this 
chapter I examine the manner in which experts have sought to understand and represent the 
‘Islamicity’ of Iranian strategic preferences and leadership in the context of it being – or not 
being – a rational-actor. The discourses surveyed in this chapter may be characterised as 
orientalist in the sense that they construe Western representations of Islam, Iranian culture, 
and Iran’s ulama as definitive of the impact that religion can have on Iran’s strategic 
preferences towards nuclear weapons.
154
 These discourses likewise axiomatically designate 
certain broad features of strategic thinking – rationality, pragmatism, for example – as secular 
artefacts rooted in Anglo-European-American traditions. In the context of Iran’s nuclear 
programme, such ontologies emerge within particular epistemic boundaries that govern the 
production and reproduction of certain images of Islam and Iran, and marginalise others.  
As we will observe in this chapter, Iran is often constructed as being “in the grip of 
enigmatic, hostile revolutionaries led by intransigent, retroactive Mullahs”.155 I propose that 
these types of discourses and narratives about Iran attain especially valuable currency in 
discussions over its nuclear programme, which are predicated on assessments of ‘rational’ 
and ‘irrational’ forms of strategic agency that are informed by only a cursory awareness of 
Islam as it is defined and understood by Muslims themselves. In addition to the realist lens 
surveyed in Chapter Three, it is through this lens of orientalism that religious 
pronouncements are frequently read and interpreted in the course of threat-assessing Iran’s 
nuclear programmes and its strategic preferences. 
                                                          
154
 Bill Ashcroft, “Representation and its Discontents: Orientalism, Islam and the Palestinian Crisis”, Religion, 
Vol. 34, No. 2, 2004, p. 114; Edward W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine how 
we See the Rest of the World, London: Vintage, 1997, p. li. 
155
Adib-Moghaddam, Metahistory, p. 125. 
The Nuclear Policies of Iran: Islam and Strategic Thinking in the Islamic 
Republic 
76 
There are two assumptions at the heart of the orientalist narrative of strategic preferences in 
Iran, which can be described as both ethnocentric (by virtue of normalising Anglo-European-
American modes of knowledge production, and othering different forms) and essentialist in 
the sense that it imposes timeless definitions of ‘Islamic’ knowledge and models of political 
authority. The first is that Iran’s religious scholars are the primary instigators and drivers of 
policy-making concerning the country’s nuclear programme – the veracity of which is 
beyond the scope of this present thesis. The second assumption is that given that religious 
scholars are involved in shaping the country’s strategic preferences concerning nuclear 
weapons, Iran is destined to produce and use nuclear weapons. It is this latter assumption that 
is the subject of this chapter and subsequent chapters in this thesis.  
Just as the image of Russians as irrational, Asiatic minded and in many ways strategically 
primitive was once salient in policy formation (see Chapter Three), the image of ‘mad 
mullahs’156 has also featured prominently in the definition of Iran’s strategic preferences from 
its 1979 Revolution up until the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). These 
images still permeate the rhetoric against the JCPOA and shape how any negotiations with 
Iran over international security issues are presented in policy-writing.
157
 They also reveal 
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much about the prominence of ethnocentrism in defining our own strategic culture, and how 
we perceive that of the ‘other’: 
[e]nemy images and ethnocentric outlooks separate the kaleidoscope of greys in international 
life into sharper blacks and whites: they help shape, simplify and give meaning to a 
strategist’s world view, his priorities and his modes of action.158 
What we find is that whether in the specific context of Iran’s nuclear programme, or its 
strategic preferences writ large, analysis and commentary has hinged on an explicit 
representation of the country’s religious scholars as a synecdoche for Iran’s supposed 
inherent irrationalism and strategic otherness. At the level of public discourse, these 
representations have historically attained far more valuable currency than any empirical 
observations about the nature of power, civil-military dynamics, or substantive clerical 
engagement in the decision-making process in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and in some 
instances colour how these factors are read. When Ray Takeyh refers repeatedly to "the 
mullahs' nuclear ambitions",
159
 we understand precisely the kinds of intentions and 
motivations he implies, and the ramifications that the ulama having these inferred ambitions 
has for the policy-making process in Iran. But who are these ‘mullahs’, and are their 
ambitions, whatever they are, as instantly recognisable as Takeyh suggests? Perhaps most 
importantly – particularly before we analyse religious thinking on nuclear weapons and 
weapons capable of mass destruction in subsequent chapters – what purpose does an 
essentialist definition of Iran’s strategic preferences serve? 
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Representations of the ‘Mullahs’ 
Edward Said identified in the writings of Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington that they 
were not “neutral, descriptive and objective prose”, but instead polemics which perpetuated 
and contributed to a-priori assumptions about the ‘orient’.160 We may discern a similar 
pattern of knowledge production with respect to assessments of Iran’s nuclear policies. The 
objectification of Iran’s religious scholars which we observe in the nuclear debate today 
(examined later in the chapter) is therefore not new, and shares some broad characteristics 
with a number of orientalist representations of Iran and Islam conceived prior to the Islamic 
Revolution. While media coverage of the Revolution, and particularly of the US Embassy 
Hostage Crisis (1979-81), solidified their standing as ‘mad mullahs’ in the western political 
imaginary, they were already by this time characterised for their supposedly anti-modern, 
superstitious, and reactionary tendencies in literatures which sought to explain – or at least 
account for – the role of religious scholars and teachings in Iranian society.  
Robert Graham’s study published on the eve of Iran’s revolution provides a valuable insight 
into the representation of Iran’s religious scholars as a collective of irrational anti-modernists. 
“[R]religious fanaticism persists in cities like Qom”,161 a place implied to interrupt a rapidly 
secularising Iranian society, and “a fiery mullah and theologian” named Khomeini presents 
the only challenge against the Shah’s land reforms and modernising efforts.162 We are 
incorrectly informed that the title ‘Ayatollah’ which precedes Khomeini’s name is “a special 
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title accorded to the most respected mullahs”.163 Graham’s definition serves to collectivise 
Iran’s ulama under the general categories of mass religion, tribal patronage and personality 
cults, and precludes an assessment of them as individuals with distinctive views. To be sure, 
Graham later refers to “40 leading mullahs”164 exiled from Qom to other parts of the country 
by the SAVAK (Iran’s security and intelligence agency), offering neither insights into who 
these scholars are nor the particular significance of their exile. It is clear in his account that 
religious scholars play some role in instigating political change, but their individual character, 
motives and influence is obscured. In this vein, the best insight we are given into Khomeini’s 
opposition to land reform is that “it was against Islam”.165  
Graham’s account is a typical representation of the homogenisation and objectification of the 
ulama in the study of Iranian politics and society, where their activism and preferences have 
been imagined as “a spectacle conjured of a purely religious instinct, the purpose of which is 
to foil Iran’s majestic march toward modern statehood and modern nationhood”.166 It also 
reflects the tendency to represent Islam as an irrational mass phenomenon, rather than as a 
distinctive source of knowledge production.
167
 They are in his account collectivised as 
‘mullahs’, incapable of rationalising their preferences outside of a reactionary awareness of 
whatever is ‘for’ Islam, and resultantly homogenised and characterised as fanatics. There are 
examples of this type of collectivisation even entering the highest levels of US policy. Majid 
al-Khoei provides an account for instance where US intelligence services confused his father, 
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Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, with Khomeini in the early 90s: “both were old men with 
white beards”.168 This particular intelligence failure is especially damning given that 
Ayatollah Khoei is believed to have enjoyed a far larger religious following among Shi’i 
Muslims than Khomeini.
169
 It also highlights the extent to which a basic lack of appreciation 
at the heart of Western analysis of the diverse clerical community within Shi’ism, and of 
religious politics and authority in the Muslim world in general, has been to the detriment not 
just of academic literature, but also high levels of policy-making and intelligence analysis.  
There are certainly more nuanced images of clerical political preferences and authority in 
Iran than Graham’s homogenising view. Richard Cottam, an Iran scholar and former CIA-
operative, for example pluralises clerical authority in Iran in his own account, and in the 
process conveys an appreciation that not every religious authority necessarily shares the same 
worldview or political goals in Iran. Yet the categories he envisions present a narrowed 
typology of cleric and clerical political agency. Political action, when taken by clerics, is 
imagined as being strategically short-term, or as part of a long-term agenda of preventing the 
rise of secularism and reform. Contrasting clerical reactions to the 1891 tobacco revolt and 
the 1905-06 Constitutional Revolution, Cottam makes an observation that although Tehran’s 
religious intellectuals supported reform, 
[f]or the majority of mullahs, especially those in the provinces, these ideas were too 
sophisticated to be understood. A campaign against foreigners – especially those who handled 
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their tobacco – was comprehensible, and with it the illiterate mullah could sympathize. There 
were, however, a significant number of intellectual mullahs who understood the liberal ideas 
of the constitutional leaders and who stood in basic opposition to them. For these reactionary 
mullahs, the status quo was not an unhappy one, and they feared the secular implications of 
the innovations of the reformists.
170
 
Cottam’s narrative of this early engagement of clerics with politics in Iran confines clerics to 
three definitions. Clerics in Iran were imagined as being uneducated and/or illiterate 
‘mullahs’, incapable of understanding the stakes of the Constitutional Revolution or their 
own place in unfolding events. Others could be educated sufficiently enough to want to expel 
foreign influence from Iranian affairs. Finally, some were imaged as being educated 
sufficiently to oppose liberal advances concocted among intellectuals from Tehran. The 
typology is problematic not only empirically, but also because it engenders a simplistic vision 
of clerical political engagement which both negates ideological and religious hybridity, as 
well as insights into the ideas the ulama have on their own terms. As Cottam implies a 
correlation between education and clerical opposition to what is constructed as progressive 
transformations being led out of Tehran, we are presented the options of viewing Iran’s 
ulama as silent on matters of politics (due, from what we may discern, as much to illiteracy 
and ignorance as to strategic quietism),viewing them as viscerally xenophobic, or as being 
ideologically opposed to reform.   
Analysts today likewise gravitate towards adopting simplistic, artificial typologies such as 
that produced by Cottam. Considering the impact of what they refer to as “atomic 
Ayatollahs” on Khomeini’s early political, ethical and philosophical opposition to any 
nuclear programme (whether civilian or military), Meir Javedanfar and Yossi Melman argue 
that Khomeini was compelled to depart from his earlier Islamic view and adopt a more realist 
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outlook after the use of chemical weapons on Iranians during the Iran-Iraq war due to 
pressure from more ‘sophisticated’ clerics.171  “The first four or five years of the Iran-Iraq 
War shocked the clerics into realizing the value of modern military technology”.172 It is 
simply assumed that Khomeini, not ‘understanding’ the strategic benefits of nuclear weapons 
at the outset of the Revolution, later came to terms with them and made an ideological and 
religious compromise. Consequently, the suppression of clerical or Islamic authenticity in 
this instance led to a more pragmatic and realist approach being adopted in the Islamic 
Republic. 
‘Mad Mullahs’ and the Problem of Deterrence  
Such images of Iran’s religious scholars are appropriated within projections of Iranian 
nuclear intentions that are defined according to Anglo-European narratives of what strategic 
thinking looks like for ‘us’ (namely, in the West) and ‘them’. It is assumed that Iran, through 
possessing what is considered a fundamentally distinct system of Islamic government 
‘controlled’ by clerics173 – whom we are told are incapable of making long-term strategic 
choices that would engender measured reciprocity, or serve global security interests – makes 
it harder for the West to read its defence posturing accurately, negotiate with it, or even 
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engage at all on matters of mutual interest. This tendency is not without its critics. William O. 
Beeman dissects images of clerical irrationality similar to those reproduced by Graham and 
Cottam in his analysis of the discourse of “mad mullahs”.174 Beeman’s critical genealogy of 
the discourse reveals a dichotomy between an “idealized governmental structure of the 
United States”175 – ‘rational’ and ultimately Liberal, with a clear division of powers across a 
secular executive, legislative and judiciary – and states like Iran deemed to miss these 
characteristics. This dichotomy is a constant feature of representations of Iran today in 
discussions over its nuclear programme. Critically, the image “provides an overly fascile 
[sic], dismissive argument to anyone in government who suggests that meaningful 
negotiations with Iran on matters of mutual interest might be pursued”.176 Beyond individual 
profiles of religious scholars in Iran, what is also absent is an historical context for how 
Islamic laws of war and peace are made by the ulama, and an assessment of how these laws 
change, and the implications that this could have for strategic decisions regarding the 
proliferation or non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction 
today. 
In light of this absence, the ‘dismissive’ argument – reasons for why Iran cannot be assumed 
to be responsive to negotiations or strategic accommodation – presents itself frequently. 
Norman Podhoretz, editor of Commentary magazine between 1960 and 1995, believes that  
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deterrence could not be relied upon with a regime ruled by Islamofascist revolutionaries who 
not only were ready to die for their beliefs but cared less about protecting their people than 
about the spread of their ideology and their power.
177
 
In the same essay, he states that there is a clear danger that “the mullahs” of Iran are 
“[d]edicated to furthering the transformation of Europe into a continent where Muslim law 
and practice would more and more prevail […] bound to use nuclear intimidation and 
blackmail in pursuit of this goal as well”178. Ilan Berman, Vice President of the American 
Foreign Policy Council, shares Norman Podhoretz’s concerns regarding the ‘mullahs’ 
ambitions. He asserts that “in the hands of Iran’s ayatollahs, an atomic capability could 
become a dangerous export commodity”179. Most revealing perhaps are the words of Richard 
Rubenstein, which state that “[i]t should be obvious that the Ayatollahs dwell in an entirely 
different moral universe than any we in the West have had to deal with”.180 Again, 
homogenisation of the ulama as irrational, unreasonable, unpredictable, and even morally 
suspect is intrinsic to the case for why Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is inevitable, and 
cannot under any circumstances be tolerated. 
Instances such as these reveal the use of rhetoric in dismissing the notion of Iran as a ‘like 
unit’ without more thorough recourse to either qualitative or quantitative analysis of the 
influence of religion over Iran’s policy-making process. The fact that ‘mad mullahs’ negate 
the crucial actor requirement of rationality in each of these areas means that the prospect of 
Iranian nuclear proliferation is assumed to be one of the primary international security threats 
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of today. Can, as Edward Shirley asks, “the theory of deterrence work in the Islamic 
world”?181 More to the point, 
Are the Iranians, who are the only Muslim radicals seriously thinking about manufacturing or 
stealing an atomic bomb, nuclearly non compos mentis?
182
 
Yet the paradox here is that while such accounts draw heavily from ontological orientalism 
(specifically, images of clerical irrationality), they nevertheless also support the realist 
‘proliferation paradigm’183 – the idea of nuclear proliferation as being inevitable – or what we 
might label the ‘deterrence parameter’. The deterrence parameter refers to the epistemic 
boundaries for assessing and projecting agency in the realm of nuclear policy. The deterrence 
parameter refers to the epistemic boundaries – dating back at least to the early days of the 
atomic age, and certainly to the formulation of a body of now hegemonic strategic literature 
in the field of nuclear deterrence (see Chapter Three) – for assessing and projecting agency in 
the realm of nuclear policy. These boundaries channel ontology in the form of discourse and 
debate over the intentions of states within the nuclear age within the narrow confines of one 
foundational question: are states rational or irrational actors? More specifically, can a given 
state be deterred from pursuing a certain course of action – and by virtue, do we consider 
them as belonging to a category of states we class as ‘modern’ – or do we consider this state 
as being undeterrable? In the critique developed over the course of this chapter and the next, I 
posit that the deterrence parameter is – like all regimes of truth – dependent more-so on how 
we imagine both ourselves and the other as opposed to strictly empirical observations.  
In the context of the deterrence parameter, accounts like those presented by Podhoretz 
assume that Iranian proliferation is inevitable, but assign this inevitability to Iran’s inherent 
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irrationalism as opposed to rationalism as a state actor. Here, what are believed to be 
elements of radical or extreme religiosity among its leadership, rather than incentives for 
proliferation provided by an anarchic international system, are considered definitive 
propellants of proliferation goals and strategic preferences more generally in Iran.  
How then do these orientalist discourses coalesce under traditional theories of deterrence, and 
serve as a definitive and disciplining spectrum of representing Iran’s strategic preferences 
towards nuclear weapons between normative orientalism and realism? One way is by 
reinforcing the dominant rationalist conceptions of state behaviour and nuclear strategy 
which preclude cultural or religious nuance within states which might impact strategic 
preferences. Rational strategic thinking is here believed to emerge only from Anglo-
European-American theories and political structures, and any divergence from these sources 
as the basis for strategic thinking can only ever produce irrational outcomes. This obstructs 
the emergence of alternative frameworks for studying Iran’s strategic preferences on their 
own terms beyond Ethnocentrism. 
Indeed, many projections of Iranian strategic preferences concerning nuclear weapons begin 
with an assessment of whether or not the Islamic Republic conforms or does not conform to 
certain orientalist images (examined in the coming pages), and the ramifications this would 
have for international security. This limits the scope of studying Iranian strategic preferences 
to the confines of the deterrence parameter – the binary concern of whether Iran is a 
rationalist state or not – and Eurocentric thinking about religion in international affairs. These 
rationalist theories of how states pursue their interests in the nuclear age  construct a number 
of images of the ‘international system’, such as one where it is dominated by self-interested 
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states existing (and competing) under anarchy (i.e. realism/neorealism);
184
 that cooperation 
and adherence to non-proliferation and disarmament regimes is possible only with certain 
states and not others (i.e. liberalism/neoliberalism);
185
 and that state behaviour can be 
reciprocated (and predictable) when based on conscious signalling and posturing, 
contributing to the emergence of ‘strategic cultures’ (i.e. constructivism).186 In these 
rationalist theories which reinforce the deterrence parameter, the impact that religion can 
have on strategic preferences is commonly either orientalised (as we will examine in this 
chapter) downplayed completely (as will be examined in the next chapter).  
The next four sections will introduce a few recurring images of religious influence over Iran’s 
nuclear policies and strategic preferences that are worthy of note: and the perceived impact of 
religious scholars on decision-making in Iran, the Shi’i ‘penchant’ for martyrdom, 
representations of the Twelfth Imam and ‘Mahdism’, and the veracity of the Supreme 
Leader’s fatwa prohibiting nuclear weapons. These elements are not exhaustive of the 
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orientalist representations of Iran in discussions over its strategic preferences, but offer a 
glimpse into a range of concerns that are prioritised through the course of analysing Iran’s 
nuclear policies; the implications of which taken to be self-evident.  
Orientalism and Institutional Analysis 
We have established that the participation of Muslim clerics in the Iranian decision-making 
process is often stated – explicitly or implicitly – to be the primary factor that leads Iran to 
miss the common psychological prerequisites for the development of a coherent and 
responsible nuclear weapons posture in the country, or for nuclear deterrence to work. Other 
accounts also cite Iran as missing the Western-modelled military bureaucracies and secular, 
rational centres of strategic decision-making needed for the state to produce predictable and 
rational patterns of policy-making which would engender stability.
 187
 Such arguments 
present a picture of aggressive political factionalism rooted in ideological clashes – often 
between what are conceived as ‘hardliners’ and ‘moderates’ – as a hallmark of policy-making 
in the Islamic Republic.
188
 One author has even attempted to naturalise factionalism in Iran 
with reference to the country’s geography: 
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Anthropologists have long suggested that mountainous terrain, such as that which dominates 
Iran’s populated areas, tends to breed cultural heterogeneity and individualism, which in turn 
often produces the kind of factionalism predominant in Iran.
189
 
Given this endemic factionalism and perpetual instability, the fate of Iran’s nuclear 
programme is believed to be out of the hands of what are considered the country’s 
‘moderates’, and instead in those of loosely grouped ultra-conservative, millenarian religious 
ideologues. Within this context, the role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 
(Sepah-e Pasdaran) in tilting the country’s balance of power towards the ‘hard-line’ forces – 
many of whom centring their political agency on a belief in the imminent return of the 
‘Hidden Imam’190 becomes a central concern in discourse concerning the prospect of a 
nuclear Iran.   
Such elements are produced as evidence that Iran’s nuclear programme should be securitised. 
Moreover, they sway between conceiving Iran as a unitary actor, or as a state where power is 
decentralised. For instance, in his commentary on whether Iran can be deterred or not, 
Michael Rubin states that “[a]t its core, the Islamic Republic is an ideological regime with a 
mission to export its revolution embedded both in its constitution and in the IRGC 
structure”.191 Amitai Etzioni also outlines his preference for treating Iran as a unitary, non-
rational actor. In this account, although the Islamic Republic’s tends to pursue foreign policy 
objectives that are “tangentially” rooted in what are deemed its objective national interests 
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(for example, in its opposition to Israel).
192
 He argues that the distinction is an important one 
given that Iran bases much of its policies related to defence and security on religious 
motivations, and what he believes to be the coherent self-identification as an ‘Islamic 
state’.193 In the process, Etzioni – as other commentators on the interplay between Iranian 
strategic preferences and external structural factors – becomes what the Copenhagen school 
would regard as the ‘securitising actor’ through defining which of Iran’s strategic preferences 
can be deemed as objectively reflecting conditions of (in)security, and which do not (and are, 
in this instance, based on otherworldly concerns). This alarmist image of Iran as a ‘non-
rational’ unitary actor is echoed in the assessment of one commentator in the Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, who states that 
the Ayatollah's regime is not typical of the Middle East or any other part of the world. It is 
religious, fanatical and addicted to martyrdom. If it survives in its present form and/or 
expands its influence to other states in the region, then there is considerable reason for 
concern. In short, Islamic fundamentalism would be the most serious cause for concern about 
a nuclear Middle East
194
 
Again, for this author the threat of the ‘Ayatollah’s regime’ derives not from its pursuit of 
strategic preferences rooted in objective conditions of insecurity found in the international 
system, but its pursuit of strategic preferences that are born out of normative ideology and 
religion. 
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On the other hand, Stephen Cimbala presents a different scenario where factionalism in the 
Islamic Republic threatens not only international security, but central political authority and 
military command in Iran itself: 
Iran caught up in revolutionary upheaval between contending factions of modernizers and 
mullahs, and already in possession of nuclear weapons, could witness a power struggle that 
leads to unauthorized delegation of nuclear command authority and/or illicit transfer of 
nuclear weapons to third parties.
195
 
In a similar vein of this specific perspective of the Iranian ‘threat’, a recurrent trope has been 
the chance of Iranian nuclear weapons falling into the hands of extremist groups. This 
particular concern can be found as early as the 1980s, with Morton Kondracke constructing a 
hypothetical situation where a dictator possessing nuclear weapons  
is overthrown by a religious fanatic resembling the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who then 
uses some of the Shah's bombs to intimidate or destroy the neighboring countries. And other 
bombs he passes on to terrorists that will use them to wage holy wars.
196
 
Kondracke ends on a note that crucially highlights the importance of imagination to threat 
assessing Iran’s nuclear programme: “[b]e glad that it didn't happen in real life. But 
something like it could”.197 Elsewhere, writing on highly enriched uranium (HEU) and 
plutonium stockpiles – the former now having been either diluted or converted to uranium 
oxide from 2013-15, the latter having never been possessed by Iran – two authors state that 
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“hard-line factions might consider sharing a portion of them with terrorist organizations, 
without explicit approval of the country’s political or spiritual leaders.”198  
When more specifically situated within the logics of nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation, 
Iranian factionalism or fragmented structures of power and authority present experts with a 
notable proliferation challenge not only due to the Islamic Republic’s seeming incoherence as 
a state, but also because these hard-line fragmented actors within the state impact the kinds of 
strategic preferences that are constructed within Iran, and how it should pursue them.  
The Shi’i Penchant for Martyrdom 
One other area of discussion which reveals its narrow focus in defining the study of Iran’s 
strategic preferences can be found in the focus on Iran’s ‘sensitivity to costs’, or more 
appropriately, the extent to which Iran can be deterred from pursuing a strategy deemed 
threatening to the interests of the United States and what is constructed as the ‘international 
community’. Here, assumptions which we make about the impact of religion on strategic 
preferences colours a wider statement on whether or not Iran can be deterred from behaving 
in a certain way due to the otherworldly influences of its leadership. For Charles 
Krauthammer –a Pulitzer Prize winner for his time at the Washington Post, qualified 
psychiatrist, and frequent political commentator – the answer is simple: “[a]gainst millenarian 
fanaticism glorying in a cult of death, deterrence is a mere wish. Is the West prepared to 
wager its cities with their millions of inhabitants on that feeble gamble?”199 
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In this respect, representations of Iran’s tactics during the Iran-Iraq war can reveal a great 
deal. Flynt and Hilary Mann Leverett for instance discuss the preoccupation with what is 
constructed in many literatures as Iran’s ‘martyrdom culture’,200  or what Robert Fisk 
believes is a Shi’i “cult for martyrdom”.201 Recounting Iran’s experiences in its war with Iraq, 
a leading French authority on jihad and ‘Islamism’ Gilles Kepel cites “the Shiite death wish” 
and “Shiite martyrology”202 in arguing that the war forced a ‘return’ to the message of self-
sacrifice contained in Karbala: 
[t]he appalling butchery of the eight-year war against Iraq gave the younger generation of 
poor Iranians an incentive to return to the former tradition of martyrdom, pushing the ritual of 
self-flagellation to the point of self-immolation
203
 
Kepel continues: “[n]o longer at issue was the transformation of the world […] young men 
had developed a new desire – a longing for death”.204 Supporting this view, the image of 
Iranian children running through minefields, with plastic ‘keys to paradise’ draped around 
their necks by Muslim clergymen, is a potent one in the literature seeking root Iranian actions 
at times with war with a primordial Shi’i attitude to death and ‘martyrdom’:205 
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[k]ey chains wrapped around their necks – the keys to heaven – some Basijis cleared 
minefields in acts of religious devotion, crying out to Imam Hossein, the Shi’a martyr, as 
explosions tore their bodies.
206
 
Tropes like this highlight a propensity for identifying unique elements of ‘Islamic’, ‘Shi’i’ or 
‘Iranian’ culture as being definitive of Iran’s behaviour as a state. These images of Shi’ism 
thus define Iran’s war strategies in Buzan & Herring’s characterisation of Iran as 
“insensitive” to the human cost of war due to its tactical use of human wave attacks during its 
war with Iraq.
207
 They are also present in Ray Takeyh’s assessment: 
Military planning and issues of strategy and tactics were cast aside for the sake of martyrdom 
and sacrifice. The war and the revolution had somehow fused in the clerics’ imaginations. To 
wage war was a way of demonstrating one’s commitment to the divine mission launched by 
Khomeini in 1979.
208
 
Explicit linkage between Shi’i religiosity and an irrational, otherworldly desire for 
martyrdom has even entered into one CIA report as a direct security threat to the United 
States: “[i]n the minds of the most impassioned Shia believers, killing Americans is a way of 
demonstrating the strength of their faith”.209 Such images reinforce a tendency towards what 
Patrick Porter has analysed as ‘military orientalism’.210 They project a model of Iranian 
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strategic preferences based upon essentialist accounts of how culture and religion impact 
Iranian military strategies and tactics; namely through implying a linear relationship between 
ahistorical characteristics of the Shi’i-Iranian ‘other’ (defined, more often than not, by 
Westerners) and Iranian strategic agency.  
When consumed within the deterrence parameter, Iran’s apparent penchant for martyrdom 
becomes an especially important concern in the assessment of how it would behave with 
nuclear weapons: 
[a]ccording to Cold War logic, the fact that America could react to a hundred thousand of its 
own dead by inflicting ten million on the enemy served as a sufficient deterrent to the other 
side not to attack. But against a culture that glorifies death in “Holy War,” the principle of 
deterrence dissolves.
211
 
Within these essentialist and orientalist approaches to understanding the impact of religion on 
Iranian strategies and tactics for war after the Revolution, the line here between tactical and 
strategic use of what are considered “suicide” tactics employed by Iran during previous 
conflicts become severely blurred. Orientalism penetrates strategic analysis through 
presupposing a Shi’i and Islamic “essence” which can determine Iran’s strategic preferences, 
overshadow tactical variation,
212
 and often to the detriment of international security. Stephen 
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Ward’s assessment of the Iranian ‘threat’ is clearly influenced by this kind of essentialist 
imagination of the origins of Iran’s military tactics: 
Since Iran became a theocracy, the regime has repeatedly stumbled over contradictions 
between its faith and the requirements of modern warfare, especially as seen in the 
Revolutionary Guard’s bloody battles during the Iran- Iraq War. […] They appear to be trying 
to reinvigorate Iran’s revolutionary spirit and restore its reliance on religious zeal and 
martyrdom as a basis for success in military operations. The combination of Iran’s 
contemporary Islamic fervor with its imperial tradition is a major factor that, if left 
unbalanced by more cautious forces in Iran, inflates the Iranians’ willingness to take risks and 
increases the threat of conflict with the United States and the West.
213
 
While a more dynamic approach could be found for instance in attempts at differentiating 
between the strategic and tactical usages of terrorism,
214
 existing approaches at explaining the 
tactical decisions Iranians make as far as they are rooted in grander strategic objectives do not 
present its preferences as undergoing constant flux. Instead, Iranian strategy is presented 
ahistorically as a cultural-religious signifier of the Iranian-Muslim ‘other’. To be clear,  the 
Iran-Iraq war certainly did feature the use of certain tactics – for instance, so-called ‘human 
wave attacks’ – in large part due to the willingness of many young Iranians to sacrifice their 
lives in serving their country and what they believed was their religion. However, the use of 
such tactics was rooted as much in material factors as they were religious doctrine.
215
In this 
regard the roots of Iran’s strategic preferences, and the tactical decisions that are taken at 
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times of war, both need to be understood in far less essentialist terms than they are presented 
in many representations today. They do not reflect some primordial Shi’i-Islamic essence – in 
this case, a “penchant for martyrdom”216 – or represent any “clear script for action”,217 but 
instead represent “the ambiguous repertoire of competing ideas” that can (but not always) be 
“selected, instrumentalised, and manipulated”.218 The challenge is therefore to understand the 
epistemic framework which governs the selection, instrumentalisation and manipulation of 
this repertoire, and how this framework provides its own boundaries for how ideas related to 
warfare are produced and selected – rather than to attempt to dissect these views within pre-
existing Eurocentric frameworks for analysis. 
The Twelfth Imam and the End of the World 
In a similar vein to how the assumed Shi’i ‘penchant for martyrdom’ facilitates an assessment 
that Iran both seeks and would use nuclear weapons, the implications of constructing belief in 
the Mahdi as distinctly ‘otherworldly’ and apocryphal219 in the nuclear debate also become 
apparent.
220
 The prominence of the idea of the Hidden Imam or Mahdi in literatures and 
commentary on Iran serves to reinforce a case that its nuclear policies are guided by an 
irrational Islamic belief system, putting it at odds with that of ‘rational’ secular states. These 
accounts point to the degree that Iranian decision-making is spurred by a messianic 
worldview of ‘Mahdism’ – an apocalyptic belief that the return of the hidden Twelfth Shi’i 
Imam (al-Mahdi) is imminent, and concomitantly that the end of the world is approaching – 
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as evidence not only of otherworldly Iranian desires for nuclear weapons, but also that it 
could not be trusted to use these weapons only for self-defence if it obtained them. In a report 
for the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) (which has been criticised in the past 
for selective reporting and questionable translations),
221
 Ayelet Savyon and Yossi Mansharof 
make the bold claim that “[t]he messianic doctrine of Mahdism is also manifest in Iranian 
foreign policy, especially in its attitude towards the Western superpowers and towards the 
nuclear program”.222 Jacquelyn Davis and Robert Pfaltzgraff assess the potential for Iran’s 
nuclear policy to be driven by a belief in the return of the Twelfth Imam as “worrisome”, and 
a potentially important source of Iran’s “nuclear ambitions”.223 More generally, Steven Ward 
links a discussion of Iranian attitudes towards warfare with what he sees as otherworldly 
concerns: “Iranian hard- liners, including the Supreme Leader, have reemphasized the Islamic 
Republic’s connection to the Hidden Imam and his coming return for the final battle between 
good and evil.”224  Elsewhere, Willis Stanley argues that Iran seeks a nuclear weapon in order 
to hasten the return of the Twelfth Imam.
225
 Finally, Dore Gold speculates that an Iranian 
bomb “is probably designed to create an apocalyptic opportunity to make Imamite Shi’a 
universally victorious” – another specific reference to the Mahdi.226 
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These constructions of ‘Mahdism’ and belief in the Twelfth Imam’s return are often mapped 
onto a Eurocentric delineation of Iranian political worldviews between ‘hardliners’ and 
‘moderates’, which in the process segregates the belief in the return of the Twelfth Imam to 
the realm of the otherworldly and ultimately hard-line religious belief. Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad is described in one account as having developed nuclear policy under the 
influence of Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, “a leading proponent of 
Mahdism”.227 There is concern that Ahmadinejad and his inner circle could have been 
influenced by other ‘hard-line’ clerics said to be convinced by the idea of the Twelfth Imam’s 
imminent return, such as Ayatollah Nouri-Hamedani.
228
 Saeed Jalili, who headed Iran’s 
Supreme National Security Council from 2007-13 and was Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator 
during the same period, is likewise described as a “devout believer in Mahdism whose 
lifetime interest has been the application of principles derived from millennium-old Islamic 
traditions to Iran’s foreign policy”.229 Another raises issue with Ayatollah Khamenei’s 
education in Mashhad rather than Qom, “where it is not uncommon to find clerics who 
claimed to be in direct contact with the Hidden Imam”.230  
The central anxiety expressed in these literatures is therefore that if nuclear weapons were 
ever to fall into the hands of ‘Mahdists’ in Iran – comprised of clerics, politicians, and even 
military personnel – they would be used. Iran’s inevitable pursuit of nuclear weapons is 
portrayed as entailing an intrinsic offensive rather than defensive purpose, and for this reason 
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makes the Islamic Republic a perpetual proliferation threat. Such accounts of the impact of 
‘Mahdism’ in defining Iran’s strategic preferences, and in the nuclear context especially, 
attempt to link religious belief in the return of the Twelfth Imam with irrational policy 
choices made to hasten his return. Here the factor of religion influencing Iran’s nuclear 
policies is invoked in order to demonstrate why the state (and its clerics and politicians 
especially) is motivated to obtain and use nuclear weapons.
231
 Consequently they define 
belief in the return of the Twelfth Imam – a foundational belief within Twelver Shi’i doctrine 
– as being an inherently irrational source of nuclear policy-making in Iran. 
Despite the inference that ‘Mahdism’ represents a homogenous, primordial ideology among 
the Shi’i, the term has no natural equivalent in classical Islamic texts, and has only entered 
Iran’s political-religious lexicon recently as a political concept as ‘mahdaviat’.232 As with 
concepts such as fatwa following the Rushdie affair, jihad after 11
th
 September, or the 
caliphate following the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) (and 
especially the spectacle of their terror), the concept of Mahdism has been defined in discourse 
over Iran’s nuclear programme according to the narrow confines of a Eurocentric approach 
for understanding religious belief in Iran, guided primarily by threat assessment as opposed to 
literature – derived from the field of Islamic Studies – which specifically addresses this 
concept more rigorously, and in line with definitions produced by Muslims themselves. As a 
result, the projection of Mahdism or ‘mahdaviat’ as an international security issue represents 
an act of social-construction within existing Eurocentric parameters of study and not the 
widening of these parameters to simply objectively factor in the variable of religion. In 
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reality, the concept of mahdaviat cannot be said to objectively reflect a coherent worldview 
among the Shi’a – let alone an irrational one or, as we are reminded by Said, a timeless 
one.
233
  
On the one hand, the utilisation Mahdism in discussions over Iran’s strategic preferences 
implies that, given that belief in the return of the Mahdi is ‘extremist’, the Mahdi is otherwise 
irrelevant to mainstream Shi’i life: “no more than an eschatological idea with little immediate 
relevance to the actual life of society”.234 This is a false premise, and – as we will see in later 
chapters – ignores the plethora of ways in which belief in the return of the Twelfth Imam can 
be expressed in Iranian society and Islamic political theology (e.g. religious taxation of 20% 
of income (khums) collected by maraji on behalf of the Twelfth Imam, the doctrine of wilayat 
al-faqih itself, etc.). 
Trusting the Supreme Leader’s Fatwa 
In light of the assumption that religion both underpins Iran’s strategic preferences and propels 
it towards obtaining a nuclear weapon, a debate has taken place over the validity and even 
existence of Ayatollah Khamenei’s fatwa prohibiting nuclear weapons production.235 Such 
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concerns highlight a common confusion over the conditions of a fatwa’s validity. Ali Ansari, 
for instance, questions the existence of Khamenei’s fatwa on the basis that it cannot be 
accessed by lay audiences in written form.
236
  Resting upon a problematic foundation that 
Islamic law is only valid or relevant as far as it is codified, this type of analysis is blind to the 
broader spectrum of ways in which Islamic law has historically been communicated to 
audiences. The Qur’an itself is believed to have been transmitted by the Prophet orally, its 
message relayed by followers who memorised it and remained unwritten during the lifetime 
of the Prophet.
237
 In the spirit of this special reverence for the oral transmission of 
knowledge, a fatwa, spoken in front of audiences of thousands of people and televised 
internationally, satisfies the criterion of authenticity even more so than a written fatwa; the 
latter only witnessed by a handful of individuals, and accepted by followers due to the 
presence of an official stamp of the marja al-taqlid’s office.238 The concerns expressed by 
experts such as Ansari also present a basic confusion over the difference between a fatwa 
pertaining to everyday religious practises (such as fasting and religious purity) and one 
pertaining to grander strategic issues, such as nuclear weapons proliferation. While the first 
category of religious edicts would easily be found in written form for the purposes of taqlid, 
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the second type would be less likely to feature in compendiums of religious edicts (i.e. a 
resalah) due to its purpose and more specific audiences.  
The debate over the validity of Khamenei’s fatwa reflects a wider set of orientalist concerns 
about the apparent predisposition of Shi’a conceal their true intentions through the practise of 
taqiyah. In this context, it is said that the Islamic Republic cannot be assumed to be a reliable 
participant in non-proliferation regimes on the basis of Khamenei’s fatwa given the 
propensity of its leaders to lie, and for this propensity to be legitimated under Islamic and 
‘Persian’ cultural practises (e.g. taqiyah).239 Hans Rühle, a former Head of Planning Staff at 
the German Ministry of Defence, likewise believes that the Iranians will inevitably break the 
terms of the JCPOA. "Barely three months after the signing of the nuclear deal, Iran has 
violated both UNSC 1929 and 2231, and tried to justify its actions with blatant lies. This is 
applied “taqiyya” in action."240 He furthermore states there to be a Muslim proclivity towards 
lying and deception rooted in a view of God fundamentally irreconcilable to that held by 
Christians: 
In contrast to Christianity, which proceeds from God as being infallible and just, in Islam 
Allah is "the best of deceivers." Several suras in the Quran contain such references (3:54, 
7:99, 8:30, 10:21, 13:42, 27:50). If and when appropriate, Allah can and will have humans 
speak and act in order to deceive others. The implications of this are clear: if Allah is "the 
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best of deceivers" who leads Islam's enemies astray, his adherents must do the same. The 
principle of "taqiyya" thus rests on firm ground and needs no special justification.
241
      
In addition, the notion of Khamenei reneging on the terms of a fatwa is also considered 
serious: “Khamenei can always change his mind”.242  
Both experts and pundits alike therefore selectively borrow cultural and Islamic concepts in 
arguments for why Iran will seek a bomb regardless of any empty assurances from its 
religious leaders that nuclear weapons are forbidden by Islamic law. Some have even 
discerned continuity between pre- and post- Revolutionary policies rooted in intrinsic 
‘Persian’ culture that transcend sectarian or religious ideology. Here, it is believed that there 
is little discontinuity between the underlying strategic preferences of previous monarchical 
regimes and those of today’s Islamic Republic – with both driven by an urge to expand its 
power and influence.
243
 Such conclusions correspond neatly with a standard realist narrative 
of Iran’s strategic preferences as being immutable and enduring – no more than a symptom of 
grander international or regional dynamics – but nevertheless draw from orientalist models 
for understanding Iranian culture and the Islamic religion. Here the role of religion and the 
ulama are interpreted as purely functional: to help consolidate and expand the power of the 
Iranian state and to secure the survival of a regime.
244
 As a statement from a Professor at 
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Georgetown University in 2009 highlights, these concepts are rarely taken on their own 
terms:  
the Persians seem to have perfected the "art of deception" (in Persian: ketman or taqiyah). 
Taqiyah means dissimulation; ketman means paying lip service to someone in a position of 
authority while disagreeing with what they are saying. Both methods consist of telling 
someone who might harm you what you think they want to hear, as telling the truth might be 
dangerous. The Persians also perfected ta'arof – the use of extremely polite gestures to 
demonstrate to others that you are superior to them. As one pursues dominance and control, 
the enemy becomes overpowered. One rarely even grasps that he or she is being humiliated – 
and ultimately defeated – until it is too late. This concept is totally alien to Western culture.245 
Again, belief in the notion that Iran routinely lies in the course of its nuclear diplomacy, and 
will ultimately cheat through the course of its nuclear deal in order to secure its a-priori goal 
of obtaining a nuclear weapon, gives an impression that Iran cannot be expected to adhere to 
non-proliferation regimes like the NPT, or any other commitments to limiting its nuclear 
capabilities. Concerns in the West at the prospect of an Iranian ‘sneak out’ scenario,246  where 
Iran adheres on the surface to the terms of non-proliferation treaties and other multilateral 
agreements aimed at preventing the illicit diversion of nuclear material for military purposes, 
while maintaining a parallel secret weapons programme far out of reach from monitoring 
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agencies such as the IAEA, illustrates how universal concerns about the efficacy of treaties 
and regimes can be projected as a higher risk when they invoke potent narratives about Islam 
and Iran related to deception. Similar concerns about Iranian negotiating tactics emerged both 
prior to and in the aftermath of the JCPOA,
247
 and comparisons between the JCPOA and the 
Munich Agreement were rife.
248
 Harold Rhode, who was an Advisor on Islamic Affairs to the 
US Secretary of Defense from 1982-2010, writes that “when Iranians think they aren’t being 
observed, they often do the opposite of what they may have just said they believe”.249  
What is notable about these discourses is the manner with which they securitise a relatively 
mundane reality facing all legal agreements and treaties in the context of religious law. As 
such, the possibility that Iran’s leadership could, having previously adhered to an existent 
Islamic prohibition of nuclear weapons, be made to formulate or accept a new Islamic legal 
opinion on nuclear weapons given emerging security threats and new international 
circumstances, is deemed as a unique challenge deriving from the Islamic faith. Yet the 
contingency of all international law on the principle of ‘derogation’, and the proviso that 
“when faced with a public emergency that ‘threatens the life of the nation’, states are able to 
suspend certain basic rights,
250
 draws attention likewise to the transience of secular 
international legal mechanisms aimed at moderating the use of force, and in particular 
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prohibiting the use of weapons of mass destruction. The dilemma of trust is also very much 
apparent in official and unofficial strategic doctrines and policies. Many states possessing 
nuclear weapons today with ‘no first use’ (NFU)251 nuclear policies nevertheless reserve or 
have reserved a right to use nuclear weapons to respond to attacks below the nuclear 
threshold (e.g. massive chemical or biological weapons attacks).
252
In the context of the 
Supreme Leader’s fatwa however, we find that universal dilemmas related to trust and 
mistrust have become subsumed into a metanarrative of East-West relations, wherein 
Western states (and individuals) can be trusted to adhere to international agreements aimed at 
preventing proliferation, and Iran – by virtue of its religious and cultural characteristics – 
cannot.  Within this realm of uncertainty and mistrust, nuclear negotiations between the P5+1 
and Iran, we are told, becomes a chaotic “bazaar”253 where the West can only be tricked into 
believing that there exists a normative obstacle to Iranian nuclear proliferation, and sold a 
deal weighed in favour of Iran. This narrative of deception, legitimated upon grounds of 
religious practise and culture in Iran, has found its way into the rhetoric of Israel’s Prime 
Minister: “[t]he Persians have been using these tactics for thousands of years, before America 
came to be”.254 The rhetoric is also easily picked up by North American analysts such as 
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Mark Dubowitz: “sounds like Obama decided to enter the Persian nuclear bazaar to haggle 
with the masters of negotiation and has had his head handed to him".
255
 It has also been 
exploited by lobbyists representing organisations such as the American Enterprise Institute 
seeking to derail negotiations with Iran that allow it to retain any independent capacity to 
manage its nuclear programme.
256
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has established that a strong component of the threat assessment of Iran’s 
nuclear programme is based upon orientalist discourse concerning how religion impacts 
Iran’s strategic preferences. These assumptions, regarding Shi’i ‘martyrdom’ culture for 
instance, ultimately guide how empirical is read within both academic and policy discourses, 
and find their currency in arguments which present Iran’s nuclear programme as an objective 
international security threat. Such arguments are narrowed and disciplined according to the 
limits of the dominant paradigm for understanding how religion can impact Iran’s strategic 
preferences, which as such distil discourses into conversations over the extent to which Iran – 
by being led by religious scholars – can be deterred from obtaining or using nuclear weapons.  
Within an orientalist account of Iranian strategic preferences, the origins of its policies related 
to security and defence are othered as being irreconcilably different to those of other 
countries. This chapter offered a glimpse into a number of areas where Iranian strategic 
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preferences are imagined as the ‘other’, and how these images have their roots in 
representations of the country’s religious scholars as ‘mad mullahs’. Rather than enriching 
our understanding of normative variance in how strategic policy is formulated across 
different cultures and religions, and among different strategic actors, we find here that these 
approaches present a tautological definition of the Iranian nuclear threat in the sense that 
assessments and projections for where Iranian policy are driven by a range of discourses 
concerning Iran, Islam, and its ulama that construct Iran as an irrational actor. In sum, Iran is 
destined to obtain and use nuclear weapons – a course of action conceived synonymously 
with irrational action – because of self-evident religious and cultural characteristics which 
compel it to do so. 
Given this context, some scholars and experts have either provided refutations of the 
normative agenda at the heart of the threat assessment of Iran’s nuclear programme, or in 
other instances offered modest forms of ‘horizontal’ critique of prevailing discourse through 
providing the counter-argument that Iran is a rational-actor and can be deterred.
257
 This type 
of literature rejects some of the type of ontology surveyed in this chapter as being rooted in 
normative bias and ethnocentrism as opposed to objective ‘fact’. Significant as this literature 
is, what it does not do, however, is challenge to a significant degree the epistemological 
boundaries of how Iran is discussed in the context of its nuclear programme. Why, for 
example, should the question of whether Iran is a rational or irrational actor be so central to 
the discussion? How do we as experts and analysts define as rationality? In an effort to 
illustrate Iran’s ‘rationality’ or prudence in the nuclear debate, foundational questions such as 
these concerning the narrowness of the debate itself have remained unanswered. 
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Just as the discourse of ‘mad mullahs’ relies upon discourses of clerical irrationality in order 
to underpin assessments of Iran’s nuclear intentions, the realist perspective negates their role 
as shapers of its nuclear trajectory, essentially dismissing the ulama once more as being little 
more than unwitting vessels of realpolitik. Many of the arguments we will proceed to assess 
in the next chapter put forth the notion that Iran is a ‘realist’ state, but imply that any of its 
formal policies associated with restraint, pragmatism, or rationality writ large, indicate that 
religion can have only at most a minor impact on its strategic preferences and behaviour as a 
state. The unique agency and thoughts of the ulama scarcely feature at all in this account, 
aside from placating references to their rationality
258
 which is itself conceived in ethnocentric 
terms.  
We will see that just as a reliance on orientalism will inevitably distort and skew the threat 
assessment we make of Iran’s nuclear programme, an overriding reliance on realism 
oversimplifies the link between Iran’s religious-political strategic thinking and an 
overarching systemic game of power-politics, and ultimately reinforces the hegemony of 
secularised IR by assuming that Iran, as a ‘like unit’, would be inevitably compelled to obtain 
nuclear weapons. While realism is able to identify the ephemeral characteristics of self-
interest and the pursuit of material power with regards to Iran, it makes an implicit normative 
claim that Iran’s strategic preferences derive from a Hobbesian ‘state of nature’, rather than 
religious beliefs and values.  
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Chapter Three: The Limits of Realism: Iran as a ‘Like Unit’ in the 
Deterrence Parameter 
*** 
It is strange that the problem of Others has never truly disturbed the realists. To the extent that the 
realist takes everything as given, doubtless it seems to him that the Other is given. In the midst of the 
real, what is more real than the Other?
259
 
*** 
Introduction 
As was established in the conclusion of Chapter Two, an argument could be made that, given 
that much of the discourse on Iran and its nuclear programme is dependent upon orientalism, 
those seeking to provide a more accurate trajectory of Iran’s nuclear programme can simply 
return to more objective, realist foundations for understanding nuclear strategy and patterns 
of nuclear proliferation. This chapter will explore why this avenue is fraught with its own 
problems that my own approach seeks to avoid. I use the term realism to refer to both the IR 
paradigm and its sub-paradigms (i.e. realism, structural realism/neo-realism, etc.), and a 
broader philosophical tendency reflecting a “general theory of (scientific) knowledge”, 
assuming that “the world is independent of our knowledge-gathering activities”.260  
Sanjay Seth notes that the predominant humanist/Weberian approach towards historicism 
treats societies and individuals as the cause or constitutive source of religion, rather than vice 
versa.
261
 What this frequently leads to is the subjection of forms of understandings developed 
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elsewhere in the world to (largely secular) epistemologies, and forms of understanding in the 
language itself
262
 – as Michel de Certeau puts it, repeatedly asking something else of the 
‘other’ than what they had intended in their own speech and practises.263 I argue that through 
situating Iran within a systemic theory of strategic agency which promises to provide an 
empirical, universal model of how states act to preserve their existence under conditions of 
‘anarchy’, realist approaches to understanding strategic decisions in Iran concerning its 
nuclear programme subject religious narratives and agency to a Eurocentric, functionalist
264
 
lens. Even critiques of how the Islamic Republic is presented in contemporary discourse – 
namely as an ‘irrational’ actor led by Muslim fanatics, as surveyed in the previous chapter – 
tend to focus on the refutation of specific normative claims levelled at Iran (e.g., that it’s 
leaders are irrational), or within a more general dismissal of existing literatures and policies 
as being driven by a deep-seated orientalist ontology rather than ‘objective’ realism,265 rather 
than a critique of the terms of the debate itself. Realist critiques of contemporary discourse 
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can be described as horizontal in that it is the ontological claims levelled at Iran, and not so 
much the ‘regimes of truth’266 giving them salience, which are taken to task.  
Deconstruction in this chapter is by contrast more vertical in that it focuses on the epistemic 
restraints that have come to narrow the study of Iran’s strategic preferences, and lend salience 
to the prevailing ontologies associated with the nuclear debate. As Foucault observes, 
[e]ach society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types of 
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which 
enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned the 
techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth, the status of those who 
are charged with saying what counts as true.
267
 
In the context of Iran’s nuclear programme, discourse frequently proliferates around 
ethnocentric definitions of rationality and irrationality in nuclear affairs,
268
 and namely the 
extent to which Iran can be deterred from obtaining or using nuclear weapons. This particular 
epistemological framework for reading Iran’s nuclear programme was not inevitable, but 
rather constitutes a regime of truth I refer to as the ‘deterrence parameter’.  
It is these epistemic constraints, and the manner with which the deterrence parameter 
facilitates the production and reproduction of certain essentialist ontologies associated with 
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Iranian strategic preferences, and ways of defining Iranian strategic agency, that I critique in 
this chapter. Far from reflecting objective facts about international security, nuclear stability 
and proliferation patterns, or an objective empirical framework for understanding Iran’s 
nuclear policies, realist discourse concerning Iran’s nuclear programme in fact reveal much 
more about the limits of intellectual inquiry in understanding religion as an influence for 
strategic behaviour. In this sense, it is worth reassessing the representation of Iran as a 
strategic actor in nuclear discourse with Patrick Porter’s recognition that “Westerners have 
debated about themselves, their own societies and policies, through visions of the Orient”269 
in mind. 
I begin by assessing the importance of social-construction in nuclear proliferation and 
deterrence as theorisation and policy. Social-construction determines the assumptions that we 
make about how states behave in the atomic age, why states pursue nuclear weapons, and 
how they behave once they have them. Both narrative and discourse are therefore crucial 
factors which influence the way in which data is interpreted and understood in the context of 
nuclear proliferation and the conception of nuclear strategy. The importance of narrative and 
discourse to the discussion of nuclear weapons supports the case for adopting a critical, post-
positivist methodology for understanding why the current debate over Iran’s nuclear 
programme is both methodologically flawed, and limited in its explanatory power. One 
reason is that the positivist propensity to objectify and study Islamic discourses concerning 
nuclear weapons and jihad “creates […] an image of ‘ideas’ as discrete objects (rather than 
as ‘beliefs’ or mental events) which can causally influence other objects, in this case 
policies”,270 thus rendering positivist accounts predisposed towards attributing causality to 
Islamic concepts that become reified in the process of tracing the policy-making process. 
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Anthony Burke also observes in his deconstruction of temporal metaphors associated with 
nuclear weapons that positivist accounts are not equipped to facilitate a critique of how 
discourse about nuclear weapons is produced within a specific episteme (and therefore not 
neutral), or how discourse about the ‘other’ in relation to nuclear strategy is conjoined to a 
range of narratives about the ‘self’. Positivist accounts, writes Burke,  
fail to illuminate the political, moral, normative and strategic stakes and conflict around 
nuclear knowledge and policy […] they fail to put under scrutiny the way in which such 
genres of rhetoric and reasoning (strategic, moral, policy, historical etc.) are imagined, 
structured, and deployed in the creation of nuclear knowledge – a ‘knowledge’ which goes 
beyond the raw physics to the creation of dynamic and contested assemblages which link 
science, engineering, strategic doctrine, moral thinking and defence policy into complex, 
contested wholes.
271
 
In this sense, a positivist lens – such as that of realism – will inevitably reveal more about the 
‘West’ than it does about Iranian strategic preferences, and therefore prove adequate only in 
describing the ephemeral characteristics of Iran current policies, but not – as is often implied 
– providing a convincing account of where Iran’s policies could go in the future. In this 
regard, as David Campbell notes, “[t]he path from “raw data” to the finished intelligence 
report is a succession of interpretive practices”,272 and as such realism is merely a prism 
through which Iran’s nuclear programme is read and often securitised.  
Here I focus specifically on the transition from US strategic discourse away from utopianism 
and idealism, towards realism and many of the ideas associated with nuclear deterrence 
theory, and highlight this transition as a process of social construction. This process 
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represented a shift away from viewing the ‘other’ as an irrational actor, to viewing it as being 
driven by the same rational and unexceptional drive of self-preservation as the ‘self’. It is 
crucial that we consider this history so that we may develop a fuller critique of the 
epistemological boundaries which discipline existing literatures and discourses on Iranian 
strategic agency, within which it can only ever be considered an irrational other or ‘like-unit’. 
In this regard, the analysis here informs a more specific study of realist treatments of Iran’s 
strategic preferences towards nuclear weapons later in the chapter, and in particular 
representations of the clergy.   
Narrating Nuclear Strategy and Proliferation Trends 
A realist narrative of why states seek nuclear weapons and how they choose to employ them 
within broader strategic doctrines is frequently taken for granted by students and historians of 
IR.
273
 This narrative holds that the diffusion and indeed proliferation of nuclear weapons –
both horizontally among states, and vertically in terms of numbers of weapons held in 
possession – was inevitable following the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki after 1945. 
Specifically, a tendency towards framing nuclear proliferation as an on-going process in 
accordance with what Benoît Pelopidas calls the “proliferation paradigm”274 promotes a 
linear view the diffusion of nuclear weapons among states (and eventually non-states) “in 
terms of automaticity and contagion”.275 Within the proliferation paradigm, it is enough to 
                                                          
273
 See Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 436; Christopher Hobbs and Matthew Moran, “Looking 
Beyond a Nuclear-Armed Iran: Is Regional Proliferation Inevitable?”, the International Spectator, Vol. 47, No. 
4, December 2012, p. 129. For a rationalist critique of this narrative and our quickness to accept it as 
conventional wisdom, see Scott Sagan, “Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb”, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996-1997, pp. 54-86. 
274
 Pelopidas, “The Oracles of Proliferation”, pp. 297-314. 
275
 William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzanova, “Introduction” in William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzanova 
(eds.), Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Volume 1: The Role of Theory, Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 2010, p.2; Pelopidas, “The Oracles of Proliferation”, p. 298. 
The Nuclear Policies of Iran: Islam and Strategic Thinking in the Islamic 
Republic 
117 
know that nuclear weapons exist to also know that they will evidently spread among states, 
with both the deterrent value and strategic appeal of these weapons taken for granted.  
This perception lends discussions of nuclear weapons a “tragic sense of foreboding over 
debates about international security today”,276 and ultimately colours the way we view the 
direction of Iran’s nuclear programme. It is this sense of foreboding that colours the 
perception that, despite what Iran’s clerics might say about nuclear weapons in public, they 
will naturally pursue what we calculate as being the best military means for protecting the 
Islamic Republic against existential threats, and for preserving (or enhancing) their political 
power.
277
  
As Paul Feyerabend’s observed that histories of science frequently project the narrative of 
innovation and discovery as being simpler, duller and more objective than the vast 
complexities, chaos and mistakes which were and are fundamental to the these processes,
278
 
the dominant realist narrative of nuclear proliferation (and ultimately strategy) reflects a lack 
of appreciation for normative ideas: both in how they determine the nuclear policies of the 
‘self’, and in defining how we view the strategic agency of the ‘other’. Here there exists a 
parallel with popular narrations of the Cold War. Realists frequently narrate the Cold War as 
being an unavoidable outcome of the global distribution of power and military vulnerabilities 
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following the Second World War. Paul Kennedy’s assessment of the emergence of US-Soviet 
superpower bipolarity reflects this tendency, focusing on economic and military metrics of 
‘great power’ status such which permitted the United States and Soviet Union to enter into a 
rivalry.
279
 Of the US side of this equation, he writes that  
[w]ith the traditional Great Powers fading away, it steadily moved into the vacuum which 
their going created; having become number one, it could no longer contain itself within its 
own shores, or even its own hemisphere.
280
 
Equally, Kennedy suggests these metrics as definitive indicators of conflict emergence, 
“[w]hat could not be doubted […] was the Soviet determination not to be left behind”.281 
Military historians are especially inclined to ignore the importance of ethnocentrism in 
accounting for the development of policy after 1945, and certainly the notion that such 
factors played any meaningful role in defining the kinds of nuclear weapons postures thought 
conceivable in those years. “What is remarkable about these attitudes” writes John Lewis 
Gaddis of idealist thinking in US policy-making “is not that they existed but how quickly 
they were given up”.282 In Gaddis’ narrative it was a matter of “weeks” rather than years after 
the bombing of Hiroshima that US officials abandoned the idea that atomic monopoly could 
be a sustainable foundation in favour of a foreign policy designed around coercive 
diplomacy.
283
 This kind of a narrative of strategic policy after 1945 coincides with the 
foundational ‘myths’ of IR as a discipline; specifically the paradigm shift from liberalism to 
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realism as a conclusion to the first in a series of ‘great debates’284 (and subsequently, the rise 
of ‘scientific’ realism and the behavioural revolution which characterised the second ‘great 
debate’)285 following the Second World War. 
In an international strategic context, these narratives suggest that after the US acquisition of 
atomic weapons, immediate structural incentives pushed the Soviet Union towards obtaining 
its own arsenal after 1945. The United States is envisioned here subsequent to its acquisition 
of nuclear weapons, and during the ensuing arms-race, as an almost “passive actor – 
responding only in self-defence when provoked by Soviet actions”.286 Here, the action-
reaction model – where actions “by any potentially hostile state to increase its military 
strength will raise the level of threat seen by other states and cause them to react by 
increasing their own strength”287 – is considered the primary factor defining strategic 
preferences and military dynamics after the introduction of nuclear weapons to international 
affairs. Moreover, the nuclear arms-race between the United States and Soviet Union is 
projected as unavoidable; a marker of the Cold War as a ‘security dilemma’,288 driven by 
what Alex Roland terms “technological determinism”.289  
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These narratives point to the Cold War being inevitable, requiring “little explanation”.290 
Here the United States is conceived as having based its own strategic calculations around 
what were objective, material indicators of its own insecurity, which accommodated the 
rising influence of “strategists in power”291 such as Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn and 
Thomas Schelling (the impact of which on today’s projections of Iranian strategic preferences 
to be surveyed later). This process allowed theories of containment and deterrence to become 
hegemonic, permitting general principles for why powers like the Soviet Union would 
inevitably pursue nuclear power and ultimately nuclear weapons. The narrative that global 
strategic postures and policies towards nuclear proliferation were – and are still, in the case of 
Iran – guided first and foremost by a prudent, benign calculation by states of how atomic 
weapons technology transform the balance of power in an anarchic, ‘self-help’ system, 
therefore denotes a realist heritage.  
Likewise today, Iran’s alleged pursuit of a nuclear weapon is considered in terms of 
automaticity with general reference to systemic or regional distributions of hard-power, and 
proliferation is ultimately taken for granted. Here the potential that Iranian strategic 
preferences could depart from those of other states – beyond the orientalist ontology surveyed 
in Chapter Two – and that religion could play an important role in shaping Iran’s nuclear 
policies, is conceived as an almost abstract concern divorced from the empirical business of 
objectively forecasting and predicting nuclear proliferation in the Middle East through 
reading quantitatively measurable variables of insecurity.
292
 The narrative goes some way 
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towards explaining why today’s discussion of Iran’s nuclear intentions is – like much of the 
traditional ways of studying nuclear weapons – perceived as a predominantly empirical affair.  
Structural-realism provides a link between the view that the Cold War – and ultimately 
nuclear proliferation, as well as the arms-race between the two superpowers – was inevitable, 
and more conceptual accounts of the roots of Iranian strategic preferences in the nuclear field. 
As a paradigm, it bridges the gap between nuclear strategic discourse and IR by locating the 
root causes of the acquisition of nuclear weapons in systemic sources of mutual insecurity 
that rendered these weapons both an attractive deterrent for states, and the ultimate guarantors 
of stable bipolarity: 
In the great-power politics of bipolar worlds, who is a danger to whom is never in doubt […] 
The United States is the obsessing danger for the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union for the 
United States, since each can damage the other to an extent no other state can match.
293
 
Kenneth Waltz’ Theory of International Politics (1979) is a formative text of this paradigm in 
IR. Waltz would go on to establish himself  as a foremost critic of prevailing representations 
of Iranian strategic agency, insisting that Iran is a rational actor and that it obtaining nuclear 
weapons could be “the best possible result: the one most likely to restore stability to the 
Middle East”.294 Outlining a series of immutable laws of international relations which 
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preclude the Cold War from being an outcome of social-construction, Waltz proposes that it 
is structures rather than individuals or cultures which “limit and mold agents and agencies 
and point them in ways that tend toward a common quality of outcomes even though the 
efforts and aims of agents and agencies vary”.295 Crucially for Waltz, it is states rather than 
individuals or domestic institutions which operate as agents of war and peace in what is 
conceived as an ‘international system’ – a conclusion he systematises from his earlier critique 
of ‘first image’ (classical realism) and ‘second image’ (liberalism) theories in Man, the State 
and War: a Theoretical Analysis.
296
 To this day, the assumptions of this paradigm influence 
our understanding of nuclear strategy,
297
 and the notion held by critics of orientalist accounts 
that clerics and religious belief are by and large irrelevant drivers of Iranian security policy. 
As a rationalist theory of conflict, power is here calculated almost mathematically, and state 
agency becomes synonymous with the pursuit of military guarantors of security in an 
anarchic ‘self-help’ system. This leads Waltz to predictably adduce that “[a]lmost as soon as 
their wartime alliance ended, the United States and Soviet Union found themselves locked in 
a cold war”.298 Here, ideology, culture and certainly religion are of little relevance for 
analysis relative to ‘hard-power’ factors which influence strategic policy. 
Imagining the Other’s Strategic Preferences 
Despite the salience of these accounts of the Cold War in the trajectory of assessing the 
other’s strategic agency in the atomic age, a wholly realist narrative cannot account for a 
continued streak of American exceptionalism in both US strategic policy and the assumptions 
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made concerning certain ‘cultural’ roots of Soviet strategic preferences (and specifically 
Soviet attitudes to warfare) lasting beyond 1945. The discursive shifts that would permit the 
Soviet Union to become equated in psychological and motivational terms with the United 
States, and ultimately recognised as a ‘rational’ adversary with similar interest in attaining a 
nuclear weapon for their own security – rooted in the anarchic structuring of the international 
system – were perhaps more instrumental to the rise of more pragmatic policy designs 
confronting nuclear issues than material factors themselves.  
Such a transition in the context of US-Soviet superpower rivalry is imagined as a linear 
departure from utopian doctrines towards a more objective (and enlightened) analysis of 
capabilities, vulnerabilities and mutual interest for self-preservation in the atomic age. Such a 
linear path is marked by a stable balance of terror during the 1950’s and 1960’s, and later 
periods of détente and rapprochement between the superpowers in the 1970s. In a similar 
fashion, calls today for a similar process of reconciliation with Iran
299
 likewise project the 
benefits for strategy and policy of rethinking the ‘other’ as an outcome of more prudent, 
rationalist analysis of strategy agency. 
Yet contrary to the rationalist myth of the origins and trajectory of the Cold War, as well as 
the primary variables driving strategic postures and nuclear policies – which today reinforce 
the ‘proliferation paradigm’ in assessments of where Iran’s nuclear programme is headed – 
US policies years after 1945 did little to reflect the global balance of power. For a brief 
period, the United States believed that they could “base the postwar [sic] period on good faith 
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and getting along with everybody”,300 and did not imagine that nuclear weapons would 
immediately change this dynamic. According to Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State 
and staunch proponent of realism, few statesmen “gave any attention to what would happen 
after the war”. In a similar vein, Moeed Yusuf states that academic and policy discourse 
began to design policies around the assumption that ‘horizontal’ or ‘Nth’ proliferation was 
inevitable only after 1949
301
 – the year of the first Soviet atomic test. Transforming the Soviet 
Union discursively into a potential superpower rival with eyes on atomic parity or superiority 
was more contingent on imagining it as such than it was access to ‘better’ intelligence 
following 1949. 
That nuclear deterrence postures – both as policies designed to deter other nuclear powers 
from using their arsenals, and policies designed to deter states from obtaining them – were 
both drawn up as policy in such haste after the first Soviet atomic test, and endured even after 
the Cold War had ended,
302
 lends itself to an important counter-narrative stating that it was in 
fact ways of thinking about the ‘other’ – rather than material indicators of proliferation on 
their own – which played a fundamental role in shaping nuclear weapons policies and the 
growing salience of the proliferation paradigm. Far from being guided first and foremost by a 
prudent analysis of Soviet military strength and vulnerability, as a narrative such as 
Kennedy’s would suggest,303 early policies and discourse were informed by specific 
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perceptions of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ in the context of atomic technology. This counter-
narrative is important to take into consideration especially when one considers the United 
States’ own intelligence estimates which predicted that the Soviet Union would acquire its 
own independent nuclear arsenal. The Soviets had begun atomic weapons research in 1943 on 
the orders of Josef Stalin,
304
 accelerating their efforts to attain a bomb in July 1945 after US 
President Harry S. Truman informed Stalin of US intent to detonate an entirely new 
destructive weapon in Japan. Although “[t]he scientist’s fears about freezing out the Soviets 
had been realized [...] the president had chosen to ignore their warnings”.305 The Soviets were 
also projected by a variety of intelligence services to attain an atomic weapon sometime 
between 1950 and 1965.
306
 Though these incorrect estimates can certainly be attributed partly 
to intelligence failures, there does also appear to have been little appreciation at the time that 
the Soviet Union’s strategic planning would ‘mirror’ that of the United States. Soviet 
strategic preferences were imagined as being born out of fundamentally different ways of 
thinking about warfare than those which compelled strategic planners in the United States. 
The notion that another state – let alone the ‘Asiatic’ Soviet Union – could develop its own 
nuclear programme independent of American assistance, or even overtake the United States 
in the quality or quantity of its weapons, did not guide how intelligence was read or policy 
was developed until after the first Soviet atomic test in 1949. Up until that moment, 
Sovietologists such as Geroid T. Robinson – inaugural head of Columbia's Russian Institute – 
would propose essentialist and ‘orientalised’ views of the roots of Russian strategic 
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preferences, such as that Russian foreign-policy decisions were born from an apparent 
"Byzantine-Asiatic" inheritance and not rational choice.
307 Such ethnocentric views of 
strategic agency as indicators of modernity, which conflated Western patterns of strategic 
decision-making with cultural superiority, persisted throughout the 20
th
 century. Booth for 
instance notes the tendency to frame the development of the Soviet Navy during the 1970’s 
as an outcome of the Russians having “discovered” sea power:308 
The implication of this attitude is that their approach has hitherto been inferior and backward, 
but that now it is moving out of the northern mists into the light of the only begotten 
Mahan.
309
 
What we therefore find is that dominant discourses constructed in the West concerning the 
strategic preferences of the Soviets revealed “very little about what was actually going on in 
the Soviet Union but a great deal about the fears and fascinations of the West”.310 Atomic 
energy and weaponry were subsumed into a narrative of US exceptionalism, and imagined as 
being uniquely under its domain: “it was America that took over the knowledge, organized it, 
fitted it together, underwrote the engineering work required, and got out in front with every 
indication that it means to stay in front”.311 Such a narrative of nuclear technology also 
impacts certain assessments today based around a bewilderment that Iran, as a ‘Third World’ 
Muslim country, could have genuine aspirations to maintain and develop the most ‘modern’ 
of scientific technologies available. Similar to representations of Russians as driven by an 
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intrinsic irrationalism which would at best delay and at worst prevent them from mastering 
atomic technology, certain images of suicide bombings and acts of terrorism have also been 
conjured in attempts at presenting the Islamic faith as inherently both anti-science and anti-
technology.
312
  
One particular area of US strategy – “nuclear one worldism”313 – specifically highlights the 
centrality of ethnocentric views about nuclear weapons and the strategic preferences of the 
‘other’ (in this case, the Soviet Union) well after the end of the Second World War. It also 
provides a better picture of how a regime of truth can come to govern discourse on nuclear 
weapons strategy towards policies that do not necessarily reflect objective ‘facts’ about 
global distributions of power, or the strategic preferences of the ‘other’. This strategy aimed 
at maintaining atomic monopoly and promoting a world in which the civil use of nuclear 
energy would be dictated by the United States alone.
314
 Successive US administrations of 
Roosevelt (1941-45) and Truman (1945-49) chose to design and push strategic postures 
around the assumption that a unipolar world order could be sustainable in the long-term, right 
up until Soviet Union’s first successful nuclear test (known as RDS-1, or ‘First Lightning’) in 
1949. Both inter- and post- war administrations rejected policy recommendations which 
contradicted the assumption that pursuing atomic monopoly could be a realistic course for 
policy, or recommended that the United States perhaps share its nuclear knowhow with its 
wartime allies.  
The Baruch Plan represented an early attempt at promoting nuclear one-worldism. Drawn up 
in 1946 and presented at the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission on 14
th
 June of that 
year, the Plan proposed that a system of international control over raw atomic materials be 
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implemented.
315
 The Plan proposed that an International Atomic Development Authority be 
created, tasked with overseeing 
all phases of the development and uses of atomic energy […] for then and only then would 
the United States be prepared both to cease the manufacture of atomic bombs and dispose of 
its stockpile.
316
 
Such ideas contained in the Baruch Plan had their roots in establishment thinking. For Henry 
Stimson, who oversaw the Manhattan Project, US-led control over atomic technology was so 
profound an obligation that failure in doing so would represent a “disaster to civilization”317. 
Full control was in his view the only course of action that would ensure a lasting world peace 
where “our318civilization” could be “saved”.319 Indeed, some of the language contained in the 
Plan reveals a far grander significance than just US national security interests: 
Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can 
work our salvation. If we fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of Fear. Let us 
not deceive ourselves: We must elect World Peace or World Destruction.
320
 
Disarmament would – naturally, given the US monopoly on these weapons – be a process 
undertaken for the good of mankind by the United States at its own pace: 
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We of this nation, desirous of helping to bring peace to the world and realizing the heavy 
obligations upon us arising from our possession of the means of producing the bomb and from 
the fact that it is part of our armament, are prepared to make our full contribution toward 
effective control of atomic energy.
321
 
A similar ethos of gradual dissemination of nuclear technology under the auspices of United 
States, who would retain in both quantitative and qualitative terms a position of atomic 
hegemony, came to permeate the Atoms for Peace programme (in which Iran would 
eventually participate). Atoms for Peace would subsequently materialise in the form of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose Board of Governors membership was 
guaranteed for many years to be composed of “states most developed in nuclear 
technology”,322 and particularly the United States.  
Aspirations for nuclear one-worldism were met with instant opposition, and shown to be 
unpragmatic and driven by utopian idealism. Soviet scientists and politicians unsurprisingly 
viewed the Baruch Plan in starkly different terms to those of the US government. 
Anticipating latter-day critiques of the IAEA, and numerous disparities at the heart of the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty that a state of ‘nuclear apartheid’ between the nuclear 
‘haves’ and ‘have nots’,323 they feared that the Baruch Plan amounted to an “international 
organization, likely U.S.-dominated, to control or inspect all aspects of Russian atomic 
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production and resources”.324 These types of utopian plans were also criticised by a swathe of 
realist strategists who would ultimately rethink the Soviet Union and the place of the United 
States in the world. The main premise of Stimson’s arguments and the outline of the Baruch 
Plan were for instance irreconcilable with ideas outlined anonymously by George Kennan in 
his now famous ‘X Article’ for Foreign Affairs one year later in 1947. In the article, Kennan 
outlined his realist theory of containment, and called for the Soviet Union to be not 
‘converted’ but instead ‘contained’. For Kennan, the United States had to focus its efforts 
mounting a more long-term challenge to Soviet designs on achieving hegemonic status: 
the United States has in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet 
policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and 
circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote 
tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual 
mellowing of Soviet power.
325
 
Given that the Soviet Union had by that point been considered by and large to possess 
strategic-military doctrines fundamentally different from those in the West, Kennan makes 
two important suppositions in this passage that were symptomatic of break from the 
predominant ontologies associated with thinking about the global balance of power up until 
that point. First, the United States did not need to convert the Soviet Union in order to 
manage it and the international system. The Soviets could be forced to behave in certain ways 
that were beneficial for the United States through carefully signalled and calculated US 
actions that would prompt predictable reciprocal actions. These reciprocated actions could be 
anticipated, and therefore conducive to a balance of power between the two states. Second, 
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Kennan implies that this approach of containment – dependent on a multipolar or at least 
bipolar (as opposed to unipolar) world – could be incredibly stable. 
Recommendations that the United States design its policies around an assumption that Soviet 
mastery of nuclear weapons technology would be only a matter of time, and should therefore 
be managed rather than prevented, were as likely to come from scientists who had worked on 
the Manhattan Project as they were from realists such as Kennan. A series of memoranda 
from James Bryant Conant and Vannevar Bush to Stimson confirm that leading scientists and 
administrators of the Manhattan Project had advised that the President should authorise the 
sharing of information about the bomb, believing the task of keeping the ‘atomic secret’ from 
its allies to be futile: “the height of folly”.326 Other requests from the scientific community 
came in the form of the Report of the Committee on Political and Social Problems of the 
Manhattan Project "Metallurgical Laboratory" – more commonly known as the Franck 
Report. Its authors argued that the United States 
cannot hope to avoid a nuclear armament race, either by keeping secret from the competing 
nations the basic scientific facts of nuclear power, or by cornering the raw materials required 
for such a race.
327
 
While these scientists certainly held idealist beliefs regarding the role that scientific 
‘internationalism’ and specifically the diffusion of nuclear technology internationally would 
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play in securing global peace,
328
 they grounded their recommendations on what they believed 
was a very practical assessment of incentives and capacities for other major powers to ‘go 
nuclear’.  
Despite these views, policy continued to reflect a belief that ‘shutting out’ the Soviet Union 
and other states from atomic technology was a sustainable course, despite protestations from 
James Franck, co-author of the report and a leading nuclear physicist, who described this 
course bluntly as “too stupid even for the movies and the funny papers.”329 Today, similar 
criticisms have been levied at calls by opponents of the JCPOA for greater intrusion in Iran’s 
civil nuclear programme, and Iran’s indefinite suspension of higher enrichment capability. As 
the prolific structural-realist Stephen Walt remarked of opposition to the JCPOA – which he 
characterised as being driven by “magical thinking” – “even a country as powerful and secure 
as the United States pays a price when it allows magical thinking to shape national policy”.330  
As a somewhat logical conclusion to the exceptionalist vision of atomic technology and 
weapons in the United States after 1945 was the rise of ‘coercive diplomacy’: the use of force 
– or the threat to use force – in order to achieve political objectives (a doctrine which persists 
to this day).
331
 This amounted to thinking about how to use atomic weapons in order to 
conquer, in the words of Henry L. Stimson, “forces of nature too revolutionary and dangerous 
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to fit into the old concepts”:332 states which were believed to threaten strategic equilibrium. 
The doctrine conceives the US atomic arsenal as representing "a valuable instrument for 
maintaining law and order in the post-war world [...] above all because they were an 
American monopoly".
333
 Even after the acquisition of nuclear weapons after 1949 by other 
major powers, the assumption which underpinned coercive diplomacy – that the United 
States was obligated to use nuclear threats when necessary in order to preserve its own 
security interests, and that these interests were synonymous with international security – 
remained ever-present in US military doctrine. Examples range from President Nixon’s use 
of a nuclear alert to prompt Soviet pressure on North Vietnam in 1969,
334
 to plans to develop 
(before calls for R&D funding were dropped 2005-06
335
) Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrators 
(RNEP) – ‘bunker-busters’ – which veteran journalist Seymour Hersh claims were primarily 
aimed for pre-emptive use against nuclear sites in Iran.
336
 Taken into account, it can be said 
that US policy in the immediate post-war era was in this area of policy geared towards 
convincing other states (with if necessary force or the threat of force) of the ‘benefits’ of 
complying with a global order whose terms would inevitably be set by the United States.
337
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These terms would naturally overlap with US national security interests, and the taken-for-
granted assumption that the United States was obligated to use its military superiority to keep 
a Pax Americana for the benefit of the world. 
Understanding the epistemic parameters which helped determine that  proposals such as those 
contained in the Franck Report were rejected, and those contained in the Baruch Plan were 
championed, is essential for us to understand the securitisation of Iran’s nuclear programme 
today beyond the notion that these threat assessments reflect objective truths about the 
driving force behind its intentions and capabilities. The United States’ achievement of atomic 
hegemony by the end of the Second World War overlapped neatly with its narratives of 
American exceptionalism, and in this regard it is no surprise that the idea of nuclear 
governance remained a compelling one in Washington. The convergence was seemingly 
obvious enough to convince one government advisor (and later President of the Carnegie 
Institution for Science) in 1946 that “[t]he challenge to our leadership — moral, intellectual 
and political — will come during the first meetings of the Atomic Energy Commission, 
scheduled to begin about the time these lines appear in print.”338 When arguing that nuclear 
secrecy undermined the reputations of both the US and Soviets as ‘great’ civilisations in 
1953, John Foster Dulles’ marked nuclear weapons as a signifier of modernity in stating that 
“[i]n the past higher civilizations have always maintained their place against lower 
civilizations by devising more effective weapons”.339 Even Kennan, often considered the 
father of US containment policy, was not immune to potent narratives of American 
exceptionalism at the heart of the United States’ new position of hegemony and atomic 
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primacy. He ultimately assigned what would be otherwise considered in realist terms a 
benign post-war balance of power unique teleological significance:  
[…] the thoughtful observer of Russian-American relations will find no cause for complaint 
in the Kremlin’s challenge to American society. He will rather experience a certain gratitude 
to a Providence which, by providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has 
made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and 
accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended 
them to bear.
340
  
Containment for Kennan then, which presupposes an adversarial challenge to US primacy, 
and in the case of the Soviet Union pointed to the existence of a political system and ideology 
dichotomous to the ideals sought by the United States, was in Kennan’s eyes itself an 
affirmation of manifest destiny – a challenge to be eventually overcome. 
The presumption of “American moral and political guardianship over atomic technology” not 
only pushed the United States towards policies designed to maintain its atomic monopoly, but 
also more crucially, as Shane Maddock observes, inevitably “undercut the professed U.S. 
goal of nuclear containment”.341 We find that the advent of US atomic supremacy did not 
bring about an immediate or considerable shift away from the basic premises of idealism in 
policy, despite the material indicators of Soviet nuclear ascendancy being ‘inevitable’. This is 
not to say that US policy-makers were, in Gaddis’ caricature, “babes in the woods, innocently 
unaware of the relationship between power and interests”,342 but instead that we should not 
lose sight of the normative framework – and ultimately, the epistemic parameters – which 
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permitted those salient ideas and assumptions related to the place of the United States in the 
world to determine aspects of nuclear policy. One historian makes the comment that  
Truman simply absorbed nuclear energy into a preexisting pattern of thought that housed both 
idealistic and realistic elements—if international co-operation could not harness the danger 
and promise of nuclear energy, the United States would have to rely on nuclear superiority to 
deter aggression or to prevail in war should deterrence fail.
343
 
The poor reception of the Franck Report and commitment to the Baruch Plan between 1945-
49 both problematise the notion that we can today project increased horizontal nuclear 
proliferation  – especially with regards to Iran – based on reference to what are considered 
objective, ‘material’ sources of insecurity, characterised by realists like Waltz as the 
‘systemic’ causes of nuclear proliferation and “spreading”344 efforts. Today the diffusion of 
nuclear weapons is viewed precisely "in terms of automaticity and contagion",
345
 or from 
within what Benoît Pelopidas calls the ‘proliferation paradigm’.346 This paradigm conflates 
rational agency with nuclear proliferation, or at the very least an Anglo-American-European 
tradition of lending nuclear weapons deterrent value as guarantors of state security. As 
Pelopidas reminds us, "proliferation" is itself a word borrowed from biology, retaining 
pathological connotations and lends an impression of inevitability
347
 that does not allow 
space for normative values to be considered as having impact on the development of strategic 
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preferences in the nuclear age.  Such a paradigm conceives Eurocentric thinking developed 
during the Cold War concerning nuclear strategy and rational action as being universal, 
negating the possibility of other conceptions of rationality:  
[t]he one-sided and Eurocentric logic of ‘planned’ proliferation, which promotes horizontal 
proliferation to those states that neorealists deem ‘rational’ and ‘objective’ is merely a 
reproduction of the superpower-based ‘Cold War’ era thinking. These ideologies disregarded 
the agency of the ‘weak’ and ‘powerless’, and the importance of the Global South or ‘Third 
World’ in affecting international affairs, and arbitrarily assigned rationality and objectivity to 
the great powers.
348
 
There are historical examples of states foregoing nuclear weapons or energy despite 
seemingly practical reasons to keep them. It was assumed, for instance, that an Egyptian 
nuclear weapon would be the inevitable outcome of the regional balance of power in the 
Middle-East in the late 1960’s and early 1970s. As Pelopidas highlights, Egypt’s decision to 
give up its nuclear weapons programme after Israel was widely believed to have developed 
its own arsenal challenges conventional wisdom about the reasons why states pursue nuclear 
weapons.
349
  
A faith in the ability of policy-makers, strategists, and international security scholars to 
benignly interpret material indicators of security and insecurity, and – based on such an 
analysis – accurately forecast patterns of nuclear proliferation (and ultimately construct their 
own policies) therefore precludes a more holistic understanding of how material factors are 
read against powerful discourses and narratives in the process of threat-assessment. It 
assumes that the intelligence analyst is free from normative prejudice: the “perfect analyst”, 
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“free of nationally inflected education and prejudice and orthodoxy”, possessing “crystalline 
certainty of perception”.350 Similarly, as David Campbell points out, “much of the discourse 
on intelligence […] begins from the unstated assumption that knowledge is something that 
can be perfected such that its object of concern can be transparently observed”.351  
The early atomic age reveals that knowledge is rarely ever produced or consumed within a 
vacuum. Early nuclear policies were informed by discourses that were rendered salient within 
specific epistemic boundaries of strategic thinking, or ‘regimes of truth’, which determined 
how the strategic preferences of the ‘self’ and ‘other’ were considered as reflecting objective 
truth. At that time, this regime of truth precluded the Soviet Union from being viewed as a 
fully rational actor. The idea that the Soviets “stood outside the bounds of Western 
civilization and could not be counted on to act rationally and honourably”352 played an 
important part of determining which types of Soviet responses to US policies were conceived 
as imaginable. US nuclear policies and strategic postures since the Second World War were 
in this sense influenced by ethnocentrism, and this may have delayed policy-makers from 
contemplating a long-term strategy of deterrence in favour of grandiose aims of maintaining 
an atomic monopoly and coercing other states to conform to its global order. Whereas the 
emerging Soviet atomic ‘threat’ was initially downplayed based on a particular reading of 
what were believed to be the cultural roots of its strategic preferences, we find today that 
through  ‘orientalising’ the alleged cultural and religious origins of Iran’s strategic 
preferences that the opposite conclusion is drawn.
353
 On the other side of the spectrum then, 
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the United States has heavily securitised Iran’s nuclear programme in spite of its own 
intelligence estimates.
354
 
Imagination has therefore always played a crucial role in how military intelligence 
assessments of emerging technologies that would transform the enemy’s strategic and tactical 
doctrines of warfare are read by policy-makers unfamiliar with the extent to which culture 
and ideology can impact such decisions, and especially when there is already a lack of 
technical data.
355
 Furthermore, it precludes an understanding of how normative values within 
other states can shape their strategic preferences through helping to determine how technical 
data and seemingly ‘objective’ metrics of insecurity are viewed. Our modern assumption of 
“Homo Strategicus”356 in the context of how Iran is threat-assessed, and indeed its own 
formulation of strategic policy, warrants deconstruction. 
Ethnocentrism and ‘Thinking the Unthinkable’ in the Deterrence Parameter 
A more realist focus on seemingly objective geopolitical metrics of nuclear proliferation, and 
potential successes or failures of deterrence, distinguish another set of ontologies situated 
within the boundaries of the regime of truth governing dominant narratives of Iran’s nuclear 
trajectory. Within this deterrence parameter, realist discourses and narratives related to the 
origins of and driving force behind Iran’s nuclear intentions have become more salient in 
defining academic and policy accounts (see the next section). Such accounts model Iranian 
strategic agency according to the core assumptions of structural realism, and as almost 
polemical rebuttals to the ontological orientalism permeating much of the discourse on Iran’s 
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nuclear programme (surveyed in the previous chapter).
357
 In the process however, they 
dismiss or downplay the importance of religion, culture and ideology in the Islamic Republic 
as factors which determine its strategic preferences concerning nuclear weapons, constructing 
Iran as a ‘like-unit’. Religious actors and values are viewed largely as superfluous to what are 
seen as objective definers of its own ‘hard security’ agenda, or at most, functional in the 
sense that they exist only to legitimise certain pre-determined courses of action. Iran is within 
this account considered a rational actor based on an ethnocentric conception of rationality 
defined by norms, institutions and forms of strategic preferences conceived in the West. 
Thus, through conceiving a new ontology of ‘rational’ action, theorists and commentators of 
the realist persuasion nevertheless fail to conceptualise Iranian strategic agency beyond the 
confines of a dominant regime of truth which privileges the ethnocentric definition of 
rationality in other states as mirroring that within Western states. 
We have thus so far highlighted the adoption of more realist deterrence postures in the 1950’s 
as a choice born of the social-construction of the Soviet ‘other’. With the 1949 Soviet atomic 
test, policy makers began to consider more seriously the ramifications of coexisting with a 
fully rational, technologically capable, and strategically ‘modern’ Soviet Union, and what this 
would mean for the United States’ own postures. In order to buttress this shift in policies 
from monopoly and prevention to those centred on containment and deterrence, Soviet 
identity – as well as that of the United States – underwent a radical reconstruction, and in the 
process lost much of its otherness. Whereas a US Secretary of Defence (1947-49) James V. 
Forrestal was once able to proclaim that “the Russians, like the Japanese, are essentially 
Oriental in their thinking”,358 to so easily dismiss the premise of mutual-rationality on the 
basis of the racist ontology of orientalism did little to convince a swathe of realist thinkers 
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whose strategic analysis of Soviet military and political agency was informed less by 
civilisational binaries than the seemingly objective metric of power: material capabilities.   
The rise of a network of “defense intellectuals”359 facilitated a shift in strategic policies away 
from the narrative of US exceptionalism and towards those of realism. The defence 
intellectuals – among whom the most well-known are Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling and 
Herman Kahn – viewed their type of analysis as a departure from that of previous strategic 
thinkers in the sense that it was designed in order to identify empirically the material factors 
which guided state behaviour and interaction. This move towards realism in the theory and 
practise of nuclear weapons strategy serves as a microcosm of a broader trend in IR theory 
during the same period away from idealism to realism during the behavioural revolution of 
the 1950’s and 60’s.360 Their rise marked an ontological shift within the deterrence 
parameter, and the consolidation of certain assumptions that became and remain hegemonic 
in both the study and design of nuclear weapons strategy. 
These theorists and their peers downplayed the analysis of the others’ unique cultural, 
ideological, and religious sources of strategic preferences. Quite the opposite, Strategy in the 
Missile Age (1959), On Thermonuclear War (1960), and The Strategy of Conflict (1960) – all 
formative texts in nuclear deterrence theory, and strategic thinking in the nuclear age more 
broadly – all assumed basic motivations for states to use (or threaten to use) nuclear weapons 
predictably, and for other states to pursue them. The authors fashioned their theories about 
deterrence and proliferation while at the RAND Corporation, a policy-institute that would, in 
Kahn’s view, be chastised for its “icy rationality” in opposition to “warm human error”, and 
                                                          
359
 Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon,  p.11. 
360
 John Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 185. 
The Nuclear Policies of Iran: Islam and Strategic Thinking in the Islamic 
Republic 
142 
“nice emotional mistake[s]”.361 In the process of doing so, these defence intellectuals 
privileged US strategic agency in defining the behaviour of the Soviet Union.
362
 Whereas 
idealism had previously situated prudent strategic thinking in the atomic age within a 
uniquely American teleology – promoting the view that atomic monopoly was a both  
necessary and inevitable part of the post-war international order – the de-emphasis in 
deterrence discourse of American exceptionalism accordingly allowed for its adversaries 
(such as the Soviet Union) to be constructed as being on equal terms with it as strategic 
actors. In the process, the Soviet Union would become subsumed into a universal model of 
state agency in the nuclear age, and taken as evidence that culture or ideology have little 
impact on its strategic agency. 
Discourse was growingly couched in an assessment of the study of deterrence as being “the 
theory of interdependent decision”,363 and hence the assumption – pre-empting the 
constructivism of scholars like Alexander Wendt
364
 – that it was impossible to divorce the 
postures of one nuclear state from the other. This type of discourse also saw the emergence a 
novel strategic analysis of conflict management guided by the seemingly empirical 
approaches of game-theory and systems-theory, and analysis based on the assumption that 
states with nuclear weapons behave according to “the reciprocal fear of surprise attack”;365 a 
notion so primordial among all entities (much alike an instinct of self-preservation) that to 
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even consider other motivations, much less intrinsic irrationality stemming from the culture, 
ideology or religious belief of those in power, would be a distraction for policy-making. 
Perhaps the most well-known artefact of this way of thinking about nuclear weapons and the 
‘other’ is the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Conceived by the 
mathematician John von Neumann, the concept referred to the capacity of a state to absorb 
“unacceptable damage” and retaliate in-kind, reducing significantly the incentive for an 
adversary to use nuclear weapons except in circumstances where its own existence is under 
threat. MAD not only assumed that leaders in the Soviet Union were rational, but also that 
increased nuclear weapons proliferation could in fact be a stabilising factor in international 
affairs.  
As previous sections have shown, framing nuclear weapons strategy in such a way was – 
ontologically, at least – novel. It assumed that the mind-sets and strategic preferences of the 
US and the Soviet Union derived from calculations based on what was recognised as a 
mutual necessity of avoiding the extremely high costs of a nuclear exchange, and this 
preserved international stability. Distancing themselves from the objectification of Russian 
otherness which had dominated thinking on post-war international relations, it was their 
theorisation of ‘rationality’ which allowed for the rise in the assumption that states were in 
the strategic realm ‘like-units’, and that the United States was unexceptional in its conduct.  
As this realist model of state interaction became more salient, realism also injected a new 
perspective of the ‘other’ into strategic-thinking and policy surrounding nuclear weapon: an 
unremarkable, predictable and risk-averse mirror of the ‘self’ that could be clearly observed 
especially in a context where any misstep could potentially lead to the complete  annihilation 
of the planet. Such a perspective would, for instance, influence Kenneth Waltz much later as 
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he critiqued the tendency of Western analysts to present nuclear proliferation in the ‘Third 
World’ as being a significant threat to international stability: 
They seem to view their people in the old imperial manner as “lesser breeds without the law.” 
As ever with ethnocentric views, speculation takes the place of evidence. How do we know 
that a nuclear-armed and newly hostile Egypt, or a nuclear-armed and still-hostile Syria, 
would not strike to destroy Israel? Would either do so at the risk of Israeli bombs falling on 
some of their cities?
366 
Even prior to Waltz, ideology and culture were of little currency within the regime of truth 
which governed our understanding how states behave under threat of atomic war or with 
nuclear weapons. Kahn recognises that “[w]e have no tradition in the United States of 
controlling our emotions. We have tended to emphasize the opposite notion […] “Give me 
liberty or give me death””.367 Similarly, when critiquing the state of national security analysis 
in the United States written at the time, he cites both “emotionalism” and sentimentality as 
factors that “only confuse debates”.368 Although theorists such as Kahn were certainly not 
proponents of cultural relativism, the notion that nuclear technology could be maintained as a 
US monopoly, or that nuclear weapons played a unique role in the teleology of the United 
States, did not fit their models of state interaction that aspired to the neutrality of the hard 
sciences.  
An ‘optimist’ view of nuclear weapons, stating that nuclear proliferation was both inevitable 
and conducive to a more stable international system, and a faith in these weapons to enforce 
uniformity in strategic doctrines across cultural, ideological or religious divides by appealing 
to an intrinsic rationality, appealed to those outside of the United States. The English scientist 
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and head of the research & development-oriented British Technical and Scientific Mission, 
Henry Tizard, explained the deterrent value of a nuclear weapon in 1945 by using the 
example of duelling in the old European tradition as a way of underlining the deterrent effects 
of nuclear weapons. In the process, Tizard reinforces the idea of nuclear weapons as utterly 
transformative, marking a departure from previous historic ways of warfare far more brutal 
and in many ways irrational.  
Duelling was a recognised method of settling quarrels between men of high social standing so 
long as the duellists stood twenty paces apart and fired at each other with pistols of a 
primitive type. If the rule had been that they should stand a yard apart with pistols at each 
other’s hearts, we doubt whether it would long have remained a recognised method of settling 
affairs of honour.
369 
We can discern some elements of a civilisational paradigm of weapons of warfare in Tizard 
in the sense that he used the transition from feudal to modern weaponry as a backdrop to 
illuminate what he sees as a trajectory from more primitive (but more likely to be used) 
weapons, to weapons capable of inflicting too great a human cost to be even considered. In 
Tizard’s view, this trajectory is a matter of basic self-preservation and rationality, and by the 
same token applies at the international level. If participants recognise that avoiding escalation 
is prudent, that the consequences of war with these weapons are too great, and that no war 
could realistically be ‘won’, then the weapons are conducive to peace rather than a threat to 
it. This was, of course, as much a hope as it was a genuinely impartial analysis of the 
international system or strategic leadership. There is also a more subtle normative dimension 
to this movement towards strategic automation: namely, the idea that “[civilisations] advance 
by extending the number of operations which we can perform without thinking about 
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them.”370 In this account, national development is inextricably linked with a movement 
towards strategic homogeneity in which postures like deterrence represent its pinnacle. 
In a similar vein as Kahn, Schelling’s work is based around the assumption that just as US 
postures were determined by signals sent by the Soviet Union, nuclear posturing in the Soviet 
Union were likewise driven by signals communicated by the US. Schelling’s acceptance of 
Soviet rationality was as much a defence of proto-constructivist methodology as it was 
cultural relativism. Today, Schelling’s work is formative of our focus upon whether or not 
Iran can be counted on to read signals sent by other states that would be sufficient in 
convincing it not to obtain a nuclear weapon, or use one if it did. In formulating his own 
theories of nuclear deterrence, this premise of Soviet rationality was a prerequisite for 
Schelling’s introduction of game-theory and his treatment of nuclear bargaining as a 
predictive science. Schelling uses a number of examples to underpin the argument that states, 
like individuals – whether consciously or not – read and emit signals to one another in order 
to avoid confrontations, zero-sum losses, and ultimately coordinate mutual behavioural 
patterns more predictably. While Schelling does not entirely discount the potential for 
‘irrational’ action in international affairs, he crucially asserts that “the assumption of rational 
behaviour is a productive one in the generation of systematic theory”,371 and therefore 
conducive to an all-encompassing nuclear strategy. With this newly constructed ‘other’, the 
premise of mutualism in the definition of strategic postures was conceived as not only 
preferable, but vital. 
Brodie would likewise emphasise the centrality of the logic of mutualism to his own reading 
of nuclear strategy even at a time when the Soviets had not developed their own arsenal, 
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commenting as early as 1946 that “[t]he first and most vital step in any American security 
program for the age of atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves in case of 
attack the possibility of retaliation in kind.”372 Brodie viewed Soviet nuclear proliferation as 
an inevitability, and therefore entirely predictable. He was joined by Kahn, who theorised a 
predictable pattern of escalation in the nuclear realm that would correspond neatly to a set 
number of actions and reactions between two or more participant actors. His analysis was 
drawn heavily from systems analysis and game theory, and it formed the basis of a 
framework for understanding, predicting and ultimately modelling conflict and lack thereof in 
the nuclear age. The predictive capacity of ‘modelling’ exercises was believed to be 
considerable, as Antoine Bousquet notes: “[m]odels grew to astonishing levels of complexity, 
fuelled by the desire to create an accurate simulation of conflict, a scientific understanding of 
a quite literal war machine”.373 
Employing modelling techniques, Kahn took the principle of mutualism a step further by 
introducing a model of conflict escalation that remains influential analytically. Kahn’s ‘ladder 
of escalation’, whose rungs ranged from “Ostensible Crisis” (1); through “Harassing Acts of 
Violence” (8), ““Justifiable” Counterforce Attacks” (19), and “Reciprocal Reprisals” (31); to 
“Spasm or Insensate War” (44),374 were premised on an assumption that nuclear postures 
could be built around the communication of intentions through the mobilisation of weapons, 
troops, and other metrics of material power; and with a precise assessment of the balance of 
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power.
375
 While Kahn’s ladder could in reality only be a conceptual exercise (there were no 
historical precedents to base an empirical analysis upon) the notion that escalation could 
transpire as intentions would materialise as the very act of a response to another action, it 
serves as an important precursor to the proliferation paradigm. Its influence can be seen, for 
instance, in concerns of a domino effect of nuclear proliferation in the Sunni-Arab world 
once Iran inevitably develops its own nuclear weapons
376
 – an arms-race considered in terms 
of automaticity, and in light of the founding realist assumption of ‘self-help’,377 rather than in 
light of an appreciation of the distinctive strategic preferences in existence across the Middle 
East and beyond. We may even find confirmation in this domino theory of Hobson’s claim 
that realism negates ‘Eastern’ agency in pursuit of an actor-reactor model, wherein “the West 
is held to be the pioneering agent or subject of world politics while the East is portrayed as a 
passive object of the diktat of the Western great powers”.378 Here, nuclear dominos in the 
Middle East are believed to fall or remain standing based on the effectiveness of US 
superpower ‘penetration’ or ‘overlay’379 in the region (and specifically, its ability to alter the 
course of Iranian behaviour through sanctions or deterrent actions).  
As the deterrence parameter consolidated itself in policy – beyond the complex, theoretical 
abstractions of Schelling and Kahn – politicians and military leaders came to accept the 
notion that some of the United States’ most easterly adversaries were in fact rational actors. 
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This meant in analytical terms a greater appreciation that the behaviour of the Soviet ‘other’ 
was driven not by irrational cultural or ideological factors, but instead an international ‘self-
help’ system.  It is in this context that policies premised on deterrence as well as coercion, 
leading (in theory) to a stable equilibrium between the United States and the Soviet Union 
(“the delicate balance of terror”),380 were imagined. The deterrence parameter hence also 
defines the realist model of Iran’s nuclear programme through disciplining the debate 
according to preconceptions about the universal laws of power and international politics 
which render the Islamic Republic a rational ‘like-unit’ state, ultimately relegating factors 
such as religion and ideology as being superfluous to what are considered universal and 
objective roots of insecurity and nuclear proliferation. It is here that the origins of what Carol 
Cohn labels “technostrategic discourse” lie in the way we study and talk about nuclear 
weapons today, and an overarching “fondness for abstraction” in discussing Iranians strategic 
preferences: the modelling of its nuclear trajectory based on assessments of “hardware rather 
than people”.381 
Narrating Iran’s Nuclear Intentions through Realism: More Heat than Light  
The realist ontology of nuclear weapons and strategy continues to coexist, alongside 
orientalism, as a dominant point of reference for assessing the direction of Iran’s nuclear 
programme, and the impact (or non-impact) religion will have on its strategic preferences 
from within the overarching deterrence parameter. Yet the inability of the realist alternative 
to offer a model of state agency beyond it reflecting an homogenous ‘rational’ pursuit of 
security also draw attention to the added benefits of looking elsewhere – beyond both 
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orientalism and realism, and ultimately the deterrence parameter – for accounts of how 
religion or culture could impact of Iran’s strategic preferences.  
Chapter Two demonstrated the manner with which orientalist perspectives of Islam as an 
irrational basis for strategic preferences (and consequently, Iran as an irrational actor) are 
drawn upon in arguments for why Iran seeks to obtain and use a nuclear weapon. In these 
narratives, Iran’s strategic preferences are defined by what is presented as an Islamic 
‘essence’ and not realpolitik. At first glance a realist refutation against claims like these 
would appear to widen our conception of strategic preferences in the Iranian ‘other’; certainly 
beyond ontological orientalism (i.e. specific normative claims about Islam and Iran which 
attain the status of objective truth). A parallel can be found in how the discourse of the 
defence intellectuals widened our understanding of the origins of Soviet strategic preferences 
in the 1950s and 60s beyond the predominant social construction of its culture and ideology.  
Yet even in accounts where Iran is portrayed as a ‘rational actor’, our conceptualisation of 
Iran’s own strategic preferences remains remarkably narrow; driven by the ethnocentric, 
universalising tendencies of an episteme which permits the modelling of ‘rational’ strategic 
agency in Iran on the Western ‘self’, and in the process, precludes Iranian strategic agency 
from being defined on its own terms. What warrants critique here concerning the realist 
framework is not the idea that Iran can be dissuaded from obtaining or using nuclear 
weapons, but rather the notions that Iran will seek them in the first place, and that its nuclear 
trajectory can be forecasted – and altered – though subsuming Iran into a uniform model of 
how strategic preferences develop in the nuclear age. There is indeed an anthropomorphic 
aspect to this process of constructing Iran’s strategic preferences to nuclear weapons, as far as 
– if we are to borrow from Anne Norton’s study of political identity –  
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[l]ikemindedness is coextensive with a likeness of physiological constitution; that all men, 
insofar as they have the same bodies, have the same capacity for reason, the same emotions, 
the same desires. This conviction […] denies the role of politics and language in the 
constitution of the mind.
382
 
Realist narratives of the origins and direction of Iranian strategic preferences therefore offer a 
glimpse into another dimension of how the study of Iran is disciplined according to the 
narrow secularism of the deterrence parameter. Rarely departing from the central logic 
contained in the literatures surveyed in Chapter Two, the counter-narrative’s assertion that 
Iran is a rational actor coincides with an assessment that religion is unlikely to influence its 
nuclear policies given the realist dictum that it does not influence nuclear policies in other 
states. The underlying logic of this approach proceeds that if the United States were in the 
same geo-strategic circumstances as Iran, they would also seek nuclear weapons.
383
  Islam is 
therefore a largely irrelevant source for Iranian strategic preferences. Iranian proliferation 
aims – in line with Pelopidas’ proliferation paradigm384 – can be understood, anticipated and 
even prevented so long as religion and the religious scholars are conceived as being at the 
very most bit-part players in a prudent game of power-politics among nations.  
The greater the religious zealotry within Iran’s leadership […] the greater might be the 
propensity to brandish nuclear weapons on behalf of an [aggressive Iran]. Conversely, if 
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religious motivations were not in the forefront of Iran’s nuclear development, the greater the 
likelihood that nuclear weapons would play a defensive-deterrent role.
385
  
Substantive attention is not paid in mainstream discourse, for example, to arguments from 
Iranians that Iran’s leadership – or even conservative clerics – might neither link nuclear 
weapons to security, nor accept their deterrent value.  Western analysts on many occasions 
tend to speak on behalf of Iran’s clerics, for instance, when linking nuclear weapons with 
national prestige and independence:  
political leaders like Khamene'i and Rafsanjani see nuclear weapons as an almost magical 
source of national power and autonomy. These men are political clerics, not international 
strategists or technologists. They intuit that the bomb will keep all outside powers […] from 
thinking they can dictate to Iran or invade it.
386
 
Although realism therefore offers an opportunity to depart from the premise of irrationality in 
assessing Iran’s nuclear programme, it is equally the case that it may simplify strategic 
thinking in Iran – and in particular, the ideas and agency of its ulama – to such an extent that 
all its actions become “cloaked in ideology […] driven by self-preservation”387. For example, 
when Trita Parsi claims that Iran’s Islamic revolutionary ideology “veiled a fairly consistent 
pursuit of realpolitik”
388
 during the Iran-Iraq war, he provides insight not for how Iran’s 
leadership view their own actions but rather his assessment of the ephemeral characteristics 
of Iranian foreign policy actions. This realist perspective demands that strategic preferences 
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in the Islamic Republic are not considered on their own terms, but rather with reference to 
universalised definitions of ‘rationality’ conceived in Anglo-American-European traditions of 
strategic thinking. This has the effect of obfuscating some of the more mystical and 
normative dimensions of pronouncements concerning nuclear weapons and war doctrines 
(such as those detailed in Chapter One), and ultimately how Iran’s strategic preferences can 
potentially change if religion does play a role (albeit however functional) in legitimising 
them. Likewise, when Kenneth Waltz argues that ‘more would be better’ with reference to 
the Islamic Republic and its potential acquisition of nuclear weapons,
389
 his assessment relies 
on the assumption that Iran bases its policies solely upon economic calculations of its 
sensitivity to costs. Waltz therefore rejects the premise that ‘unit-level’ normative factors 
determine its behaviour at the international level.
390
 “Iranian policy is made not by “mad 
mullahs” but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders”.391 
Kingston Reif, Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction policy at the Arms Control 
Association, rightly dismisses the claim that Iran is ‘undeterrable’ as being founded upon 
“conjecture rather than fact”.
392
 Yet in continuing to state that “Iranian foreign policy, since 
the Islamic Revolution has been guided by the principles of realpolitik, not millenarian 
fanaticism”,
393
 Reif denotes the prevailing lens for viewing Iran’s actions between being 
inspired by inevitably irrational religious impulses, or by realism. It can also be said, 
particularly in light of previous narratives studied concerning the linear progression towards 
‘mutual’ policy-formation between states, that the recent acceptance of Iran’s rationality in 
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analysis of its nuclear programme highlights more unspoken inquiries over the extent to 
which Iran can be considered a ‘civilised’ member of the international community, rather 
than a rogue Islamist state. As Chair of the UK Defense Select Committee, Julian Lewis told 
the UK House of Commons in November 2015, “I look at Iran and say to myself: “Here is a 
prime candidate for containment””.394 His logic is telling: for Lewis, whether or not Iran can 
be ‘contained’ from developing and using nuclear weapons would be an accurate barometer 
of its civility: 
[w]hen I look at these different societies, I ask myself which are the most likely, if we can 
contain them, or keep the lid on them, to develop and evolve – just as our own society, over 
500 years or more, developed and evolved – in a modernising direction. I think that Iran is a 
strong candidate for a society which, if contained and prevented from doing something too 
terrible, has the prospect of [coming] back into the comity of nations […]395 
Within a more functionalist iteration of this realist lens, religious discourse, structures of 
authority and narratives are accepted as important components of foreign policy formation in 
Iran, but only in their appropriation, manipulation or utilisation by ‘rational’ policy actors 
seeking to legitimise certain (predetermined) political or military courses of action. Here, 
even as religion is accepted as playing some role in defining Iran’s nuclear policies, it is 
conceived as being a cover for more basic motivations common to all states and leaderships 
existing within an anarchical international system. In one example, Mehdi Khalaji provides 
an avenue for opening up this discussion through accounting for maslahah in the Islamic 
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Republic of Iran’s decision-making process concerning nuclear weapons,396 but his analysis 
represents a tendency towards distilling relevant fatawa and opinions in order for religious 
discourse to fit within the epistemic boundaries of realism, rather than being read on its own 
terms, and conflates maslahah with raison d’état.397 This gives the impression that the roots 
of Iranian pragmatism and expediency must lie narrowly in Anglo-European or North 
American traditions of realism, negating the possibility that they originate in unique 
epistemic parameters set by competing Islamic theologies (beyond orientalist essentialism).  
Others have accepted religious structures of authority as an important variable in whether or 
not Iran will follow a more aggressive nuclear path, but in the process relied upon an artificial 
scale of agency between ‘radical’ or ‘hard-line’ and ‘moderate’ clerics. Ray Takeyh claims 
that from 1993-2003 Iran “evolved […] into a largely circumspect and cautious regional 
power whose strategic doctrine is predicated on preserving its independence and safeguarding 
its vital interests”, and attributes this transformation to the rise to power of Mohammad 
Khatami as a “moderate cleric”.398 The implication in Takeyh’s analysis is that Iran’s nuclear 
trajectory will be determined by a perpetual conflict inside the country between Muslim 
‘hardliners’ predisposed to conflict and proliferation, and Muslim ‘moderates’ who, 
embracing realpolitik, will be more open to reconciliation and non-proliferation if they are 
convinced it is in their interests. Again, what is not at task is the assumption that clerics are 
open to pragmatic calculations based on cost and benefit, but instead the notion that more 
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conservative or ‘radical’ clerics would by definition not engage in these types of calculations 
themselves.
399
  
In the context of negotiations between the West and Iran over its nuclear programme, 
analysts – deploying a comparable scale of religious agency – have even proposed a 
dichotomy between the ‘paths’ of Imam Hassan and Imam Hussein in analysing the departure 
in from Iranian nuclear policy-making under Ahmadinejad – characterised as confrontational 
and ideological – to the conciliatory style and breakthroughs of the Rouhani 
administration.
400
 Laurence Louër believes these two paths to be contradictory given that 
while the former opted for a peace treaty with Muawiyah I and ultimately coexistence rather 
than militant resistance, the latter chose armed struggle and revolution.
401
 Former British 
Ambassador to Iran Sir Richard Dalton believes the path of current Iranian President Rouhani 
to be inspired by the second rather than third Shi’i Imam:  
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[w]hether or not there is a comprehensive deal will not upend Iran’s internal structure or its 
economic relations with the outside world. But the Imam Hasan route, under President 
Rouhani, can mean that the symptoms of decline can gradually be eliminated.
402
 
Parallel conclusions were drawn from the Supreme Leader’s comment during a speech 
delivered to IRGC command in 2013 that Iran would adopt a position of ‘heroic flexibility’ 
(narmesh-e qahramaneh) in negotiations with the West over its nuclear programme.
403
 In the 
words of one journalist, “Khamenei can claim to have emulated Imam Hassan’s path of 
compromise. He’s chosen pragmatic politics over revolutionary ideals as his legacy”.404 As 
perhaps best encapsulated by a proclamation heading a dispatch from the Guardian’s Tehran 
Bureau, “[h]ello diplomacy, so long martyrdom”405 became a common conclusion drawn 
from Khamenei’s speech, implying a pragmatic reassessment of Iran’s policy options under 
the heavy weight of nuclear-related sanctions at the expense of revolutionary-religious 
dogma. 
Such depictions overstate the functional ‘purpose’ of narratives and discourse in Iran’s 
nuclear trajectory, and obscure the broader picture of how Iranian leaders might narrate the 
decisions they make with regards to the nuclear programme to themselves and Muslim 
constituents inside the country. First, while these narratives could very well legitimise a wide 
range of different policies or political stances, to imply that clerics could be forced to choose 
between the two as being distinct paths offers the paradox that Iran’s ulama derogate the 
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founding principle of Twelver-Shi’ism while at the same time use it as a tool in support of 
certain policy outcomes. Orthodox Twelver Shi’i belief tends to consider the Imamate as a 
whole – referred to collectively as the masoomin – rather than in its constituent parts, with 
each Imam considered equally infallible to another in their judgement and deeds.
406
 Referring 
to the examples of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Imams, Golpayegani writes that "their non-
armed policies were more effective than armed uprising in elevating the name of Islam, 
guarding the truth, and protecting the shari'at [path] in their time", but makes this statement 
contingent on the assumption that it is the duty of the Imam and only the Imam to discern the 
correct path.
407
 In the event of a shift away from conflict to rapprochement, it would be 
unlikely that Iran’s ulama would explicitly champion the theology represented by one Imam 
at the expense of another. In the same vein, to suggest that Iran switch from the ‘resistance’ 
narrative of Imam Hussein to the ‘patience’ narrative of Imam Hassan points to how our 
contemporary reading of Islamic belief and ideology in Iran is influenced by the prevailing 
either/or logic at the heart of the deterrence parameter. Here, we continue to define and 
categorise behaviour which might have their roots in Islamic beliefs according to biases, 
norms and values determined within a Eurocentric episteme. Either Iran commits to what is 
constructed as the otherworldly, revolutionary and ideological path of Hussein, or the 
pragmatic path of Hassan. Again, Shi’i theologians do not rigidly distinguish between the 
approaches of these two figures, and instead view them as being intertwined and as much in 
esotericism as they were prudent leadership and recognition that different circumstances 
demanded required different responses. Indeed, the notion that there could be friction 
between the foreign policies of two or more Imams would negate much of traditional Shi’i 
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belief in infallibility and divine guidance.
408
 In the context of clerical opinion as it guides 
Iranian security policy, the nezam scholars are likely to view the different approaches to these 
scenarios in a much more mystical light than the realist lens applied by the former UK 
Ambassador.  
This is not to say that there is no individual agency or ‘entrepreneurship’ in deciding which 
elements of religious discourses and narratives are applicable to strategic preference-making. 
As has been pointed out by scholars, Iran’s leadership has in the past justified certain courses 
of policy action with reference to narratives of Imam Hussein and Karbala. Casting Saddam 
Hussein in the role of Yazid I, Khomeini had little trouble convincing Iranians – whether his 
own military ranks, or the population at large – of the contemporary resonance of Imam 
Hussein and his martyrdom in  Karbala as Iran defended its territory against an Iraqi military 
invasion.
409
 Iranians have even utilised religious narrative and discourse as a way of resisting 
the Islamic Republic. In 2009, cries by protestors of “ya Hussein, Mir Hussein” fused the 
traditional motif of Imam Hussein’s sacrifice with the Green movement’s contestation of 
election results as they mobilised against the government.
410
 What is at task, rather, is the 
propensity for experts to speak for Iran's ulama and design the parameters for which ‘Islamic’ 
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pragmatism is situated. Those familiar with Khamenei’s background as a religious scholar, 
and in particular his translation of a 1970 book by Radhi al-Yaseen entitled The Peace of 
Imam Hassan (Solh al-Imam al-Hassan) – which in Farsi bears the subtitle ‘the Most 
Glorious Heroic Flexibility of History’ – could read the Supreme Leader’s remark without 
reverting to the either-or logic inscribed in ethnocentric readings of strategy in Iran.
411
 Some 
saw no massive departure in Iran’s position, or the notion that the Islamic Republic could 
pursue diplomatic pragmatism without abandoning its revolutionary strategic culture: "A 
wrestler sometimes shows flexibility for technical reasons. But he does not forget about his 
opponent or about his main objective.”412 Akbar Ganji, for instance, writes that: 
[t]here are some things that Khamenei thinks an “Islamic civilization” simply cannot 
compromise on, including the pursuit of independent technological progress, the division of 
gender roles in social life, and a commitment to public piety as a means of national solidarity. 
[…] But within those parameters, pragmatic compromise is always a possibility. Indeed, 
Khamenei believes that adjusting to new circumstances is an obligation for Islamic 
civilization if it hopes to survive.
413
 
Islamic scholars themselves view pragmatism within the parameters of both Imams Hassan 
and Hussein,
414
 highlighting a less dichotomous vision of realism and revolution within the 
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Islamic traditions. One may even discern more mutualistic logic at the heart of this kind of 
Islamic strategic preference-making: namely, the formulation of policy in anticipation that the 
‘other’ will conform to established patterns of behaviour. In this regard, one narrative of 
Imam Hassan’s peace treaty in particular holds resonance for Khamenei’s position today:  
Al-Hasan responded to Mu'awiya's request for making peace. However, he made him bind 
himself by conditions which he would break one by one. So if Mu'awiya did that, the people 
would declare their wrath and protest against him. Thus peacemaking [sic] was the beginning 
of the wrath that has lasted for generations. Also this wrath was the beginning of the 
revolutions that happened successively to remove that usurping regime from history.
415
 
Equally in the case of taqiyah, ketman and ta’arof, the objection here is thus not that these 
concepts ‘exist’ and are employed by Iran’s leadership, but that their functionality within 
dominant discourse is an outcome of epistemic as well as ontological orientalism. These 
concepts are either othered as being distinctly non-Western (see Chapter Two), or subsumed 
into (hegemonic) Western definitions of pragmatism and expediency. Frequently when 
analysts employ Islamic terminology, they do not intend for their arguments to come up 
against Islamic legal-theoretical scrutiny, or the critique of historians. Rather, there is an 
expectation that Western audiences will subsume these concepts into a pre-existing body of 
knowledge about the ‘Orient’, and a narrow Eurocentric paradigm for understanding nuclear 
weapons proliferation and deterrence. They are useful only as far as they can reinforce and 
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ultimately naturalise existing perceptions of why states seek nuclear weapons, and what 
factors can prevent states from using them. Moreover, both processes rely upon the silence of 
the ‘other’ in allowing Islamic concepts to retain some relevance in the nuclear debate.  
This more rationalist paradigm for understanding Iran’s strategic preferences has not gone 
completely un-questioned. Homeira Moshirzadeh has disputed the adequacy of relying 
completely upon a 'rationalist' or realist account of Iran's nuclear programme. He argues that 
discourses concerning independence and justice – distinct from realist or liberal motivations 
of power or wealth-creation – are the main drivers of Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology. 
“[A]n actor’s ‘rationality’ is shaped within discursive structures […] ‘cognition’ is not just a 
mental condition independent of discourses.”416 In other words, a state’s assessment of its 
security policy is contingent on a preceding narrative. Material factors reinforce, rather than 
precede, these discourses. Adib-Moghaddam develops a similar framework for understanding 
Iranian strategic preferences more thoroughly in his definition of Iran’s foreign policy 
culture. He concurs that to characterise Iran’s own foreign policies as pragmatic or realist is 
inadequate, and instead prefers to focus on the  
utopian-romantic ideals formulated during the revolutionary years, and institutionalized as 
central narratives of the Islamic Republic, constitute the contemporary grand strategic 
preferences of the Iranian state.
417
  
Utopian ideals, not merely ‘systemic factors’ as Waltz defines, nor any essentialised religious 
or cultural doctrines, have their own particular impact on Iran’s vision of what it can and 
should accomplish using nuclear technology.
418
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Although the either/or tendency of realism reinforces the strength of the deterrence 
parameter, it can also serve to demarcate between the rule and its exceptions. Edward Said 
explores this point in general terms through reading Henry Kissinger, who divides the world 
into ‘cultures’ that have come to terms with separating the subjective self from the objective 
material world, and those that have not.
419
 The logic proceeds as follows that: 
[c]ultures which escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking have retained the essentially 
pre-Newtonian view that the real world is almost completely internal to the observer […] 
empirical reality has a much different significance for many of the new countries than for the 
West because in a certain sense they never went through the process of discovering it.
420
 
According to such views, culture does have an impact upon international affairs as far as it 
defines the states and states people willing to put aside normative biases and utopian impulses 
in favour of addressing the world as it is. Again, this logic has its resonance in the context of 
Iran’s nuclear programme today. Iranian leaders, many of whom are clerics but also 
politicians and policy-makers, cannot be adequately confined to Newtonian or pre-Newtonian 
categories identified by Kissinger, and are therefore drawn upon by proponents of both sides 
of the debate in a way that reinforces Western analysis on the subject as hegemonic, and 
nuances found elsewhere to be irrelevant. Either Iran’s leaders are irrational and fanatical, or 
they are cold and calculating. In both cases, the deterrence parameter remains the hegemonic 
lens for viewing Iran’s nuclear trajectory, and continues to set the terms of the debate over its 
nuclear programme. 
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Conclusion 
The transition from US nuclear policy from 1945-49 to that of subsequent decades provides 
evidence in support of Ken Booth’s claim that ethnocentrism "can distort important aspects of 
strategic thinking, especially where problems of perception and prediction are involved".
421
 
Nuclear weapon strategies were and continue to be a framework within which narratives of 
the self and the ‘other’ are fashioned and refashioned. When identity is recognised as a 
constitutive process, reliant upon both an object (‘them’, ‘other’) as well as subject (‘us’, the 
United States), how the Soviet Union – or Iran – is represented in policy discourse as the 
‘other’ is crucial. “To hold an identity” writes Robert Jervis “is to set a boundary, to separate 
Self from Others, to exclude as well as include”,422 and for this reason any faith in the ability 
of experts or policy-makers to benignly interpret material indicators of security and insecurity 
in order to determine the strategic preferences of themselves and others – outside of specific 
epistemological boundaries – is misplaced. Nuclear strategy as theory and practise has since 
the early atomic age been dependent on social-construction, and this has been observed in 
this and the preceding chapter in the context of Iran. From the perspective of policy analysts, 
and a notable segment of academia also, the Islamic Republic’s identity – like that of the 
Soviet Union – only makes sense as an irrational ‘other’, or a ‘like unit’. This mirrors Said’s 
observation that “rhetorics of general cultural or civilizational specificity” adopt either a 
utopian narrative emphasising integration and the “harmony between all peoples”, or the 
opposing clash of civilisations narrative.
423
 In the process, analysis loses sight of specificity 
as it is defined within the cultures and countries that are studied, and our own narrative of 
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strategic agency in states like Iran – or the Soviet Union – hinge on Eurocentric definitions of 
the ‘other’. 
Given the limited explanatory potential of either approach to understanding Iran’s strategic 
preferences, a more critical approach is necessary. Today, a more critical approach could help 
us look for alternative possibilities for how religion can impact Iran’s strategic preferences 
towards nuclear weapons beyond both orientalism and realism, and reject its current status as 
being merely an independent variable within Eurocentric models of nuclear proliferation.  
This approach would require that we abandon the notion that a wholly material assessment of 
a state’s nuclear intentions is possible, and that reading, predicting or designing strategic 
postures can ever be quantitative exercises independent of discourse.  
We have found in this chapter a clear propensity in varied literatures towards ignoring unique 
epistemic constraints for what can be legitimised as a strategic policy decision, and the 
popular representation of an underlying ‘realist’ normative approach to understanding 
international relations as if it were a natural basis for the state’s strategic preferences. Within 
realism, religion can only be reduced to what Amr Sabet calls “sociological and cultural 
epiphenomena”, and we as a result ignore its “distinct claims to validity and its internal 
communicative meanings”.424 
There has been an overwhelming preference towards viewing the Islamic Republic’s nuclear 
programme today within the narrow confines of the deterrence parameter. As such, we know 
very little – beyond our own ethnocentric discourses and narratives – about what Islamic 
Republic’s strategic preferences could be, or where they might emerge from, if Iran’s 
decision-makers are assumed to be influenced by religious beliefs. Herein lies the problem 
with merely situating Iran as an object within the deterrence parameter: it is only through 
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characterising the Islamic Republic as an undeterrable ‘other’, or a like-unit, that its nuclear 
options are assessed. Realism, by negating ‘otherness’ in the pursuit of assessing universal 
‘like-units’, and in perpetuating the notion that material factors compel states to predictably 
enact policies designed to secure state survival and power, by definition skews our analysis of 
the unique motivations of individual states – ignoring specific narratives and discourses that a 
positivist account would most likely consider ‘first image’ factors and therefore irrelevant. 
The social-construction of its strategic preferences, which could potentially have a religious 
and Islamic legal-theoretical dimension to them, is also dismissed in this account as 
irrelevant. This renders the dominant approaches to assessing Iran’s nuclear programme as 
incapable of providing a qualitative case that Iran seeks nuclear weapons beyond the 
normative claims that it is irrational, or unexceptionally ‘like us’ in its conduct of 
international affairs.  
If we are to take a lesson from the US-Soviet case study, it is that investigating Iran’s own 
unique narratives as an Islamic Republic on their own terms, and the multitude of ways that 
these narratives can potentially influence its strategic preferences towards nuclear issues, will 
allow far greater insight into the origin of Iranian nuclear policies – and where they could 
head in the future – than realism. Recognition that identity has always played and continues 
to play a crucial role in determining policy shifts and nuclear strategy challenges the 
assumption that nuclear proliferation or strategic decision making among states can be 
predicted as a strictly empirical affair, contingent on the analyst’s mere recognition of certain 
material interests to obtain a bomb stemming from ‘hard security’ threats and vulnerabilities 
in what is considered an anarchic international system. In short, a better informed analysis of 
Iran’s nuclear programme could rest on taking its revolutionary slogan of independence from 
both Cold-War blocs – ‘na sharghi, na gharbi’ (neither east, nor west) – far more seriously. 
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As will be observed in chapters Four and Five, Islamic discourses related to jihad and 
weapons capable of mass destruction are far less rigid than commonly assumed. Islamic laws 
of war are consequently more amenable to the notion of ‘pragmatism’ than caricatures would 
suggest, but there remain specific conditions that have to be met in order for laws to change, 
or ‘states of exceptions’ to emerge. Specifically, epistemological boundaries for what are 
conceived as ‘Islamic’ policies are perfectly capable of situating legal discourse which can 
address certain extraordinary believed to be necessary to safeguard an Islamic ‘state’ than 
ethnocentric or essentialist approaches permit. As such, far from being irrelevant, religion can 
play a central role in defining and moderating Iran’s strategic preferences towards nuclear 
weapons and other WMD.   
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Chapter Four: Weapons, Tactics and Strategies of Mass Destruction within 
an Islamic Framework for Analysis 
‘Ali related that Allah’s Messenger had an Arab bow in his hand and, on seeing another with 
a Persian bow in his hand, said, “What is this? Throw it away. Stay with these and the like, 
and with spears with shafts, for Allah will help you to support the religion with them and 
establish you in the land.  
– Hadith narrated by Ibn Majah425 
Introduction  
The previous two chapters have established that discourse and narrative are far more salient 
in the process of threat assessment (and more precisely, projections of the trajectory of Iran’s 
nuclear programme) than debates about nuclear strategy and proliferation within the 
deterrence parameter suggest. It is difficult to ascertain the impact of today’s fatawa 
concerning nuclear weapons upon Iran’s strategic preferences beyond more or less fixed 
ontologies: orientalism, or realism. That these ontological definitions are shaped within 
epistemic parameters that fixate on whether or not Iran can be considered a ‘rational’ actor, 
the discussion over Iran’s nuclear programme – and the role that religion places in defining 
its policies more generally – cannot be considered an empirical affair.  
Most importantly in the context of this thesis, the nuclear discussion has not sufficiently 
engaged with the possibility that religion could impact Iran’s strategic preferences concerning 
nuclear weapons in a way that a) gives the ulama themselves a voice, or b) considers the 
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depth and nuances of Muslim thinking on weapons capable of mass destruction and strategy 
independent of Western concepts. It is this specific failure of orthodox theories concerning 
nuclear deterrence and proliferation which calls for a new approach for understanding 
normative Islamic influences on Iranian behaviour beyond those identified in both orientalist 
and realist accounts; accounts that we have seen reveal more about the ‘self’ than they do the 
‘other’.  
This chapter will introduce an alternative theoretical foundation for analysing Iran’s strategic 
preferences concerning nuclear weapons today. The analytical framework designed in this 
chapter attempts to overcome this the trappings of such an approach – and the functionalist 
lens for understanding religion associated with realism – by using Qur’anic ontology as the 
starting point for understanding the conceptualisation of security and defence within Iran 
today from a perspective closer to that of the ulama. This theoretical foundation is therefore 
rooted in an analysis of Islamic sources, and provides a basis for understanding how Islamic 
laws aimed at moderating the conduct of nations or ‘states’ at times of war are formed, when 
they remain static, and when and where they can change. As Morgan Clarke points out, 
“Islamic legal scholarship is neither produced nor consumed in a vacuum”,426 and it is vital 
that all Islamic law and legal discourses are scrutinised within the context they are 
formulated. In the process, I will attempt to discern ‘Islamic’ roots of pragmatism and 
expediency which could have a bearing on how Iran’s religious leaders view the future of the 
country’s nuclear programme. This forms the basis of a dynamic reading of Islamic 
jurisprudence designed to respond to the specific needs of government – what Adib-
Moghaddam describes as “Shia realism”427 – which we will see in Chapter Five acts as a far 
better starting point for analysing where the Islamic Republic’s strategic preferences derive 
                                                          
426
 Morgan Clarke, Islam and New Kinship: Reproductive Technology and the Shariah in Lebanon, New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2009, p. 2. 
427
 Adib-Moghaddam, Iran in World Politics, p. 158. 
The Nuclear Policies of Iran: Islam and Strategic Thinking in the Islamic 
Republic 
170 
from (and where they could head) than the narrow ethnocentric ontologies of the deterrence 
parameter. 
I begin the chapter by outlining three levels of analysing Islamic laws of war, and attitudes 
towards weapons and strategies capable of mass destruction more generally.  These are:  
1. the level of Qur’anic ontology (i.e. what the Qur’an says, and how it has traditionally 
structured Muslim attitudes to war and peace), 
2. the level of secondary sources (predominantly ahadith), and what these say about the 
practise and attitudes of the Prophet and his Ahlulbayt, and 
3. the level of theology, and how theology has impacted separate ‘referents’ of security 
in Shi’i and Sunni schools of military jurisprudence.  
These levels are by no means definitive, but can provide a foundation for any attempt at 
tracing the kind of influence that Islam can have on Iran’s strategic preferences. Qur’anic 
ontology can be conceptualised as a basic point of reference for strategic preferences, made 
sense of in practical terms in the process of being channelled through secondary sources and 
theology in discussions of how Muslims can secure certain objectives – defined largely by the 
ulama – within an overarching Islamic episteme. More precisely, secondary sources can 
therefore be considered a mediatory level between theology and Qur’anic ontology: a level 
where Qur’anic ontology is deciphered, utilised in order to legitimise certain theologies, and 
ultimately linked linearly with clerical pronouncements. My conclusion is that these three 
levels of analysis must be taken together in order for theory to properly account for any 
potential normative religious roots of Iranian strategic preferences. As such, I will utilise this 
broader framework for analysis in Chapter Five in providing a counter-narrative of Islamic 
discourses concerning nuclear weapons and other weapons capable of mass destruction. 
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In outlining this analytical framework, I identify the kinds of Islamic sources, ideas, 
structures of religious authority, and forms of knowledge production that have historically 
defined laws (both Shi’i and Sunni) which govern the use of weapons capable of mass 
destruction. Here, I focus more broadly on weapons capable of mass destruction as opposed 
to nuclear weapons and the more rigid classification of weapons of mass destruction (i.e. 
WMD) given the inevitable silence of the Qur’an and formative Islamic military 
jurisprudence on modern weapons technologies (see the following section). This will inform 
a more contemporary analysis in Chapter Five, where we will observe how early concerns 
related to weapons capable of mass destruction continue to influence contemporary thinking 
in Iran’s religious establishment concerning nuclear weapons. 
At the outset, a few words should be said regarding the types of precedents – legal and 
historic – that are included as cases studies in this chapter. It will become apparent in this 
chapter and the next that my framework for viewing Iranian strategic preferences towards 
nuclear weapons and other WMD is based on a premise that there are sufficient similarities 
today between Shi’i and Sunni forms of military jurisprudence due to the acceptance of 
maslahah by prominent Shi’i legal theorists in the 20th century. In light of sovereignty being 
located among the Twelve Imams, and a tendency against involvement in governance 
(including imperial conquest), Shi’i legal theorists have not traditionally been innovators in 
the arena of military jurisprudence. We will see in Chapter Five that the precise theological 
foundations of the Islamic Republic however open up contemporary Islamic discourse to 
embrace a far wider scope of formative precedents – many of which are outlined in Sunni 
legal scholarship – in determining Shi’i opinions on nuclear weapons and other WMD, and 
(more broadly) what can be done in the name of an ‘Islamic state’. Nevertheless, this does not 
imply a linear path of action for the Islamic Republic today when faced with a ‘state of 
exception’. 
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My genealogical reading of Islamic military jurisprudence highlights three things about the 
potential religious roots of Iranian strategic preferences that would otherwise be overlooked 
today inside of the deterrence parameter. First, it demonstrates the relevance of historical 
experiences in informing contemporary religious positions on nuclear weapons and other 
weapons capable of mass destruction, and especially the specific debates and concerns inside 
and between competing theologies of ‘pragmatism’ and ‘expediency’ in light of a need to 
protect an Islamic state.  
Second, it allows for the types of formal and informal power structures and authoritative 
voices within Islam – and Shi’ism especially – to be better understood in relation to how 
Muslim societies react to revolutions in military technology in accordance with the shari’ah. 
Understanding these authoritative voices, and how they have historically found 
accommodation within power structures, is fundamental if we wish to assess the veracity of 
Islamic legal opinion inside the Islamic Republic today concerning nuclear weapons, and 
how the scholars themselves view the more pragmatic needs of governance relative to 
religious law (beyond the deterrence parameter and its ontologies of orientalism and realism). 
It is in this context that we can begin to assess the impact of religion upon Iran’s strategic 
preferences on its own terms, and offer an alternative narrative of pragmatism rooted in an 
Islamic epistemology as opposed to the deterrence parameter. 
Third, it reveals the problems with essentialising strategic preferences for the Islamic 
Republic of Iran based on its self-identification as 'Islamic', ‘Shi’i’, or even 'Persian'. We 
have already established that Shi’ism today is projected in discussions over Iran’s nuclear 
programme as a homogenous and distinctive theology and legal tradition, associated with 
certain ontological characteristics. Among these are its abject irrationality and a fixation 
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among adherents with martyrdom.
428
 Outside of the narrow confines of the nuclear debate, 
Shi’ism has been variously characterised as a “religion of protest” or “resistance”,429 
especially in works now closely associated with the Iran’s revolution.430 Such essentialist 
readings of Shi’ism imply a linear trajectory in its political theology away from pragmatism 
and expediency and towards protestation, revolution and resistance. We will observe how 
both pragmatism and expediency can exist consistently as ontologies within a Shi’i-Islamic 
episteme, and what this means for understanding military jurisprudence. 
First Level of Analysis: Qur’anic Ontologies of Warfare 
We should begin by analysing the prerequisite foundation for Islamic discourses concerning 
warfare and weapons capable of mass destruction which claim to have a basis in law: the 
Qur’an. Islam was born at a time and place when violent conflict was an inescapable and in 
many ways normal part of everyday life.
431
 Scholars note that the Arabic word used to denote 
pre-Islamic times – jahiliyah – often translated as ignorance, has as its root the letters jīm-hā-
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lām: ‘irascibility’, “above all, a chronic tendency to violence and retaliation”.432 Viewing the 
revelation of Islam as a revolutionary moment which would inevitably transform society from 
this status of jahiliyah, it was therefore natural that Muslims at the outset of Islam’s birth had 
very specific and frank discussions about how the religion would moderate violence, 
including violence in times of conflict. The sole authoritative source for all Islamic sects – the 
Qur’an – contains a number of verses addressing the conditions for waging war, and in the 
process outline a number of parameters. It is stated plainly in Surah al-Baqarah, for instance, 
that Muslims should only: 
fight in the cause of God (against) those who fight you but be not aggressive; for verily God 
loveth not the aggressors 
And slay thenwherever ye find them and drive them away whencefrom they drove you away 
for mischief is more grievous than slaughter but fight not with them nigh unto the (Inviolable) 
Sacred Mosque until they fight with you therein but if they fight with you slay them (for) such 
is the recompense of the disbelievers. 
But if they desist, then verily God is Forgiving, Merciful. 
And fight with them until there is no (more) mischief and religion be only for God but if they 
desist then there should be no hostility save against the aggressors
433
 
In the same surah it states that while jihad is divinely ordained, it is not necessarily a state of 
affairs to which humans automatically gravitate towards. In doing so, the Qur’an 
acknowledges an inherent conflict between human nature – inclined towards peace and non-
violence – and the prevalence of war in this world (dunya), but also commands that this 
conflict be reconciled by a balanced approach to war and peace:  
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Fighting (in the cause of God) is ordained unto you, and it is hateful to you, and perchance ye 
hate a thing whereas it is good for you, and perchance ye love a thing whereas it is bad for 
you; and verily God knoweth while ye know not.
434
 
Although war is therefore sometimes unavoidable, and at times even obligatory, the Qur’an 
contains an explicit command for believers not to be excessive in their conduct: 
And kill ye not any one whom God hath forbidden but for a just cause; and whoever is slain 
unjustly, then indeed have We given his heir the authority, but he shall not be extravagant in 
slaying; Verily he is aided (by God).
435
 
Verse 190 of Surah al-Baqarah furthermore puts unequivocal limits on the conditions under 
which wars should be fought, and implies a far more defensive doctrine than the orientalist 
analysis surveyed in Chapter Two would suggest: “And fight in the cause of God (against 
those who fight you but be not aggressive; for verily God loveth not the aggressors”.436   
Elsewhere, the Qur’an also forbids fighting during the ‘four sacred months’ of Muharram, 
Rajab, Dhū al-Qiʿda and Dhū al-Ḥijjah.437  
Yet it is vital that our reading of jihad in the Qur’an does not become narrowed to more 
contemporary polemics regarding whether Islam is a religion of peace, or a religion of the 
sword. Likewise, an Islamic framework for analysing Iran’s strategic preferences today 
should not hinge on the acceptance of one particular view of warfare over others, but instead 
allow for a variety of different perspectives – some seemingly contradictory – to maintain a 
degree of semblance in the minds of the ulama today. It is therefore the process of selecting 
one aspect of Qur’anic ontology over another which is of importance to understanding where 
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Iran’s nuclear programme could head, rather than the veracity of one interpretation of 
Qur’anic ontology over another. 
While Qur’anic ontology clearly outlines limitations for warfare, its very revelation is now 
intertwined with a teleology that accepted certain forms of violence as legitimate and even 
divinely ordained. For example, there is a tendency for classical legal texts related to warfare 
and other issues towards projecting the revelation of the Qur’an (and ultimately, its ontology) 
as having taken place over four distinct periods, namely: 
1. peaceful propagation of Islam and the hijrah to Madina, 
2. a stage of defending Madina from Meccans, 
3. a limited war of aggression against Mecca, and finally 
4. the rapid expansion of Islamic territory beyond the Arabian peninsula.438 
Classical jurists articulating some of the foundational views on jihad with recourse to 
Qur’anic ontology were therefore driven by a different theological outlook than some more 
contemporary theologians that have attempted to determine how religion should guide 
strategic policy. Within this classical theological outlook of the Qur’an’s revelation, and the 
subsequent spread of Islam under the first four caliphs, they were freer to debate the 
intricacies of jihad beyond the constraints of having to defend Muslims against 
characterisations of the Islamic faith as being more violent than others. As an example of a 
more modern trend in reading military jurisprudence, when Ayatollah Mostafa Mohaghegh 
Damad today refers to the practises of the Prophet concerning jihad, he opts to utilise 
biographical accounts of his life example rather than Qur’anic ontology, or even specific 
secondary sources (e.g. ahadith): 
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When he migrated to Medina and gave permission to his followers to carry arms, he did so 
only for self-defense. The wars he carried out against such tribes as Huwazan and Thaqif 
were all defensive. “The wars he conducted against some Jewish tribes of Medina such as 
Binadir, Biqada’ah, and Biqinqa’ were in response to their breach of peace agreement they 
had signed.” The behavior of the Prophet in wars and peace all proves the primacy of peace 
over war in dealing with his adversaries.
439
 
Disputing the inference in the discourses surveyed in Chapter Two that the ulama read 
Islamic law dogmatically and rigidly, Damad’s reading points to a wider reading of Islamic 
sources than Qur’anic ontology per-se in the formulation of opinions related to jihad. While 
it is clear that Damad’s conclusions function more as theological tract than they do as formal 
legal instructions, they nevertheless serve as a reminder that metanarrative has its own 
resonance in guiding opinions on jihad from among the ulama, and that essentialising 
‘Islamic’ strategic preferences through a narrow reading of Qur’an and Sunnah overlooks a 
substantial number of other normative sources. In this context, a parallel can be found in how 
Qur’anic ontology is discerned within a broader epistemological framework, and the 
formulation of strategic preferences within the deterrence parameter. Given that Damad’s 
views can also be assessed as polemical in that they address contemporary concerns about the 
‘image’ of Islam presented in the West, his views are thus a reminder that contemporary 
Islamic thinking on jihad can often be situated in a broader system of competing secular 
views related to war and peace (e.g. realism, American exceptionalism, etc.).  
Yet in contrast to more recent theological narratives of warfare presented by scholars such as 
Damad, classical scholars who conceived of formative literature in military jurisprudence 
readily accepted both periods of defensive and offensive jihad as being equally fundamental 
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to the revelation of the Qur’an to the Prophet. This allowed for Qur’anic ontology to be 
consumed by legal theorists as a comprehensive source capable of addressing all questions 
related to defensive and offensive war, and specifically during the consolidation and 
expansion of Muslim empires.  
Part of the role of these jurists would be to act as ‘securitising actors’ in determining which 
type of verse to draw from: belonging to the period of the hijrah, defensive war against the 
Meccans, or limited offensive war against Mecca. To this day, certain verses have been used 
to justify that considerable expense and thought be devoted to the construction of both 
offensive and defensive military capability. Take for example the following verse of the 
Qur’an commanding believers to 
prepare ye against them whatever (force) ye can, and steeds of war at the garrison to frighten 
the enemy of God thereby and your enemy and others besides them, whom ye know not, (but) 
God knoweth them; and whatever things ye spend in God’s way, will be repaid unto you, and 
ye shall not be dealt with unjustly
440
 
Focusing on the use of the word ‘steed’ (‘rebat’ in Arabic), Ayatollah Mortaza Mutahhari – a 
central figure of the Islamic Revolution in Iran who chaired Iran’s Revolutionary Council at 
the time of his assassination in 1980 – interprets this verse as a meaning that Muslims should 
always maintain the most modern of military arsenals and technology, regardless of the costs.  
Rebat comes from the word Rabt. Rabt means to tie. Rebat-ol-Kheyl means tied horses 
(horses tethered). The statement about horses in readiness is made because in the past, the 
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strength of armies consisted mostly in horses, but naturally each age has its own 
characteristics.
441
 
Mutahhari connects military modernity to fear in his reading of the ayat, and specifically the 
ability of Muslim armies to instil fear in the enemy as a deterrent: 
These verses mean that for the fear of our strength to enter the hearts of our enemies and 
eliminate the notion of aggression from their minds, we are to build ourselves an army and 
make ourselves stronger.
442
 
Mutahhari shares this interpretation of the steed verse with Ayatollah Lotfollah Safi 
Golpayegani, a prominent marja al-taqlid appointed by Khomeini to run the Guardian 
Council in 1979, whom eventually resigned due to his rejection of Islamic expediency.
443
 In a 
reading couched in a general critique of ‘quietist’ scholars that would reject the need for 
significant expenditure or efforts in the military domain due to the absence of the Twelfth 
Imam, Golpayegani’s opinion is that even for defensive purposes, Muslims should acquire 
the most modern weapons.
444
 Notably, Golpayegani compares the necessity of maintaining a 
modern defensive capability to protect one’s ‘Islamic homeland’, with the basic responsibility 
to protect one’s possessions.445 In the process he situates his view of a military deterrent in an 
Islamic perspective of Qur’anic ontology couched in a transcendent view of the Qur’an, 
where it is believed to mediate between our own limited faculties of reasoning and absolute 
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truths only fully grasped by the Prophet and Twelve Imams. “Just as a Muslim’s house, 
dependents, property, and self must be safe from danger and attack by outsiders, the Islamic 
homeland as well – which is the home of all – must be free from danger”.446 Incidentally, 
Abul Ala Mawdudi – an influential Pakistani political theorist and activist – would also 
likewise later refer to this verse in arguing that it was incumbent for Muslims to possess 
"every type of weapon available".
447
  
Yet although Qur’anic ontology can therefore be read as commanding Muslims to build and 
maintain the most modern of military forces, it contains no strict definition of what 
constitutes a modern military arsenal or capability. Even beyond the Qur’an, understanding 
what constitutes tactical or strategic modernity is by no means an objective task. As Ward 
Wilson reminds us, from a technical and deployment perspective nuclear weapons are much 
less modern and effective than emerging capabilities, such as cyber warfare and laser 
technologies.
448
 The most devastating weapons are not necessarily the ‘smartest’, nor most 
technologically advanced or functional. A more recent emphasis – or at least perceived 
emphasis – on ‘hybrid’ warfare in Russia’s strategic doctrine449 should likewise force us to 
consider whether the Islamic Republic’s might view its enhanced capacity at blending 
asymmetric measures (often non-military) with conventional military capabilities
450
 as more 
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strategically ‘modern’ than outright mass destruction or nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapons 
would therefore not necessarily fit within this particular Qur’anic ontology, and this warrants 
further inquiry into whether or not the ulama view them in this light today.  
A similar ambiguity in how to read Qur’anic ontology as it relates to warfare is found in its 
prohibition against jihad during the four sacred months of the year. While Muslims are 
instructed not to fight during these months, the following verse implies a condition of 
perpetual war so long as there are ‘idolaters’: 
So when the sacred months are past then slay the idolaters wherever ye find them, and seize 
them and besiege them and lie in wait for them in every ambush, then if they repent and 
establish prayer, and give the poor-rate, then leave their way free to them
451
 
Commentators
452
 tend to overlook the complex presentation of jihad in Qur’anic ontology 
and instead refer to verses like this in isolation from others or abstracted from the Qur’an as a 
whole.
453
 This tendency favours a narrative that Muslims today seeking to revive or return to 
an ‘authentic’ form of Islam will inevitably retrieve a set of strategic preferences that are 
diametrically opposed to those – conceived in Judeo-Christian, or secular traditions – which 
privilege stability, restraint, expediency and ultimately security.  In doing so, both 
contemporary jihadis and orientalists alike have constructed a ‘clash regime’ – a regime of 
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truth based on the assumption that conflict between ‘Islam’ and ‘West’ is inevitable454 – out 
of their own readings of Qur’anic ontology, assuming strategic preferences conceived in the 
Islamic world to be radically more confrontational than those originating in the West. This 
amounts to the conclusion that the foundational views of Islam inevitably push the West into 
“permanent war against the ‘other’”.455 Such a clash regime can be noted in the work for 
instance of famed historian and orientalist Bernard Lewis as follows:  
In the classical Islamic view, to which many Muslims are beginning to return, the world and 
all mankind are divided into two: the House of Islam, where the Muslim law and faith prevail, 
and the rest, known as the House of Unbelief or the House of War, which it is the duty of 
Muslims ultimately to bring to Islam. But the greater part of the world is still outside Islam, 
and even inside the Islamic lands, according to the view of the Muslim radicals, the faith of 
Islam has been undermined and the law of Islam has been abrogated. The obligation of holy 
war therefore begins at home and continues abroad, against the same infidel enemy.
456
 
It is this type of paradigm for viewing Islam – and the prominent discussions of jihad inside 
Islam in particular – which allows the discourse of the ‘mad mullah’ to become more salient 
in discussions regarding the direction of Iran’s nuclear programme, and raise the stakes over 
debates related to the origins of its strategic preferences more generally. For scholars like 
Lewis, Qur’anic ontology normalises war through its specific identification – and 
securitisation – of external and internal enemies of the faith. ‘Authentic’ Islam is here in its 
purest form, according to this account, inevitably intertwined with perpetual jihad, and 
strategic preferences founded upon such a ground can only ever be expansionist and offense-
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oriented. It is from a similar premise that Samuel P. Huntington constructs a major fault-line 
in his ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis, and why he views conflict between ‘Islamic civilisation’ 
and others to be inevitable.
457
 We do not refer to India’s nuclear weapons as ‘Hindu’,458 yet 
often describe a potential Iranian weapon and the strategic choices leading to weaponisation 
as ‘Islamic’ based on the premise of a clash of civilisations, rooted in what is perceived to be 
an unequivocally hostile belief system rooted in the Islamic faith. 
Crucially, this kind of de-contextualised view of the earliest sources of Islam has precedence 
in popular readings of Islamic commentary referring to the type of Qur’anic ontology that 
Lewis has in mind. The very division of the world into two ‘abodes’ which Lewis refers to a 
much older paradigm devised by the influential Hanafi jurist Mohammad al-Shaybani, who 
believed the world is comprised of territory already under Muslim rule and that not yet under 
Muslim rule. These two distinct ‘abodes’, or ‘domains’ – dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam), 
and dar al-Harb (the abode of war). Additionally, a third abode – dar al-sulh, or abode of the 
peace treaty – was later conceived as a legal framework for accommodating cordial relations 
with non-Muslims (or in some cases “capitulation”).459 These were predominantly non-
Muslim territories which “remained autonomous provided that its people recognized Muslim 
authority and paid tributes”.460 Shaybani’s division of the world into dar al-harb and dar al-
Islam, which can be considered an early Islamic ‘metanarrative’ based upon the idea that 
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military confrontation with peoples of other religions, cultures and ‘civilisations’ is an 
inevitable, constant reality facing the Muslim community until a final victory of the Islamic 
faith.
461
  
Yet the normalisation of war in the Qur’an does not necessarily point to the Islamic faith 
being any more of a violent normative basis for strategic thinking about warfare than other 
secular frameworks, or an inherent preference for verses of the Qur’an regarded as more 
violent than others. On the contrary, as we have seen in the context of Surah al-Baqarah 
earlier in this section, it is precisely by projecting war as an inescapable feature of the 
temporal world that regulating its conduct according to God’s law is possible. “Like it or not, 
life is war and struggle” writes Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani – who chaired Iran’s 
Revolutionary Council – but “those who are acquainted with a sublime object of faith wage 
war “in God’s way,” for God’s sake”.462 As a parallel, it is precisely through Christianity 
having reconciled prohibitions against killing with the need for defence that it was able to 
systematise a religious framework for international relations based on Just War Theory.
463
 
not so much a single tradition but rather a broad intertwining of competing and collaborating 
traditions that are united simply by the task of trying to judge normatively acts of violence.
464
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In relation to more recent attempts at theorising a theological basis for warfare, the type of 
normalisation of war within Qur’anic ontology can be said to bring the Islamic paradigm 
closer in line with the Christian-realism of Reinhold Niebuhr to the extent that his moral 
framework for war likewise is dependent upon specific religious scripture (along with a 
credence based upon a claim to ‘universality’),465 while at the same time based on the 
rejection of literalism.
466
 Counter-intuitively then, the normalisation paradigm rooted in 
Qur’anic ontology  simultaneously challenges the perception of Islam both as an irrational 
doctrine of expansion and perpetual conflict constructed by Lewis and in the discourses 
surveyed in Chapter Two, and the ethnocentric ‘like-unit’ model proposed by the dominant 
realist perspectives of state agency surveyed in Chapter Three.  
This is especially the case when considered in the context of prominent views on mass 
destruction. Early Sunni laws forbade mass destruction during war on the assumption that 
Muslims would one day inherit the territory that was being fought over. Laws forbidding 
Muslim soldiers from harming the environment at times of war were based on Shaybani’s 
logic that territories could be classified as either territory under Muslim control or not yet 
under Muslim control, therefore tying the fate of land under the control of the enemy with the 
future prosperity of the Muslim state. Date trees, for example, could not legitimately be cut 
down or burned by Muslim soldiers when occupying enemy territory. 
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Do not destroy the villages and towns, do not spoil the cultivated fields and gardens, and do 
not slaughter the cattle.
467
 
This aspect of the normalisation paradigm derived out of Qur’anic ontology would certainly 
preclude Muslims from using weapons that would cause catastrophic damage to the 
environment. The views of Shaybani himself also point to a more ethical approach to warfare 
than given credit for, considering it impermissible to kill minors during war due to them 
having not reached an age where they make a choice of ‘refusing’ or ‘accepting’ Islam, 
thereby placing them outside of both dar al-harb and dar al-Islam.
468
 
Both pragmatism and restraint are ultimately found in Shaybani’s paradigm, but also rooted 
in the Qur’an’s normalisation of war. This raises the possibility that an ‘Islamic’ view of 
warfare can engender both humanitarian and ‘rationalist’ outcomes for policy within a system 
of governance predicated on Islamic law. That such pragmatism can be found in early 
Qur’anic ontology also points to the problematic contemporary discourse that Iranian foreign 
policy-making can be measured accurately (and definitively) in terms of Islamic authenticity 
against streaks of realpolitik. It is with this in mind that Amr Sabet develops a more nuanced 
analysis of Shaybani’s al-harb/al-Islam distinction, concluding that there are parallels 
between his conception of war and peace and those developed centuries later by Hugo 
Grotius, and even modern realists such as Kenneth Waltz and Hans Morgenthau. Yet Sabet 
argues that commonalities shared by Shaybani and the later authors, particularly with regards 
to the “juristic” interest in studying the phenomenon of war, derives from the fact that all 
seek to construct a systemic theory of the international out of the basic condition of war, 
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rather than the ontological definitions themselves. Like Grotius, Morgenthau and Waltz after 
him, Shaybani was interested in 
causes and justifications of war and the conditions of peace, security, and order; […] power 
and position as an/the essential actor (unit of analysis in the community of nations; […] 
conceptions and images of the international system and the role of the “state” in that 
system.
469
 
As such, the division of the world into abodes of ‘Islam’ (and by implication, ‘peace’) and 
‘war’ as a metanarrative of ‘us’ and ‘them’, is less a confirmation of a clash of civilisations 
than it is evidence of early attempts at constructing a systemic theory of  international 
relations within Islamic parameters. Shaybani’s reading of Islamic scripture was made 
possible through his utilisation of a legal framework as the basis for international relations 
and – specifically – the moderation of war. As Adib-Moghaddam points out, it was only 
much later with the writings of Katib Çelebi in the 17
th
 century that the al-Harb/al-Islam 
dichotomy took on a more militaristic and expansionist connotation.
470
 Shaybani’s dichotomy 
therefore does not point to any foregone conclusions about the type of strategic preferences or 
attitudes to warfare on a micro-level.  
Second Level of Analysis: Secondary Sources of Islamic Law  
We have recognised that the normalisation of war in Qur’anic ontology allows for a 
‘systemic’ vision of security and international relations inside Islam that is potentially more 
important for understanding contemporary strategic preferences in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran than ontological definitions taken individually or out of context. This systemic vision 
helps consolidate the epistemic boundaries of what are constructed as being ‘Islamic’ 
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strategic preferences, and opinion-making concerning various tactical doctrines associated 
with mass-destruction. It is within this space that strategic preferences which govern the 
development, use and non-use of weapons capable of mass destruction compete with one 
another.  
Yet in spite of the broad acceptance of this space for formulating strategic preferences, there 
has been historically little consensus between Shi’i and Sunni schools regarding the types of 
secondary sources – namely, narrated traditions (ahadith) – which can inform the reading of 
Qur’anic ontology, particularly in the context of developing laws and doctrines of war. This 
is crucial as there are far more secondary sources that outline either explicit or implicit 
parameters for warfare than there are Qur’anic verses. We will now proceed to consider the 
second level of analysis: non-Qur’anic sources of military jurisprudence and strategic 
preferences in Islam. This remains central for our assessment in Chapter Five of how 
pragmatism and expediency are viewed within Shi’i religious legal discourses, and how these 
views could impact policies on nuclear weapons. 
Aside from the Qur’an, narrated traditions which illustrate the sayings and practises (singular: 
sunnah, plural: sunnan) of the Prophet are also relied upon in developing both legal 
parameters of warfare based on reference to Qur’anic ontology, and theologies for viewing 
what Giorgio Agamben might consider ‘states of exception’471 (more of which will be said in 
the next section, and in Chapter Five). Given the Islamic view that the Qur’an is entirely 
complete and in no need of authentication, its own parameters are consequently held by both 
Shi’a and Sunnis to be of greater weight than those found in ahadith. A precedent or 
commandment in the Quran can subsequently overrule any hadith believed to contradict its 
content.  
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Nevertheless, ambiguity in how to apply verses in the Qur’an to military strategy (including 
if and when the use of weapons capable of mass destruction can be necessary or permissible, 
and seeming conflicting verses of the Qur’an such as those outlined in the previous section) 
has meant that Muslims have also relied upon the example set by the Prophet outlined in 
ahadith. In addition to the sunnah of the Prophet, Twelver Shi’a consider the verified 
judgements and precedents set by a succession of ‘infallible’ (masoom) Twelve Imams, 
present on earth between 632 and around 873-74 AD, as authoritative.
472
 During the lifetime 
of the Prophet and the Twelve Imams, this meant that there was little controversy in heeding 
to one source of guidance on political, spiritual, and military matters. On a practical level, 
Shi’i emulation of these masoomin means that they should in theory draw from a wider 
historical sample of authoritative traditions related to military jurisprudence than their Sunni 
counterparts. If any of these infallibles were to declare jihad, or outline conduct on the 
battlefield, their opinions would be considered an authoritative basis for strategic preferences.  
Of these ahadith, some provide a general views within Shi’ism concerning jihad, while 
others highlight conducted specifically related to weapons capable of mass destructions and 
strategies associated with mass destruction. In a famous hadith narrated on the authority of 
the Sixth Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq, the Prophet upon witnessing fighters returning from battle 
blesses them for having performed the ‘lesser’ jihad, but states that they have yet to perform 
the ‘greater’ jihad. When asked what the greater jihad was, the Prophet replies that it is jihad 
‘al-nafs’: the struggle of the self.473 Khomeini dissects this hadith in volume within which he 
explores a wide selection of ahadith from a mystical and ethical standpoint: 
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man is a marvel possessing two lives and two worlds within one existence. That is, apparent 
life or the outward world, which is this worldly existence, and is associated with his body, and 
the other is ‘inner life’, the inward world, associated with the hidden, invisible, higher other 
world, his soul in short
474
 
Khomeini ultimately interprets this hadith as indicating that the ‘lesser’ jihad of war is the 
practical foundation for the greater jihad of purification. Taleghani cites a similar hadith 
regarding the Fourth Imam, Imam Sajjad, concluding that it be a “precondition” for jihad that 
the participant be someone who is repentant before God.
475
 For both Khomeini and 
Taleghani, jihad was in this hadith a reminder of the unity of this life (dunya) and the next 
(akhira),
476
 and of the ‘normalisation’ paradigm contained in Qur’anic ontology which 
absorbed war and military affairs into the realm of the spiritual. We find this sentiment in 
Khomeini’s work expressed elsewhere: “[l]ook at the Prayer of Kumayl, which has been 
transmitted from the Commander of the Faithful, and reflect on the fact that it was composed 
by a man who wielded the sword.”477 
There are a few practical examples from the brief tenure of Imam Ali as Caliph (detailed in 
ahadith), as well as during the lives of subsequent Imams, which can help us discern tactical 
or strategic doctrines of war within Shi’ism. One of the few insights into his strategic outlook 
can be found during the Battle of Siffin in 657 AD, when the army of the first Imam Ali 
fought against that of Muawiyah I (led by Amr ibn al-Aas). Due to their losses, enemy 
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soldiers began raising Qur’ans on spears as a gesture that both sides should cease hostilities 
and heed to the Qur’an’s guidance in reaching an arbitrated settlement.478 The call for 
arbitration was made at a point where it seemed that defeat of Muawiyah’s forces was 
inevitable, and because of his suspicions that the enemy would use the arbitration to their 
own benefit. In addressing his followers, he recounts that: 
[w]hen they raised the Holy Quran by way of deceit, craft, artifice and cheating, did you not 
say that they are our brothers and comrades in accepting Islam? They want us to cease 
fighting and ask for protection through the Book of Allah, the Glorified. Our opinion is to 
agree with them and to end their troubles. Then I said to you, in this affair, the outer side is 
Faith but the inner side is enmity.
479
 
Imam Ali’s justification for having initially opposed arbitration and the cessation of conflict 
stemmed from a more mystical claim of representing a form of military and political 
leadership that transcended all temporal criteria, driven by ‘hidden’ truths as well as practical 
considerations. In a famous tradition contained in Nahj al-Balagha, he dismissed the gesture 
of propping Qur’an’s with spears as a reminder of Islam’s teachings in the following way:  
when this thing (arbitration) was done I found that you agreed to it. By Allah, if I had refused 
it, it would not have been obligatory on me. Nor would Allah have laid its sin on me. And by 
Allah, not that I have accepted it, I alone am the rightful person who should be followed, for 
certainly the Qur'an is with me. I have never forsaken it since I adopted its company.
480
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For the Shi’a, the actions of Imam Ali reflected the Qur’an in its fullest esoteric and exoteric 
form – the “speaking Qur’an” (al-Qur’an al-Natiq)481 – thereby intertwining his leadership 
and military conduct with divine guidance. As Khomeini writes, “one stroke of Imam Ali’s 
sword was more meritorious than all the acts of worship performed by the jinn and 
mankind”.482 In a similar vein to the transcendent conduct of Imam Ali, accounts of the 
martyrdom of the Third Imam, Hussein, are told and eulogised each year during the month of 
Muharram, and there are vast scholarly literatures examining the resonance of these accounts 
which often highlight examples of bravery, self-sacrifice and uncompromising moral clarity 
during the Battle of Karbala as narrated in (both authentic and inauthentic) ahadith.
483
 More 
specific insights into Ali’s views of warfare are recounted by the ninth century historian al-
Tabari, and in the commentary to Nahjul Balagha by Mutahhari. Imam Ali is believed to 
have set the following limits on jihad prior to the Battle of Siffin:  
a) that believers never instigate war, 
b) that believers never strike first, 
c) that those fleeing from the battlefield are not pursued and killed, 
d) that the wounded are not killed, 
e) that the believer not mutilate the enemy, and 
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f) that neither women, children or the elderly are harmed.484  
These conditions would in theory be sufficient in rendering weapons capable of mass 
destruction, including nuclear weapons, impermissible as deterrents (and inevitably, part of a 
strategic doctrine which allows for their use against civilian populations), and weapons of 
first-use.  
Ali’s position at Siffin had a legacy which transcended this one particular battle. During the 
Iran-Iraq war, Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili made reference to the example of Imam Ali’s set 
here in his justification for why Iran should not accept a ceasefire with Baathist Iraq in 
1982.
485
 Iran moreover rejected the sequencing of UN Security Council Resolution 598 on 
the grounds that a ceasefire should have only come about after arbitration, rather than before 
– again an allusion to the lessons of Siffin.486 In 2012, Ayatollah Khamenei’s representative 
to the IRGC Ali Saeedi also made a reference to Siffin, quoting Malik al-Ashtar in arguing 
that Iran should not cave in to western demands regarding its nuclear programme due to the 
‘weak will’ of certain Iranians – again, likening this group to the partisans of Ali at the 
time.
487
  
Beyond these examples, the Eighth Shi’i Imam – Ali al-Ridha – is said to have become 
enraged with his brother Zayd bin Musa bin Ja’far Sadiq, upon learning that he had set fire 
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and destroyed all of the houses belonging to the House of Abbas and its followers in Basra 
after it had been retaken from Abu al-Saraya’s control.488 So infamous was this incident of 
mass killing for the Shi’a that Zayd received the nickname Zayd ‘al-Naar’: Zayd of the 
Fire.
489
 Yet in another instance, it is recounted in one hadith found in Kitab al-Kafi, graded as 
‘good’ by Allamah Majlisi, that Imam Ali had sentenced to death by fire those who attributed 
divinity to him (namely, the ghulāt).490 This highlights a point of ambiguity in whether the 
Imams forbade the use of fire as a weapon writ large, or only in circumstances which would 
result in ‘unlawful’ deaths. 
As the discrepancy – at least in principle – between the actions of Imam Ali and the view of  
Imam al-Ridha concerning the use of fire as a weapon indicate,  just as there is difficulty 
associated with attempting to ascertain what an ‘Islamic’ doctrine of warfare looks like with 
sole reference to Qur’anic ontology in its constituent parts (i.e. verses) rather than as a whole, 
there is an equal difficulty with attempting to construct a definitive Islamic doctrine of 
warfare with reference to traditions in isolation from Qur’anic ontology, or (as we will 
observe in the next section), theology. This should be kept in mind as one attempts to 
understand the origins of fatawa on nuclear weapons today, particularly as we assess the 
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importance of couching all proclamations in this area in a system whereby the connection of 
the Supreme Leader’s views to a higher truth is taken (at least in principle) as a given.  
For all those ahadith which have served as the basis of Islamic laws which put limits on 
jihad, there are others which reinforce a much more confrontational outlook on military 
affairs and what can be done in the name of ‘protecting’ Islamic referents of security. Based 
on secondary sources, these outlooks can therefore be used to justify or prohibit the use of 
weapons capable of mass destruction. In Sunnism at least, the earliest legal theorists writing 
formatively on the topic of jihad related to the topic of war had themselves fought to expand 
Muslim territory into Byzantium, and were more inclined to view war as a “religious duty”491 
and include narrations which reinforced the normalisation paradigm. The outcome, however, 
was that normalisation soon became equated with the more militant vision of Shaybani’s al-
Harb/al-Islam distinction. “These scholars were transformed by their followers into saints, 
which in return empowered their militant vision of jihad and established it as mainstream 
dogma in Islamic religious thought”.492 This distinction is moreover compounded by the Shi’i 
reliance on ahadith transmitted through the Imams rather than companions of the Prophet, or 
jurists working in the court of a caliphate: “whereas Sunni legal schools follow the juridical 
opinions of some jurisconsults of Medina and Iraq, Shi’is [sic] follow the opinion of their 
Imam”.493  
Nevertheless, certain readings of ahadith by contemporary Iranian scholars have also resulted 
in combative doctrines of jihad where it would seem that conventional normative limits of 
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warfare would not apply. Ali Rahnema for instance has highlighted how Ayatollah Mesbah 
Yazdi conceives a new category of jihad  – ‘preventative jihad’: a pre-emptive category 
wherein it is permissible to wage war “in defence of “religious and human values””,494 and 
has done so by referring Imam Hussein’s example.495 Other views espoused in Shi’ism by the 
Imams seem to point to acquiescence to the practical need of government as a first and 
foremost priority, with all ethical considerations being secondary to this basic need. Ibn 
Taymiyah even draws upon a hadith where the first Shi’i Imam is asked about the need to 
follow a leader who is unjust, to which he is said to have responded: “[because] thanks to it, 
highways are kept secure, canonical penalties are applied, holy war is fought against the 
enemy, and spoils are collected”.496 
Third Level of Analysis: Theology  
In addition to these two levels (Qur’anic ontology, secondary sources) is theology, the third 
level of analysis of sources for strategic preferences emerging from within an Islamic 
episteme. Following the death of the Prophet, supporters of Ali’s claim to leadership of the 
ummah disputed a number of claims made Abu Bakr and his supporters. Among the most 
prominent was that the Prophet had not designated a successor, and that given this omission 
his successor should be elected.
497
 Shi’a not only reject the suggestion that the Prophet did 
not appoint a successor on historical grounds.
498
 They also reject this notion with reference to 
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the nature of revelation, posing the following question to their Sunni brethren: if the Prophet 
was infallible, how could he have left the ummah’s future – whether defined in security, 
prosperity or spiritual terms – in the hands of the fallible masses? Would the final Prophet of 
Abrahamic monotheism allow for power to be handed down regardless of a link between 
leadership and a divine mandate?  
After the first four Caliphs, Sunnis of varying ethnic and theological dispositions would go 
on to hold a monopoly over the political and military affairs of Muslim lands which would 
extend well into Europe, Asia and Africa. With the exception of the ‘Shi’i Century’ (10th-11th 
centuries), and up until the consolidation of the Safavid dynasty in 16
th
 century Iran, Shi’a 
existed largely as an insecure persecuted minority sect on the fringe of different ruling Sunni 
dynasties. All but one of the Twelve Imams was murdered, and Shi’a believe that all but two 
were martyred on the orders of various Caliphs.
499
 Adherents of Shi’i Islam were routinely 
mistreated and killed for their beliefs, subjected to the charge of apostasy; so much so that, as 
Heinz Halm notes, the prototypical Shi’i bore the motif of the “the quietly enduring 
martyr”.500 A far cry from the orientalist Shi’i penchant for martyrdom caricature, Shi’i 
theology has traditionally underscored martyrdom in a far less triumphalist context – one of 
loss, waiting and salvation, and not necessarily of uprising or revolution, and certainly not in 
the cause of military expansion. Some of the personalities revered today among many Sunnis 
as Islam’s most gifted military leaders – such as Khalid ibn Walid and Salah al-Din Ayyubi – 
are charged by Shi’a with forced conversion, looting, killing non-combatants, and other 
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crimes against those who opposed or resisted the Caliph.
501
Alastair Crooke also notes that the 
Sunni acquiescence to hereditary power in Islam, divorced from the requirement of divine 
appointment – all in the name maintaining order and the security of Muslim lands – resulted 
in a social compact “shunned” by Shi’a.502 It is for this reason of having separated jihad from 
the precondition that it be conducted ‘for the sake of God’ (fi sabilillah) rather than temporal 
gain that Ayatollah Taleghani writes that “in the time of the Umayyad caliphs, just as 
everything connected with Islam was deformed, jihad was deformed”.503 
While both Shi’a and Sunnis would therefore share a basic existential interest in the ‘security’ 
of Muslim lands from potential external threats, both the status-quo and military expansion of 
Muslim territories served the interests of Sunnis more so than they did Shi’a.504 As John 
Kelsay points out, 
Sunni theorists developed and presupposed a particular interpretation of the Qur’an, which 
may be read, at least in part, as an apologia for the conquests of the mid to late seventh 
century […] [a] scholar such as al-Shaybani thus presupposed the connection of Islam with an 
imperial state and its power.
505
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As a consequence, a large body of Sunni military jurisprudence was the by-product of an 
alignment of Islamic law-making with the material interests of the state, and an intimate 
relationship between Islamic knowledge-production and empire. Efforts at creating a social 
compact between believers and the state after the death of the Prophet required that Sunni 
jurists construct a body of law which assumed the necessity of a robust rather than ‘just’ 
political authority, and this trickled down into expectations of the individual believer at times 
of war and peace. In this regard, Mairaj Syed argues that a “systematic” legal doctrine of war 
in Islam emerged only after the death of the Prophet Mohammad, and specifically in the 
context of empire building: 
It would be no stretch to describe the attitude of entitlement to power and conquest produced 
by the rapid imperial expansion as a Muslim Manifest Destiny. Put simply, the context in 
which Sunni religious scholars undertook the systematic elaboration of jihad as a legal 
doctrine was substantially different from the context that produced the Divine texts on which 
they relied. The imperial success of the Muslims following Muhammad’s death no doubt 
informed the direction and substance of the construction of a systematic approach to 
warfare.
506
 
It is in this context that, traditionally, centuries of military conduct which served the imperial 
expansion of Muslim territorial boundaries, but resulting in the abrogation of Islamic law or 
innovation of newer, more pragmatic laws, have until fairly recently been formally rejected 
within Shi’ism.  
Contrary then to what is often assumed about the religious roots of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran’s expansionist aims, especially in the context of modern Sunni Arab fears of an 
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emerging ‘Shi’i Crescent’,507 or what is misconstrued from Vali Nasr’s ‘Shi’i revival’ 
thesis,
508
 the Shi’a have traditionally viewed security in a much more local rather than 
expansionist or imperialist context. This theology shaped the Shi’i identification of referent 
objects of security, and in turn had an impact on the articulation of formative military 
jurisprudence in Shi’i sources concerning weapons capable of mass destruction. Once 
consolidated as formal legal parameters, they would prove hegemonic until the emergence of 
the Safavid state, and – as will be examined in-depth later on – the rise to power of Khomeini 
and his vision of wilayat al-faqih for the 20
th
 century. 
Referent Objects of Security and Securitising Actors in Shi’ism  
When considered together, these three levels provide a non-secular analytical framework for 
understanding Islamic ‘referent objects’ of security: “things that are seen to be existentially 
threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival”.509 This framework can help trace 
referent objects in terms of what they are, and how they emerge, consolidate themselves and 
change over time, and the significance of these processes for understanding Iranian strategic 
preferences today, and whether or not Iran could – consistent with the religious convictions 
of its leaders – develop nuclear weapons in the future. Equally, it can help with qualifying the 
agency of the ulama as ‘securitising actors’, those capable of “[securitising] issues by 
declaring something – a referent object – existentially threatened”,510 and exercising 
pragmatism from within ‘Islamic’ epistemic parameters. 
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One of the earliest referent objects of security for Shi’a was the Shi’i community itself, in 
contrast to Sunnis conceiving a grander referent object of the caliphate or wider ‘ummah’. 
Notably, it was in securing a more local referent object that basic Islamic practises could be 
abandoned if one feared for their life or the lives of other believers at the hands of a 
tyrannical government. In contrast, securing the larger and more substantive referent object of 
the caliphate could not be used to justify the temporary abrogation of Islamic laws, including 
those pertaining to military affairs. It has been established that clerics had played an integral 
role in legitimising the spread of Islam outside of the Arabian Peninsula, at times using 
military means. The most urgent issue facing the Shi’a, by contrast, was its very own 
survival, and the preservation of its belief system. It is in this context that there were far 
fewer incentives for the Shi’a to preserve the status-quo, or to promote theological discourse 
that excused certain questionable military tactics in the name of the Islamic ‘state’. 
As an early act of self-preservation, the Shi’i community sought to secure itself as a referent 
object by way not of modern military technology or deterrence, but rather a concept rooted in 
the Qur’an known as taqiyah – dissimulation. This practise enabled the Shi’a who feared 
persecution to adopt the motions of Sunni-Islamic practise as a means of concealing their 
identity. The principle of taqiyah gained specific resonance in the Shi’i community as its 
principle mechanism of survival against increasingly powerful and hostile governments 
which viewed them as ‘rejecters of the faith’ (rafidah). Such was its importance to the 
existence of the Shi’i community – and to the belief system of the Shi’a – that the Sixth Imam 
Ja’far al-Sadiq is narrated as saying “[d]issimulation is the shield (turs) of the believer. 
Dissimulation is the refuge (ḥirz) of the believer. Whoever does not practise dissimulation 
has no faith (imān)”.511 In this latter regard – and in contrast to the crude account of taqiyah 
surveyed in Chapter Three – the practise was in its earliest incarnation a mechanism for 
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protecting intangible referent objects of security, and not transient foreign policy interests 
only nominally rooted in an appeal to ‘self-preservation’. 
The historic tendency towards introversion and a limited, local definition of security (i.e. the 
Shi’i community) is in another sense derivative theologically from a lingering preoccupation 
within Shi’ism over “the difference between abiding by the laws of … [an] Islamic 
government and obedience to laws whose legitimacy and credibility are only supported by 
majority will”,512 especially during the era of the “greater” occultation (al-ghayba al-
kubra).
513
 For the most part of Islamic history, this rendered both Shi’ism and Sunnism 
doctrinally irreconcilable with one another on many issues related to the governance and 
legal administration of the Muslim community: “two parallel orthodox perspectives of 
Islamic revelation”.514 Hamid Enayat regards the historic Shi’i rejection of the notion that 
majority or popular opinion – the ‘general will’ – is an adequate source for Islamic law or 
governance as the sect’s “most outstanding feature”.515 It was not enough to claim just 
authority over the ummah with a promise to safeguard their protection, nor by pointing to the 
general will. One must be divinely appointed either explicitly as a successor to the Prophet, 
or implicitly as a representative of such an authority. 
A corollary to this view is that, historically, the Shi’a have viewed only the Prophet and 
Twelve Imams as possessing an explicitly legitimate mandate to act as securitising actors 
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with the authority to declare both offensive as well as defensive jihad. Regarding the specific 
prerogative to declare offensive jihad - jihad al-talab – it is notable that even in recent history 
Twelver scholars avoid claiming this authority. When Khomeini refers to jihad in a 
contemporary setting, he refers specifically to defensive rather than offensive jihad. For 
instance, he states that he refuses to give “the order for sacred jihad” as a response to an 
army’s assault on Iranians in Gorgan and Gunbad-e Qabus, in spite of his acknowledgment 
that there was an apparently strong justification for doing so.
516
 Lotfollah Safi Golpayegani 
similarly provides an argument that offensive jihad as only permissible in the presence and 
under the command of the Twelfth Imam,
517
 and only considers defensive jihad – “defending 
the heart of Islam and honor of the Muslims […] repelling the enemies’ attacks from the 
Islamic borders […] a general obligation”.518 
Following the will of any other securitising actor, or subjecting security policy to the will of 
the majority can – in the classical Shi’i view at least – lead Islamic societies to enact policies 
that are in diametric opposition to divine will. These policies cannot be considered ‘Islamic’, 
and therefore their outcomes can only be considered detrimental to legitimate ‘referent 
objects’ of security, and ultimately the interests of the Muslim community. In a more basic 
sense, rule of the majority “is too weak to be presented as an alternative to comprehensive 
religious, moral and philosophical doctrines”.519 
It is precisely these higher and narrower criteria of legitimacy for those that are permitted to 
define the ‘security interests’ of the Shi’a (and consequently, the actions that can be taken in 
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their name) that endows the views of anyone believed to be the ‘just ruler’ – or governing on 
their behalf (such as the wali al-faqih in Iran today) – with deeper, unseen ‘Truth’. Recalling 
the question of succession analysed in the previous section, we are reminded that disputes 
over the qualification of succession were based as much on esoteric beliefs about revelation 
and the Qur’an as they were on rational arguments. The majority of Twelver Shi’a believe 
that although the exoteric content (ẓāhir) of Qur’anic ontology is clear and authentic (and has 
remained as such since it was first revealed to the Prophet), its esoteric meaning (bāṭīn) has 
been either misunderstood or deliberately concealed. In this context, the Prophet himself and 
a succession of Twelve Imams – and only those of closest spiritual proximity to these figures 
– are the only figures capable of discerning this more mystical inner truth of the Qur’an by 
the Shi’a. As such, any parallel claims to authoritative interpretation can only be considered 
false.  
It would be perhaps an over-simplification, though by no means wrong, to say that Shī’īsm 
propounds [batin, ta’wil, haqiqat], while Sunnīsm is mostly associated with their opposite. 
But the division does represent a sharp breach between those Muslim intellectuals who 
remain firmly committed to theosophy (’urafā), and those well-versed in juridical sciences 
and formalistic casuistry (fuqahā).”520 
Today, there are a plethora of arguments offered by Shi’i ulama in support of clerical 
involvement in managing the political – and ultimately military – affairs of Muslims, 
particularly during the period of occultation of the Twelfth and Hidden Imam.  These 
arguments frequently attest to a belief in Shi’ism that “without esotericism exotericism loses 
its meaning”.521 These arguments rely simultaneously on Qur’anic ontology, secondary 
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sources, and a more mystical theology of revelation and ‘Truth’ that they believe point both 
towards an intrinsic leadership function of the ‘most learned’ (namely, the ulama) in the 
absence of the Twelve Imams, and ultimately the authoritative status of their opinions related 
to military jurisprudence. Speaking to his companion Kumayl ibn Ziyad, the first Shi’i Imam 
Ali ibn Abi Talib is narrated as having said the following: 
The people are of three kinds: the divine scholar, those who seek knowledge and tread the 
path of salvation, and the rabble [hamraj ra’ā’] who follow every crowing creature, never 
partaking of the light of knowledge, never relying on a solid base.
522
 
Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, such narratives of religious authority have dominated 
Qom’s seminaries and provided a scholarly backbone to the case for wilayat al-faqih in Iran.  
Yet early on in Islamic history, when the formative views and opinions within Shi’ism and 
Sunnism concerning warfare and the ‘state’ were being made, this view had encouraged a 
distinct quietism in Shi’ism that precluded extended commentary on military or stately 
affairs. By conceiving the ‘just ruler’ early on, weapons of warfare were perceived to be in 
the hands of what were ‘unjust’ usurpers of rightful spiritual and ultimately political 
authority. Shi’i opposition to the structures of religious, political (and ultimately military) 
authority set up under the Umayyad dynasty provides evidence against the essentialist view 
of Shi’i Islam as being a ‘religion of protest’,523 naturally inclined to acts of revolutionary 
defiance against tyrannical or oppressive powers.
524
 This remains true in the modern age, as 
attempts at projecting Shi’ism as being intrinsically opposed to temporal political authority 
reflect a deep Eurocentrism which considers “the intrinsic fusion of Islam and politics” as 
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“inhibitive of modern secular state formation”,525 and ultimately contradictory to many areas 
of Iran’s foreign policy-making and defence policies latently characterised as ‘realist’. 
Early opposition to this dynastic rule and the imperial conquests undertaken in the name of 
Islam hinged more significantly on an important theological debate inside Shi’ism regarding 
the place of the ‘just ruler’. The social construction of the ‘just ruler’ within Shi’ism would 
legitimise a multitude of different political stances and military postures among the 
transnational Shi’i community, often with implications for how they viewed the necessity of 
protecting the state or nation. Such a view led the Imams to reject the legitimacy of numerous 
wars undertaken by successive caliphs, which they regarded as being driven by worldly 
motivations rather than divine guidance.
526
 Abdulaziz Sachedina determines as follows: 
[t]he original purpose of jihād […] according to the Imamites, was not preserved under the 
caliphate. What had caused the jihād to drift away from the Qur’ānic purpose was the coming 
to power of unjust and unrighteous authority claiming to undertake jihād in the name of God. 
Of the two main purposes of jihād – namely, to call upon the people to respond to God’s 
guidance, and to protect the basic welfare of the community – the first purpose, according to 
all the Imamite jurists, required the presence of al-imām al-‘āḋil or the person deputized by 
such an authority. This was to guarantee that jihād against unbelievers was undertaken strictly 
for the cause of God.
527
 
The most foundational questions in Shi’ism related to jihad therefore invoke a deeper 
concern over whom has the legitimate authority to declare war, and which individuals were 
capable of discerning proper military conduct where both the Qur’an and ahadith are silent. 
This would later set the terms on the permissibility of jihad and laws aimed at moderating it. 
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The second referent object of security contained in Shi’ism is therefore found in the mandate 
of the Imamate itself, and all juridical, political and esoteric authority claiming to derive from 
it. As we will see in Chapter Five, this referent object is far more conductive to a broader 
definition of what needs to be secured, such as a caliphate or a state. Within such a view, 
protecting the security of the state can in some instances align naturally with protecting the 
Imamate or ‘just ruler’, but only if certain conditions are met. 
Pragmatism in Islamic Law: Usul al-Fiqh and Maslahah 
We have so far established a non-secular framework for understanding the origins of Islamic 
referent objects of security located in Shi’ism. Here Qur’anic ontology, secondary sources 
and theology overlap in the construction of a number of referent objects – such as the Shi’i 
community itself, or divine mandate – which must be protected by any means necessary. We 
will examine in Chapter Five how these referent objects can be cited in order to legitimise 
certain ‘extraordinary’ policies towards nuclear weapons and other WMD which could result 
in the partial or complete abrogation of specific Islamic laws, but that these referent objects 
are defined and are reconstructed on their own terms. We will now move on to applying this 
analytical framework in assessing one of the primary mechanisms permitting military 
jurisprudence to be more flexible than either orientalism or realism would suggest: maslahah. 
On a very basic level the chronology of a fatwa is straightforward: recourse to the individual 
interpretation of a scholar (ijtihad) occurs only when there is a lack of specific ordinance 
found within either Qur’anic ontology or secondary sources. In cases where there are no clear 
precedents set in these primary sources, encounters with modern ‘innovations’ (bid’ah) are 
evaluated through reference to the secondary principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) in 
assessing whether they are permissible or not. Though not recognised by all schools of 
Islamic jurisprudence, secondary principles of usul al-fiqh include:  
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 consensus of the scholars (‘ijma), 
 individual discretion (istihan), 
 expediency (maslahah), 
 ijtihad, 
 inference (istidlal), and 
 local custom (‘urf).  
In addition to these sources is the methodology of qiyas, which is the use of analogical 
reasoning based around similar precedents found in Islamic source.528 More general principles 
which influence Islamic law include the rule that all things should initially be assumed 
permissible unless stated impermissible in primary or secondary sources.
  
The Shi’a narrow these categories down to two secondary categories which complement the 
Quran and Hadith – ‘aql (reason) and ‘ijma. Although Shi’i jurists have for centuries rejected 
the use of qiyas as a secondary source in the case that a specific legal definition cannot be 
found within primary sources, they believe that kalam – juristic discourse – fulfils the 
requirements of a secondary source under both categories of ‘aql and ‘ijma. In practise this 
means that while jurists of the Twelver Shi’i school do not believe that modern challenges 
can be met by appealing to logical precedents found in similar cases, they do believe that a 
reasoned debate and discussion among the ulama can reveal the legal standing of a given 
issue. Given these views on the distinction between kalam and qiyas in classical Twelver-
Shi’i legal theory, one cannot therefore use the Prophet’s authorisation of the use of 
trébuchets as definitive evidence for ballistic missiles being Islamically permissible today. 
However, and especially within more modernist Shi’i paradigms of Islamic law (such as that 
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associated with contemporary theologian Mujtahid Shabistari),
529
 it is sufficient for a scholar 
to arrive at the conclusion that ballistic missiles are permissible through reasoned, informed 
and ‘innovative’ discourse (kalam) and ijtihad which may involve some reference to logical 
precedents. 
Much like qiyas, maslahah is not viewed as a ‘source’ of Islamic law by either Sunni or Shi’i 
schools, but rather a mechanism for deliberating on matters in light of considering some 
notion of ‘public interest’. Both the individual agency of the scholar and the social-
construction of threat/the threatened are here essential factors that underpinning Islamic law-
making. Identification of a ‘public interest’ is itself being a subjective process, similar to the 
process of securitisation. If we choose to define maslahah as a derivative of the Arabic ‘al-
Salah’ (‘wellbeing’), and as the opposite of ‘mafsada’ (“harm”, or “pain”), then we are 
reminded that both concepts are subjective and “do not amount to scientific truths”.530 This 
leaves considerable scope for the jurist to identify referent objects of security – and the 
appropriate means for securing them – to Muslim societies. They are responsible for defining 
the extent of a particular harm (both in its qualitative severity and whether it impacts all 
Muslims or a particular subgroup), what this harm threatens, and the urgency with which it 
must be resolved.  
Felicitas Opwis postulates that while early Muslim jurists who began using the term 
maslahah in the 10
th
 century derived it from the Maliki conceptual method of istislah – 
discerning what is ‘good’ and ‘beneficial’, “considerations of maslahah seems to have been 
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part of the legal practice quite early on, even if not known by this technical term”.531 Opwis 
points to the formative literatures on maslahah as evidence that this kind of legal deliberation 
therefore contained a political as well as theological dimension early on.
532
 Among the first 
legal theorists to theorise the concept was the Persian scholar al-Juwayni, who argued that 
there could be preference for whatever was in the interest of the ‘public’ if the reasons for 
doing so were a) rationally clear and obvious (amr daruri); b) due to a need that is below that 
of urgent necessity (haja ‘amma); c) for noble reasons (makruma); for recommended reasons 
(mandub), or finally d) due to reasons that are beyond rational comprehension.
533
  
Al-Ghazali, a student of al-Juwayni, is credited for retrieving maslahah “out of the realm of 
the otherworldly reward for the obedient believer” and transforming it into “an intelligible 
criterion that can be used as a means for legal change”. 534 This allowed maslahah to depart 
from being merely a methodology of sole pertinence to the practise and well-being of the 
individual believer, and instead become a practical method for securing the greatest good for 
the greatest number within the boundaries of Islamic acceptability. Recourse to mashalah 
was predicated on the identification of certain categories of public interest, such as 
“accredited public interest”, and “interests […] of no value if […] not ordained by the All 
Wise Lawgiver” (i.e. God).535 As such, “not every quality that seems of benefit qualifies as a 
public interest (Maslahah), but only that which is deemed beneficial by the Lawgiver, and 
                                                          
531
 Felicitas Opwis, Masaha and the Purpose of the Law: Islamic Discourse on Legal Change from the 4
th
/10
th
 to 
8
th
/14
th
 Century, Leiden: Brill, 2010, p. 9. 
532
 Ibid, p. 27. 
533
 Hayatullah Laluddin, Mohamad Nasran Mohammad , Zuliza Mohd Kusrin, Shofian Ahmad , Zaini Nasohah , 
Mohd. Zamro Muda , Md. Yazid Ahmad and Ahmad Muhammad Husni , “An Analysis of Maslahah’s 
Development Through al-Ghazali Pre and Post al-Ghazali Periods”, International Business Management, 6 (2), 
pp. 187-193, 2012, pp. 187-188; Opwis, Masaha and the Purpose of the Law, p. 50. 
534
 Opwis, Masaha and the Purpose of the Law, p. 58. 
535
 Muhammad al-Mukhtar al-Salami, Al-Qiyas (Analogy) and its Modern Applications [Tr. Mohammad Hashim 
Kamali], Eminent Scholars Lecture Series, No. 15, p. 81. 
The Nuclear Policies of Iran: Islam and Strategic Thinking in the Islamic 
Republic 
211 
wherein beneficence outweighs corruption”.536 Opwis cites the issue of prohibiting alcoholic 
drinks other than wine based on their inebriating qualities, as opposed to any other criteria, as 
an example of the kind of ‘interests’ that jurists had in mind when conceiving of maslahah.537 
For our purposes, it is the more expansive and governance-centric form of maslahah related 
to warfare and the state, and the general provisions for expediency contained in various 
discourses prior to its emergence as a more or less formal legal methodology after the advent 
of al-Ghazali, which are of relevance to the contemporary use of the concept by Shi’i 
scholars. In recent times, the acceptance of maslahah by many Shi’i Iranian Muslim scholars 
– or conceptual division of Islamic laws into ‘fixed’ (thabet) and ‘changeable’ (motaghayyer) 
categories
538
 – has opened laws governing the use and non-use of weapons of mass 
destruction to definition through reference to precedents and methodologies set in Sunni 
sources. So prevalent is this tendency that Islamic scholars in Iran readily cite Sunni sources 
– even deeply problematic ones from the perspective of theology539 – as a foundation for 
arguments supporting official Iranian policy against WMD proliferation and use.
540
 Crucially 
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however, despite the transience of such laws, they retain a socially constructed lineage to 
divine mandate and status as ‘objective truth’ when reinforcing the opinions of the wali al-
faqih. Though recently introduced into debates and commentary over Iran’s strategic culture 
as a framework for designing Islamic laws – or abandoning them – with the national interest 
in mind,
541
 the concept of maslahah as it is conceived by Twelver Shi’i legal theorists reflects 
much more about how the actions of government, rooted in some reference to the security of 
the Muslim community, are able to retain their dogmatic stature through the proximity of 
maslahah to esoteric Islamic ‘truth’. It is here that Khomeini’s explicit outline of his 
expectations – as wali al-faqih – of how the Islamic Republic would be different to previous 
experiments with the nation-state is particularly revealing: 
[w]e want “nationality” in the light of Islamic teachings. We will do anything for the Iranian 
nation only in the name of Islam [sic] not nationality […] [defending] Islamic nations is an 
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obligation. But it does not mean that we put Islam aside and cry for nationality and “pan-
Iranism”.542 
In short, maslahah as it conceived in Iran is not unique because it elevates the importance of 
the nation state above Islamic law, but rather due to the manner with which it is utilised to 
situate extraordinary action within an Islamic episteme as a ‘state of exception’. As we have 
already seen, the ‘public interest’ has traditionally been defined by the Imam of the time in 
Shi’ism, and connected to a divine mandate and infallible judgement. Indeed, one could argue 
that it was only through adapting the framework of maslahah to his revolutionary Shi’i theory 
of government that Khomeini could salvage the concept without the theological baggage of 
its Sunni legal parameters. The ‘greater’ occultation of the Twelfth Imam removed the 
physical embodiment of infallibility and divine authority from the temporal world. It was in 
this period of the occultation that multiple sources of juristic authorities emerged to fill the 
void and claim to legislate on behalf of the Twelfth Imam. This gave rise to competing 
interpretations of how the Shi’i community should conduct their lives – notably in the form 
of decrees, or fatawa – and the consolidation of Shi’i Islamic legal theory. Religious scholars 
in Qom now largely – although not completely – accept what had previously been a Sunni 
judgement that the expedient interest of the public or state could at times necessitate that 
otherwise disliked or forbidden acts could be undertaken in its defence: that the ‘worldly’ 
survival of the Muslim community must be considered a vital part of deliberations on the 
shari’ah. How a Muslim state should weigh “the sanctity of human life against the military 
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necessity of winning the war”543 has therefore since the 20th century been a dilemma for the 
Shi’a of Iran in the same way it was historically for Sunnis.544 
By constructing a lineage from the wali al-faqih to the hidden Twelfth Imam, Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s doctrine of wilayat al-faqih retrieved maslahah from the purely subjective 
authority of jurists who popularised it through reconciling the mechanism with a divine 
mandate, consequently imbuing all decisions taken in the cause of protecting the Islamic 
Republic way with an esoteric higher ‘Truth’. Yet it is important to note that maslahah was 
not a completely alien concept to the Shi’a. Hamid Enayat, for example, has likened 
maslahah to muqaddimah-e wajib (obligatory preliminary). “Since the Shi’is [sic] refute 
maslahah, the concept of ‘obligatory preliminary’ is also a device to circumvent any 
objection to law-making for which there is no specific canonical license.”545 Furthermore, the 
“rule of correlation” (qa idat al-mulazama) dictates that “whatever is ordered by reason, is 
also ordered by religion”,546 and can also be said to resemble maslahah in some respects. 
This did not necessitate that reason could trump classical sources, but rather that reason was a 
primary avenue through which religious law is discerned and understood in lieu of explicit 
scriptural definition. 
[I]n the area of moral obligations that were religiously ordained – as was the case with the 
duty of “enjoining the good and forbidding the evil” – there was recognition of the fact that it 
was reason upholding the general welfare of humanity that acknowledged the 
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comprehensiveness of the religious ordainment by engaging in its interpretation and 
discovering all the principles necessary to make it relevant at a given time in history.
547
 
In theological terms, the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran brought with it the 
enmeshment of Iran’s own destiny with the destiny of the transnational Muslim community, 
and ultimately the future of Islam, allowing for the convergence of the legalistic concept of 
‘public interest’ with Iran’s own national interests, and ultimately the interests of the Shi’a as 
a whole. This totalising narrative lends meaning and legitimacy to the “Islamic leviathan”548 
that Adib-Moghaddam identifies, but also allows it recourse to the same legal mechanism 
which buttress an otherwise antithetical theologies associated with Sunnism.  
[T]he vali-e faqih, the Supreme Jurisprudent who sits on top of the intricate constitutional 
framework in Iran, is conceptualised, politically and theologically, as that link between the 
people and the transcendental.
549
 
Wilayat al-faqih as it is implemented in Iran today equates obedience to the sovereign (i.e. 
wali al-faqih) with obedience to God’s law. Likewise, disobedience to the sovereign is 
considered tantamount to waging war against the authority of the Twelfth Imam and 
ultimately God. When a charge of moharebeh – ‘enmity against God’ – is levied at an 
individual by virtue of disobeying legislation within the Islamic Republic, the charge does not 
mean to imply that legislation passed under the auspices of Khamenei or any other Supreme 
Leader carries literally the same authority as the word of God, but instead that to disobey the 
sovereign in the Islamic Republic (while the occulted Twelfth Imam has implicitly devolved 
his own authority to the Guardian Jurist) amounts to waging war against the Imamate, and 
ultimately Allah. This has enormous implications for the way that expediency and 
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pragmatism are viewed inside of the Islamic Republic’s highest centres of decision-making, 
as well as the military. As with the earliest scholars of maslahah, the definition of public 
interest can be linked to mystical as well as material concerns, and it is often that these 
definitions inform one another. As such, we may view Khomeini’s acquiescence to the large 
Iranian death-toll resulting from attempts to take swathes of territory with ill-equipped but 
numerically superior troops not simply as a calculation based neither on cold realism or 
fanatical Islamism, but instead infused with a more mystical reading of Iran’s place in 
history, and his own belief in the broader significance of his office.  
Now that we have established an analytical framework for understanding strategic 
preferences, we may proceed to analysing precedents drawn from Islamic history concerning 
weapons capable of mass destruction. These precedents are relevant to our understanding of 
how threat is socially constructed in Islamic discourse, and our goal of conceiving of an 
alternative approach to assessing the structural relationship between fiqh in Iran and 
contemporary policies towards nuclear weapons and other WMD. In the process of 
examining these precedents, we will observe the fluid relationship between Islamic ethical 
and moral frameworks for participating in war – as outlined in fiqh – and the expedient 
interest of protecting the Muslim community existentially at times of war.  
Cases: Weapons, Tactics, and Strategies Capable of Mass Destruction 
It was noted previously that the sheer scale of indiscriminate destruction and human suffering 
nuclear weapons can cause is unprecedented in the history of military technology. As such, 
there are no exact parallels to be found in military technologies confronted in Qur’anic 
ontology, secondary sources, or Islamic theology. Nevertheless, Muslim scholars of varying 
schools of thought have throughout history had to weigh up the supposed benefits of using 
weapons, tactics and strategies capable of causing mass destruction (as well as strategies and 
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tactics with the potential cause mass destruction more generally), against ethical and legal 
parameters set by Islam. Certain tactical and strategic doctrines of warfare, and weapons 
themselves which have been addressed from within these parameters, offer important insights 
into contemporary theorisation concerning what strategic preferences towards nuclear 
weapons could look like today in Iran if the ulama has an impact in this area, and how best to 
read the fatawa surveyed in Chapter Two. This compels us to consider historical justifications 
for and against the use of weapons, tactics and strategies associated with mass destruction, 
and how these arguments hinged on the social-construction of ‘threat’ and ‘threatened’, often 
with some reference to the notion of ‘public interest’ in the identification of a referent object 
of security. 
The first basic characteristic associated with nuclear weapons as a revolutionary military 
technology is the indiscriminate destruction they cause. In the case of ‘strategic’ nuclear 
weapons designed to target populations, critical infrastructure and industrial centres in 
addition to explicitly military targets, it is extremely difficult to avoid the infliction of 
substantial collateral destruction (whether calculated in human lives, property, the 
environment, etc.). Within a realist paradigm (as surveyed in Chapter Three), it is the 
indiscriminate impact of nuclear weapons which endows them with their deterrent value, and 
forces states – through fear of massive destruction – to act rationally and predictably in the 
atomic age (e.g. through developing their own deterrent weapons, or by not using their 
existing weapons in fear of reprisals). In the context of two or more nuclear-armed states, 
“[t]he very fact that war could be total in the sense of destroying both sides means that the 
conflict of interest cannot be total.”550 
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These particular ethical dilemmas presented by nuclear weapons – concerning overall 
destructiveness, and ultimately culpability and collateral damage – are addressed thoroughly 
in fiqh at all levels of analysis. We have observed in previous sections injunctions expressed 
in Qur’anic ontology, secondary sources and in theological accounts – some explicit, others 
not – against the killing of non-combatants (especially women, children and the elderly) 
during battle. At the same time there are also some more pragmatic assessments derived from 
the levels of secondary sources and theology which tolerate mass destruction and collateral 
damage in certain circumstances. While some of these assessments stem from the explicit 
acceptance of non-combatant deaths in securing a strategic objective, others stem from 
practical concern of the difficulties in distinguishing between combatants and non-
combatants. As Algar highlights, “[e]ven in classical times […] it was not always possible to 
maintain rigorously the distinction between combatants and non-combatants and to protect 
the latter from harm”.551  
The differing views over how to accommodate outwardly conflicting accounts of the sunnah 
of the Prophet regarding the use of surprise military attacks at night (ghārāt layliyyah or 
bayāt in Arabic) within explicit prohibition of initiating battles contained in Qur’anic 
ontology are demonstrative of the problems associated with reducing Islamic military 
jurisprudence (and other religious discourse in this area) to an essentialised dogma. These 
kinds of attacks were initially deemed prohibited due to the difficulty in distinguishing 
between combatants and non-combatants – not to mention friendly fighters and the enemy – 
under the cover of darkness. Anas ibn Malik, a companion of the Prophet, narrates an account 
stating that even when the Prophet would arrive at the enemy’s territory at night, he would 
avoid surprise attacks and wait for the dawn before commencing battle.
552
 Another hadith 
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however details an incident where the Prophet was asked if night attacks were permissible, 
given the accentuated danger of accidentally killing women and children by accident. Here he 
is said to have responded that although these casualties would be considered non-combatants, 
they were nevertheless from “them” (i.e. the enemy), suggesting that attacks in this scenario 
would be permissible.
553
 Subsequent to the Prophet, while the majority of Sunni scholars 
would permit ghārāt layliyyah, the Shafi’i position on the issue would remain consistent with 
Anas ibn Malik’s narrative: namely, that the Prophet avoided such attacks, and that they are 
therefore impermissible.
554
  
Yet a contemporary Shi’i account reveals an alternative perspective, invoking simultaneously 
the ‘normalisation’ paradigm surveyed earlier in this chapter and the central logic of 
maslahah. Implying that the methods of jihad associated with the Prophet represented a 
quintessentially modern form of compartmentalisation (i.e. between ‘departments’ and 
involving separate planning), Muhammad Dhāhir Watr cites accounts from Ibn Hanbal, al-
Bukhari, Abu Dawud, and al-Waqidi – all Sunni jurists, the last of which being Harun al-
Rashid’s chief Islamic judge (qadi) – in arguing that the Prophet readily took part in night 
operations (such as the battles of Dhi al-‘Asheerah and Dumat al-Jundal) so long as use of 
this tactic could help Muslims gain a significant advantage over enemy forces.
555
 In a similar 
vein, traditions from classical Shi’i jurists such as Shahid al-Awwal point to night attacks 
being ‘makrooh’: disliked, but not forbidden.556 This amounts to some acceptance among the 
Shi’i of collateral damage as an inevitable part of war, and evidence of the dynamism of 
Islamic military jurisprudence based around regular calculation – in battle, if necessary – of 
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the costs and benefits of conducting such an operation in securing an Islamic referent object 
of security.  
Concerning culpability more specifically, there is a similar lack of consensus among various 
juristic accounts related to narrow versus broad definitions of who can within reason be killed 
at times of war. Certain sources have indicated that the Prophet authorised the execution of 
Duraid ibn al-Simma, a strategic advisor to the enemy at the Battle of Hunayn, despite al-
Simma being a centenarian and therefore not a direct participant of the battle itself.
557
 More 
conceptual discussions of culpability are often intertwined with some reference to 
‘transgression’ (tughyan) in Islam: both in terms of Muslims not transgressing against Islamic 
laws, and how to respond against the transgression of Muslim boundaries (territorial, legal, or 
otherwise). In his commentary of a verse in Surah al-Baqarah, Mutahhari defines 
transgression in the context of the injunction that “God loves not those who transgress” as 
follows:  
it is those who are fighting us that we are to fight and not anyone else, and that it is on the 
battleground that we are to fight, meaning that we are to fight with a certain group of people 
and that group is the soldiers that the other side have sent, the men of war whom they 
prepared for war with us and who are fighting us.
558
 
He juxtaposes this definition of a combatant with that of a non-combatant: 
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people who are not men of war, who are not soldiers, who are not in a state of combat, such as 
old men, old women – in fact all women, whether they are old or not – and children, we must 
not interfere and we must not do any of these other things that are counted as transgression.
559
 
Mutahhari adopts the normalisation paradigm of warfare in order to simultaneously delineate 
a first category of people who cross a certain threshold, and therefore must be confronted 
militarily, but also in order to set out rigid legal obligations for Muslim forces to likewise not 
‘transgress’ against an interlocked second category of people who – by not meeting the 
various criteria as the first category – are conceived as by definition non-combatants. While 
Mutahhari is unspecific in how this injunction should be applied practically when 
distinguishing between those who have transgressed and those that have not, his position 
would logically extent to a prohibition against strategic nuclear weapons, and certainly also 
certain biological and chemical weapons. Despite Mutahhari being specific in the military 
context within which he frames transgression, John Kelsay suggests that this commentary is 
better read as a polemic in support for what is constructed as a justly guided legal framework 
for war: “jus ad bellum and, in particular, on issues of right or competent authority”.560 What 
matters to Mutahhari here is the broader epistemic space within which ordinances or 
categories associated with military affairs can be ‘discerned’ from divine sources, by what are 
constructed as ‘competent’ authorities, and the formal recognition of this space as the 
boundaries of the shari’ah. 
For different reasons the broad notion of ‘retaliation in kind’ – qisas – represents a principle 
concern within both the deterrence parameter and Islam. Qisas forms one of three pillars of 
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criminal law within the shari’ah.561 Its earlier origins lie in a pre-Islamic concept of 
mumathala: “repaying like with like”.562 Both its validity and remit in Islam are underlined in 
the following verse of the Qur’an: 
O, ye who believe! Retaliation is prescribed for you in the matter of the (unlawfully) 
murdered, the freeman for the freeman, the bondman for the bondman the woman for the 
woman; but if any remission is made (to any one) by his (aggrieved) brother then the 
recognised course be adopted and payment made to him in handsome manner.
563
 
The principle of qisas within Islam originally aimed at resolving disputes between individuals 
and at the level of small communities, and more often than not related to individual murders. 
As Algar points out, qisas concerns individual rather than collective responsibility, and the 
Qur’an’s statement that “no soul shall bear the burden of another” is viewed by some as 
supportive of this interpretation.
564
 This more local definition of qisas – as opposed to the 
notion of reciprocity in deterrence theory, calculated in terms of automaticity by military 
strategists – has been reinforced by the close involvement of victims and the aggrieved in the 
decision to enact this type of punishment.
565
  More broadly applied in Islamic military 
jurisprudence, we may find some support for the use of siege weaponry in retaliation to the 
similar use of these weapons by the enemy. The military commander Amr ibn al-Aas is said 
to have responded tit-tor-tat at the battle of Alexandria in 641CE; launching the severed 
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heads of enemy soldiers as a reciprocate response to the Byzantines using this same tactic in 
order to inspire fear and terror.
566
 The concept of qisas has been utilised in the modern age by 
Sunni jihadi scholars to justify a range of collective punishments usually considered 
unlawful. They refer to, among others, the judgements of ibn-Taymiyah, ibn al-Qayyim and 
Abu Abdullah al-Qurtubi in support of an argument in favour of using the principle of qisas 
on the battlefield as a strategic deterrent: 
if the disbelievers were to kill our children and women, then we should not feel ashamed to 
do the same to them, mainly to deter them from trying to kill our children and women 
again.
567
 
Some of this type of Sunni discourse which legitimises the killing of civilians underlines the 
necessity of qisas on the battlefield (and beyond) through connecting it to a narrative wherein 
the Muslims exist in a state of weakness, forced to adopt otherwise prohibited military tactics 
such as suicide bombings or even using chemical or biological weapons
568
 as a last resort in 
an attempt to strike a blow against more powerful enemies,
569
 and is at times supported with 
reference to the Qur’anic verse that “Allah does not charge a soul except [with that within] its 
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capacity”.570 Practically, as was the case in post-2003 war Iraq, this came to overlap with an 
emphasis on ‘revenge’ attacks by Sunni insurgents.571  
These points of emphasis do not overlap with the narrative held by Shi’i-Iranian clerics in 
positions of influence today, notably because many of them largely view the Islamic Republic 
to be a legitimate Islamic state, and – as we will see in the next chapter – in fact do not accept 
a narrative of Muslims (or at least the Shi’a) as existing in a state of weakness. Among Shi’i 
scholars, there is no consensus for the systematic application of qisas to the battlefield 
context, and certainly not strategically in the form of a nuclear deterrence doctrine involving 
massive retaliation. Ayatollah Hossein Ansarian, founder of the Dar al-‘Irfan al-Shi’i 
research institute in Qom, highlights that after Muawiyah I had prevented Ali and his soldiers 
from drinking from the Euphrates in an attempt to make them die of thirst, Imam Ali did not 
retaliate in kind once he regained control of the river.
572
 In the context of Iran and 
contemporary Shi’ism, unlike the concept of maslahah, there is little evidence suggesting that 
the concept of qisas has become more salient within Iran’s strategic and tactical doctrines 
after the Revolution. On the contrary, there seems to be more evidence suggesting that 
leading clerics refused to sanction ‘retaliation in kind’ during the Iran-Iraq war with specific 
regards to chemical weapons use.
573
The seeming rejection of qisas would theoretically 
preclude Iran today from legitimising nuclear weapons on the basis of their use in retaliatory 
strategy. 
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Though not a tactical innovation, the use of human shields (tatarrus) during battle also offers 
very clear parallels with the modern conceptualisation of nuclear deterrence as a form of 
hostage taking. Thomas Schelling alludes to the similarity between the two. 
[T]he “balance of terror,” if it is stable, is simply a massive and modern version of an ancient 
institution: the exchange of hostages […] today’s military technology makes it possible to 
have the lives of a potential enemy’s women and children within one’s grasp.574  
Steven Lee concurs that “nuclear deterrence, like vicarious punishment, is an institution of 
hostage holding”,575 and similar views have been expressed elsewhere by critics and 
proponents of deterrence alike.
576
 Though it is considered incumbent on Muslims to avoid 
non-combatant casualties when bombarding an enemy, the moral burden is placed solely at 
the hands of the enemy if they are believed to have purposefully engineered a scenario 
wherein the death of non-combatants becomes unavoidable. This even extends to the enemy’s 
use of Muslims as hostages.  Numerous scholars have declared it permissible to bombard the 
enemy using trebuchets in such a way that Muslim prisoners, used as human shields, are 
inevitably killed in the process. Ibn Qudamah’s for instance states the (Hanbali) view in the 
following terms: 
And if they shield (themselves) in war with their women and their children, it is permitted to 
fire upon them and (to fire upon them) with the intention of killing; for the Prophet [...] fired 
on them (at Ta’if) with the mangonel when women and children were with them. And this is 
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because if one desists when Muslims are among them it leads to a crippling of jihad. When 
they (the fighters) know that the enemy uses them (civilians) as a shield it causes 
trepidation.
577
 
Those killed under such circumstances are viewed as martyrs, and culpability would here lie 
with the enemy conceived as having engineered the ‘balance of terror’ rather than those 
leading the bombardment. Other notable jurists, such as Abu Hanifah (founder of the Hanafi 
madhab), Yaqub ibn Ibrahim al-Ansari (Chief Islamic Judge in Abbasid Caliph Harun al-
Rashid’s court), and Sufyan al-Thawri (founder of the defunct Thawri madhab), concluded 
that it was permissible under certain circumstances to attack an enemy which has deployed 
human shields.
578
 Tellingly, the Maliki jurist Abu Abdullah al-Qurtubi stated that attacking 
an enemy which uses human shields should be undertaken only in the “absolute and 
definitely clear interest of the Muslims”:579 a clarification appealing to maslahah, and 
ultimately some definition of an Islamic ‘referent object’ of security based on political, 
geographical or ideological criteria. To be sure, Ahmed al-Dawoody has chosen to 
supplement a summary of al-Qurtubi’s view on human shields with his assertion that 
attacking human shields might be permissible if it avoids “the collapse of the entire Muslim 
nation into the hands of the enemy”. 580  
On the other end of the spectrum, the founder of the Hanbali madhab Ahmad ibn Hanbal was 
unequivocal in his belief that under no circumstances would it be permissible to bombard an 
enemy that used human shields if these human shields were comprised of Muslims, non-
Muslim citizens of a Muslim land (ahl al-dimmah), or people from a place that the Muslims 
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had entered into a peace treaty with.
581
 From the Shi’i perspective, Allamah Hilli declared it 
permissible (albeit disliked) to target women, children, or Muslims used as human shields “in 
case the fire of war is aflame”582 (i.e. during the fog of war). Hilli is joined in this opinion by 
Ibn al-Baraj al-Tarabulsi,
583
 and Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad even recalls an incident at the 
Siege of Tai’f where the Prophet is said to have used human shields as an extraordinary 
measure.
584
 
An even more explicit parallel between nuclear weapons impacts and the types of weapons 
capable of mass destruction encountered in Islamic legal discourse concerns the immense 
damage caused by the heat they give off. A logical comparison can be made here between 
early views on incendiary weapon – seen to cause unnecessary, indiscriminate and cruel harm 
– and nuclear weapons. Historians trace the Islamic encounter with a particularly effective 
form of incendiary weapon – ‘Greek fire’ (known as ‘naft’ in Arabic and Old Persian) to the 
Siege of Constantinople in 678 AD,
585
  when Byzantine ships launched concoctions of what 
is thought to be a mixture of petroleum and calcium oxide at the enemy.
586
 This amounted to 
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the use of “ancient flamethrowers”, spewing flames thickened with resin.587 So effective were 
these weapons as a revolution in military technology at the time that they have been 
described as early evidence of ‘shock and awe’ tactics.588 Just how Muslims first acquired the 
secrets of thermal weaponry for themselves in 844 AD – a secret closely guarded by the 
Byzantines – is debated.589 Whatever the case, use of naft weapons was “greatly expanded” 
under Salah al-Din Ayyubi’s caliphate (1138-1193). They were deployed and used in a 
variety of ways, including the classic ‘Greek fire’ model (i.e. a napalm-like concoction 
projected through tubes), using siege machines to lob clay pots containing the concoction into 
cities and citadels, and by launching enflamed arrows.
590
  It is probable that naft played a key 
role in military campaigns for control over Sicily and Italy.
591
 
Given its initial usage at sea, and in lieu of any explicit instructions for naval warfare found 
in Qur’anic ontology, Greek fire was initially assumed religiously permissible on pragmatic 
grounds through resort to qiyas, and specifically a comparison with previous use of catapults 
during land battles.
592
 There were then some notable objections to using naft or other 
incendiary weapons from the Shafi’i school of Islamic jurisprudence. The school’s founder, 
Mohammad al-Shafi, forbade the use of thermal weapons but couched his verdict on the 
condition that there be no discernible “dire necessity” (darura) for using them. Khaled Abou 
                                                          
587
 Stephen Turnbull, “The Walls of Constantinople”, in David Nicolle, John F, Haldon, & Stephen R. Turnbull 
(eds.), The Fall of Constantinople: The Ottoman Conquest of Byzantium, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007, p. 
152. 
588
 Charles D. Stanton, Medieval Maritime Warfare, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Ltd., 2014, pp. 24-25. 
589
 One theory is that the Byzantines had in fact taught the Ummayads how to engineer the weapons as part of 
their discussions of forming an alliance against the Aghlabids. See Douglas Haldane, “The Fire-Ship of Al-Salih 
Ayyub and Muslim Use of “Greek Fire””, in Donald J. Kagay and L.J. Andrew Villalon (eds.), The Circle of 
War in the Middle Ages: Essays on Medieval Military and Naval History, Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1999, Pp. 
138-139. 
590
 David Nicolle, Saladin and the Saracens, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1986, p. 40. 
591
 Haldane, “The Fire-Ship of Al-Salih Ayyub and Muslim Use of “Greek Fire””, p. 139. 
592
 Hassan Salih Khalilieh, Islamic Maritime Law: An Introduction, Leiden: Brill, 1998, p. 119. 
The Nuclear Policies of Iran: Islam and Strategic Thinking in the Islamic 
Republic 
229 
el-Fadl defines ‘dire necessity’ here as either ‘first-use’ by enemy forces, or the enemy 
garrisoning themselves in a citadel where it would be effectively impossible to defeat them 
using alternative military means.
593
  In scenarios such as these, use of thermal weapons could 
become justified based on ‘dire necessity’: ‘disliked’ but nevertheless permissible. Al-Shafi is 
joined in his assessment by the modern scholar Sheikh Afifi al-Akiti at the University of 
Cambridge, whose own rationale proceeds as follows: 
The original ruling [al-aṣl] for using a bomb (the medieval precedents: Greek ﬁre [qitāl bil-
nār or ramy al-nafṭ] and catapults [manjanīq]) as a weapon is that it is makrūh [oﬀensive] 
because it kills indiscriminately [yaʿummu man yuqātilū wa-man lā yuqātilū], as opposed to 
using riﬂes (medieval example: a single bow and arrow). If the indiscriminate weapon is used 
in a place where there are civilians, it becomes ḥarām except when used as a last resort [min 
ḍarūra] (and of course, by those military personnel authorized to do so).594 
The classical Shi’i view is more tempered than that of al-Shafi, and states it as disliked 
(makrooh) but permissible in certain circumstances to subject the enemy to bombardment 
with fire.
595
  
Returning to the earliest view of naft as being analogous to catapults, another issue 
confronted at the second level of analysis – ahadith – as well as in juristic literature is use of 
siege weaponry: manjaniq (also known as mangonel, or trébuchets). These were essentially 
large catapults which lobbed projectiles, such as large stones or incendiary clay pots. 
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Muslims later on during the Crusades spoke about siege equipment in terms familiar to those 
that might view nuclear weapons: as the definitive symbol of military and strategic 
modernity, and as a great equaliser in military confrontations with the European powers.
596
 
The manjaniq was present not only at the time of the Crusades, but also during the life of the 
Prophet himself. He is said to have allowed the use of manjaniq during an attack on Ta’if in 
the year 8 AH,
597
 and Ibn Hisham credits him as the first to have used this type of weapon in 
the history of Islam.
598
 Makkah itself was the subject of siege bombardment at the Battle of 
Harrah during the rule of Yazid I,
599
 and Ayatollah Fadl’Allah refers to this incident in order 
to admonish Yazid’s behaviour as caliph.600 However, it is likely that opposition here centres 
on the use of manjaniq in Makkah rather than the principle of use writ large. Another 
prominent Lebanese Shi’i scholar seems to target Yazid rather than the technology itself, 
situating his opposition within theology as opposed to fiqh: 
[Yazid] ordered his army to set up mangonels towards Mecca. He ordered his men to throw 
Mecca with ten thousand stones in one day. The army blockaded Mecca for four months and 
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kept on fighting every day until the news of Yazeed’s death came. The mangonels had hit the 
Kaaba and destroyed it besides the fire that had been set on it.
601
 
Given that such weapons inevitably bring an enemy’s non-combatant population within range 
of attack, the use of these weapons would often result in the collateral deaths of non-
combatants, and significant damage of buildings. The following verses penned after the Siege 
of Baghdad (812-13 AD) highlight a strong awareness of the indiscriminate nature of these 
weapons, and provide evidence that the manjaniq inspired terror602 
O shooters (rumāta) of the manjaniq 
All of you without compassion 
You do not care if anyone is a friend 
Or not a friend.
603
 
[…] 
Do not go near the manjaniq and its stones 
You saw the man killed, how he was buried. 
He went out early, that no news might escape him 
And came back dead, leaving the news behind. 
What vigour and health he had 
When he went out early in the morning!
604 
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We should also bear in mind that the use of this siege weaponry centred on the need to 
“decide possession of a built-up area” as opposed to decimating the enemy’s entire forces.605 
As with naft, manjaniq were therefore accommodated as part of a Muslim strategic arsenal 
but were not regularly used. That they were however used in states of ‘dire necessity’ or in 
order to secure strategic objectives is important. Like al-Shafi’i, al-Mawardi argued in the 
10
th
 century that the use of manjaniq was forbidden against internal enemies (i.e. rebels) – 
likely due to the massive damage they would cause to Muslim territory – but again couches 
his verdict in the qualification that this is dependent on no first-use from the enemy, and that 
the enemy must be forewarned of the bombardment so as to limit casualties.
606
The classical 
Shi’i view similarly allows for the use of manjaniq in circumstances where it might ensure 
victory for a Muslim army:  
It is permissible to fight the enemy through imposing siege (hisar), martial law […], 
mangonel, demolishing the strongholds and houses, and any other means enabling the 
Muslims to defeat their enemies and achieve victory”.607 
Further insights can be found in verdicts concerning chemical and biological weapons, due 
not only to their capacity to cause indiscriminate damage and destruction, but also the 
especially inhumane manner of death they can cause. One of the most problematic military 
technologies the Muslim community confronted early on came in the form of the systematic 
use of poisons – whether arrows and swords laced with it, or its use in water supplies. The 
first Shi’i Imam was struck and later killed by an assassin’s poisoned blade.608 Out of a total 
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of Twelve Shi’i Imams, all but two died at the hand of poisoning. Descriptions of the death of 
Imam Hassan at the hands of poisoning are particularly graphic, and narrated as such in 
eulogies and biographical accounts. The Shi’a believe him to have suffered for 40 days after 
first ingestion, vomiting blood and – it is said – pieces of his liver.609 As with certain 
representations of the use of manjaniq, the Shi’a often use the poisoning as a motif 
representing the injustices and harsh circumstances endured by the family of the Prophet. 
Their prohibition is therefore a theological rather than strictly legal one. Of the classical Shi’i 
scholars, al-Hilli completely forbade the use of poisoned arrows in battle regardless of any 
strategic or tactical benefits.
610
 Sheikh al-Tusi held a similar absolutist view of poisons being 
forbidden: 
[i]t is permissible to fight the unbelievers with any means of warfare, except the deployment 
of poison in their lands, that is disliked. Because that can lead to destruction of those who it is 
not permissible to kill, including children, women, and the insane.
611
 
These classical jurists are joined by the 20
th
 century Iranian scholar Ayatollah Abu al-Qassem 
al-Khoei, who forbade the use of poisons with reference the sunnah of the Prophet.
612
 Yet 
Algar has highlighted the legal view of the Shi’i jurist ‘Shahid’ al-Thani (a student of the 
Safavid court-scholar Muhaqqiq al-Karaki), who permitted the lacing of swords, arrows and 
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lances with poison,
613
 as well as the poisoning of an enemy’s water supply.614 Al-Thani’s 
view exist on equal footing with those of al-Hilli and al-Tusi, and highlights that there 
appears to have been some justification in the past for the use of poisoning as a means of 
forcing the enemy to capitulate in the work of classical Shi’i scholars. 
There does not appear to be a correspondent ‘absolute’ verdict against the use of poisoned 
arrows within the Sunni schools at the same time as al-Hilli’s fatwa. The Maliki jurist Khalil 
ibn Ishaq al-Jundi only goes as far as to forbid their use due to the tendency of the suffering 
caused to outweigh strategic gain.
615
 What is inferred here is that if a circumstance presents 
itself where the suffering caused by the use of poisoned arrows might be outweighed by a 
strategic outcome, that their use may become permissible. Majid Khadduri for instance cites 
the Hanafi scholar al-Shaybani as having permitted the spoiling an enemy’s water supply 
with poison or blood in order to force them to surrender.
616
 Yet Wahba al-Zuhayli, a 
contemporary Syrian jurist, has distinguished between the rulings of scholars of the Hanafi, 
Shafi’i and Hanbali madhahab, and those of the Maliki disposition. Whereas he argues that 
the former allowed any – even “weapons of steel [silāḥ al-abyaḍ] and deadly agents, even to 
the point of poisoning the enemy with projected incendiaries and noxious gases”617 – to be 
used in if they were to “break the enemy’s strength”,618 the Maliki school refused to allow 
poisoning, or even the destruction of fortresses (unless this was done in retaliation).
619
 Some 
have identified a linear relationship between Zuhayli’s own opinion that Muslims are today 
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permitted to develop certain WMD capacity as a deterrent, but never use such weapons for 
offensive purposes,
620
 and previous debates among medieval Sunni jurists. As such, we can 
only conclude at best from the positions of medieval Sunni scholars that the only consensus 
regarding the use of weapons capable of mass destruction is of a no-first use policy. 
Neither Qur’anic ontology nor secondary sources feature discussions regarding the 
permissibility or impermissibility of biological weapons prominently. Likewise, there is 
scarce evidence suggesting that Muslim empires used or deployed biological weapons on the 
battlefield for either strategic or tactical purposes. There are however exceptions, but these 
instances are difficult to situate within any clear legal discussions from among Islamic jurists. 
During the 14
th
 century, for instance, the Mongol Khan Janibeg used the murder of a Muslim 
trader in the city of Tana – a city controlled by the Mongols, but within which Genoese 
merchants were permitted to trade – as grounds to lay it siege. Merchants fleeing the Mongol 
army sought refuge in Caffa, a high-walled city primarily used by its Christian merchant 
populace for warehousing. As this latter city also came under siege, the Mongols “hurled 
plague-infected cadavers”, “thereby transmitting the disease to the inhabitants”.621 What is 
also notable about this episode, if we are to believe the account of Gabriele de’ Mussi – an 
Italian notary who documented the event and the subsequent spread of what became the 
Plague – is that its chronology does not imply a strategic incentive for the use of biological 
weapons when they were meant to have been used during the siege:  
[t]he dying Tartars, stunned and stupefied by the immensity of the disaster bought about by 
the disease, and realizing that they had no hope of escape, lost interest in the siege. But they 
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ordered corpses to be placed in catapults and lobbed into the city in the hope that the 
intolerable stench would kill everyone inside.
622
 
It was therefore only after the Mongols had decided to end the siege that they decided to use 
disease as a weapon against the inhabitants of Caffa. The siege had been designed to restore 
the ‘honour’ of the Mongol empire that had seen one of its subjects murdered, also raises the 
possibility that certain acts of mass destruction were committed in the heat of battle, and as 
military leaders were given considerable tactical freedom – a characteristic which in many 
ways was not replicated in Iran’s experience during its war with Iraq. In contrast to the 
experience of senior IRGC commanders during the Iran-Iraq war,
623
 it is extremely unlikely 
that military leaders were acting in consultation with religious authority linked to the court of 
Janibeg, and we can thus only speculate as to the extent that Islam (and in particular, the 
shari’ah) informed their decision to launch diseased cadavers at a besieged city housing 
mostly non-combatants. What might be a more fruitful endeavour is to categorise this 
incident within the remit of laws related to qisas, as well as the tactical use of terror – neither 
of which falling within the natural remit of maslahah.  
Conclusion 
This chapter began with the construction of an analytical framework for understanding 
strategic preferences from within an Islamic episteme. The framework centred on three 
interrelated levels of analysis: Qur’anic ontology, secondary accounts of the practises of the 
Prophet and Imams contained in ahadith, and theology. This analytical framework was then 
used to contextualise the consolidation of various schools of military jurisprudence, and 
rationalise the types of thinking underpinning legal verdicts related to the use of strategies, 
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tactics and weapons associated with mass destruction in a way that goes beyond the 
deterrence parameter. 
We may conclude that Islamic law – both Shi’i and Sunni – is remarkably adept at creating a 
space where weapons capable of mass destruction can legitimately be situated within 
strategic preferences. Islamic ontology and secondary sources contain very few absolute laws 
limiting either jihad or weapons capable of mass destruction that, at least in principle, ‘dire 
necessity’ or the ‘public interest’ cannot trump. If what is constructed as the Islamic state is 
considered existentially threatened, there are provisions within Islamic law which can be 
conducive to prohibitions on the use of weapons capable of mass destruction being 
overturned. 
There are therefore ample examples of an expedient approach to weapons, strategies and 
tactics of warfare based upon a higher objective of safeguarding some organised collective 
notion of Islamic peoples from external (or internal) violence and existential threat. These 
imperatives became clearer as we examined how the ‘public interest’ (maslahah) or ‘dire 
necessity’ is invoked within rulings on weapons capable of mass destruction and jihad. 
Concepts such as these ushered in a body of ‘military jurisprudence’ developed by Sunni 
legal theorists which served a specific purpose of maintaining and expanding Islamic empire. 
It was, however, much more divorced from many of the theological dilemmas that stymied 
the rise of a parallel school of military jurisprudence in Shi’ism based upon expediency or 
public interest. Evidence throughout the chapter suggests that, in relying on concepts like the 
‘public good’ and absolute necessity, Islamic traditions of war are too fluid and adaptive to fit 
inside the deterrence parameter. For this reason, it is impossible to discern an essentialist 
definition of ‘Islamic’ approaches to war – ingrained in Qur’anic ontology, secondary 
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sources, or theology – which would render Iranian nuclear proliferation today being 
inevitable, and a major international security concern.  
Given that the ulama are such central figures as securitising actors in this process of 
designating weapons, strategies and tactics of mass destruction permissible or not, we will 
now proceed to use this framework as a basis for understanding contemporary Islamic views 
in Iran concerning nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and specifically 
look for ‘referent objects’ in the consolidation of military jurisprudence today. In short, what 
are the lengths that the Islamic Republic might be willing to go in defence of its territorial 
integrity and ruling political system? Do they necessarily view nuclear weapons in the same 
way as deterrence theorists? In answering, we need a better understanding of what its 
‘referent object’ of security is, and particularly how prominent the mechanism of maslahah is 
in legal thinking concerning nuclear weapons. 
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Chapter Five: The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Policies beyond the 
Deterrence Parameter 
*** 
We are waiting for the return of the Imam, which does not mean that we are giving up on the 
possibility of a good government.
624
 
*** 
Introduction 
Having developed an analytical framework for understanding strategic preferences from 
within ‘Islamic’ epistemological boundaries – where these preferences emerge from, how 
they are consolidated, and how they change – we may now assess the Islamic Republic of 
Iran’s strategic preferences towards nuclear weapons. The first objective of this chapter is to 
analyse Shi’i-Islamic views regarding nuclear weapons and other WMD – set out in Chapter 
One – on their own terms through utilising the analytical framework developed in Chapter 
Four. Chapters Two and Three established that the views, personalities and structures of 
religious authority are rarely considered in political scholarship or commentary beyond an 
ethnocentric (and often Eurocentric) lens. If the epistemic parameters of this lens continue to 
discipline our reading of Iran’s strategic preferences, proclamations or viewpoints on nuclear 
weapons and other WMD (such as those surveyed in Chapter One) will tell us very little 
about potential religious origins of Iranian policy. Either fatawa on nuclear weapons and 
other WMD will confirm pre-existing essentialist assumptions about Islam, or they will be 
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understood by way of realism as purely functional. In both cases, analysis will continue to 
reveal very little about potential religious roots of Iran’s strategic preferences. 
The second objective of this chapter is to provide a counter-narrative for what Iran’s strategic 
preferences related to nuclear weapons acquisition, use/non-use would look like if we assume 
that religion and religious actors have a substantive impact on its policy-making. Again, this 
objective will be pursued with reference to the analytical framework developed in Chapter 
Four. What can these verdicts tell us about how those within the Islamic Republic view their 
Iran’s security? Under what circumstances might religious opinion on nuclear weapons 
change? What can these verdicts tell us about the authority of the Supreme Leader in a 
strategic context?  
We will find in this chapter that while some Islamic discourses related to nuclear weapons 
overlap with ‘Third-World’ critiques of dependency and neo-colonialism, others reflect a 
unique appropriation of maslahah by 20
th
 century Iranian Islamic scholars. This exposed 
contemporary law-making and indeed strategic thinking in Shi’ism to the ‘public interest’, 
massively altering the relationship between the ulama and the state. As Hamid Mavani 
writes, Khomeini  
co-opted the Sunni concept of public welfare (maslaha) by arguing that this ought to be the 
criterion for evaluating all actions at a particular time and in a specific context. The end result 
is to make all matters of government and obedience to the jurisconsult a subcategory of divine 
authority (al-wilayat al-ilahiyya), thereby depriving the public of its right to question or 
express an opinion on those issues that demand religious devotion and uncritical 
acceptance.
625
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Having previously shunned this concept as inapplicable to the Shi’i tradition, due to either the 
presence of a divinely connected law-maker on earth (i.e. the first eleven Imams), or the 
absence of the Twelfth Imam, the introduction of this concept opens up Islamic legal thinking 
in Iran to a vast history of precedents and discourses – legal and otherwise – concerning 
warfare and mass destruction which considered the urgency of protecting the Islamic 
‘nation’, ‘community’, or even ‘state’,  above all other Islamic ordinances.626 This ultimately 
transforms the fatwa into a political text in the Islamic Republic of Iran, contingent on 
assessments of the strategic benefits Islamic law can have for the Islamic Republic of Iran.
627
 
At the same time, although these fatawa are always in motion, they also retain unique 
eschatological and theological significance which ensure they transcend other more mundane 
policies in Iran derived solely from its political processes. This has significant ramifications 
for how we choose to interpret religious views on nuclear weapons, and the potential salience 
of these views in the Islamic Republic of Iran today. It also, I argue, points to alternative and 
unique accounts of pragmatism and expediency in the Islamic Republic of Iran than those 
found in orientalist or realist accounts.  
Islamic First Principles on Nuclear Weapons 
We will begin by discerning what Islamic ‘first principles’ on the rules of engagement can 
potentially tell us about Iran’s current policies. Of the views surveyed in Chapter One, many 
religious scholars make reference to what seem to be static and impermeable principles of 
warfare related to the need to avoid the deaths of non-combatants, and root this doctrine in a 
Qur’anic ontology of warfare. Here Qur’anic ontology sets out what are construed (at least 
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initially) as rigid rules – rooted in divine sources themselves – about who can and cannot be 
legitimately targeted at times of war either in actual combat, or as part of deterrence or 
compellence strategies. With regards to these first principles forbidding the killing of non-
combatants, which would extend logically to nuclear weapons possession and use also being 
forbidden, Ayatollah Lankarani’s views are of note. Lankarani references the normalisation 
paradigm of warfare, rooted in Qur’anic ontology. In Lankarani’s view, war – rather than 
representing a state of exception in and of itself – is itself contained within Islam and 
therefore subject to a range of principles (usul (principles), adab(etiquette), akhlaq (ethics) and 
ahkam (rules/commandments)). For Lankarani, these principles of warfare must be upheld 
even in situations where their abandonment could allow Muslims certain tactical advantages. 
For example, while Lankarani prohibits Muslims from certain actions associated with 
aggression or excess during war (e.g. killing captives, destroying trees, etc.) – an opinion we 
may regard as unsurprising from the perspective of Qur’anic ontology –  his inclusion of the 
deployment of poisons specifically on both the battlefield and in residential areas invokes 
practical scenarios within which a ‘state of exception’ could theoretically justify the use of 
WMD, but for Lankarani do not. Given their emphasis on ‘Islamic principles’ related to 
human life, Sobhani’s views – given their explicit repudiation of nuclear weapons use and 
deterrence – likewise draw upon basic first principles which provide evidence against both 
orientalist and realist accounts of how religion might impact Iran’s strategic preferences 
(namely, in legitimising or at least excusing the use of nuclear weapons). 
There are other Qur’anic ontologies which could theoretically legitimise the use or possession 
of nuclear weapons and other WMD. Khomeini’s insistence, for instance, on the obligation 
upon all to defend “through any means possible” Muslim countries as a response to an 
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invasion regardless of the direct presence of any divinely appointed Imam or their deputy,
628
 
circumvents a traditional emphasis within Shi’ism upon just rulership in the context of 
warfare in the construction of certain referent objects which demand obedience first and 
foremost to tactical and strategic urgency outlined through temporal authorities. Yet 
Khomeini’s actual behaviour when confronted with the opportunity to develop and use 
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against Iraqi forces during the Iran-Iraq war points 
to restraint during his tenure as Supreme Leader, which combined both ultimate military as 
well as spiritual authority. Chapter One illustrated that at repeated junctions where the use of 
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons could have been legitimised in protecting the Islamic 
Republic of Iran from a genuinely existential threat, Khomeini – in weighing up competing 
Qur’anic ontologies – did not project these weapons as fundamental to securing the survival 
of Iran.  Indeed, Khomeini’s emphasis on the distinction between himself and Saddam 
Hussein
629
 points to the salience of theology in his own intellectual rationalisation when 
ascertaining Iranian strategic preferences, and outcomes in actual Iranian policy. Rather than 
exploiting this space of ambiguity and abandoning Qur’anic ontology with preference for 
secondary sources or theology which – as we have seen in the previous chapter – could have 
potentially legitimised Iranian acquisition and use of WMD, Khomeini seems to have erred 
even closer towards Islamic first principles against the killing of civilians, taking the 
opportunity to reinforce this position through acknowledging the significance of his own 
office as leader of an Islamic Republic (specifically, through explicit comparison with the 
secular, Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein).  
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Maslahah and the ‘State of Exception’ 
First principles contained in Qur’anic ontology are contingent upon there being an absence of 
circumstances which can make it necessary or in certain cases even obligatory to suspend 
basic Islamic ordinances in order to safeguard a referent object from an existential threat. Yet, 
as we have seen, clerics do not necessarily react to all circumstances where Iran is (in 
military terms) existentially threatened by socially constructing these situations as states of 
exception. Clerical engagement with maslahah cannot therefore be sufficiently understood 
from within a realist paradigm. 
When conceptualising the circumstances which would permit nuclear weapons acquisition or 
use – particularly if we wish to account for the discursive processes behind today’s fatawa 
that define both referent objects of security (i.e. the Islamic state) and existential threats – a 
better starting point than those explored in Chapters Two and Three is Agamben’s 
theorisation of the ‘state of exception’. Of the opinions surveyed in Chapter One, a large 
number of clerics conceive states of exceptions concerning when referencing some notion of 
‘public interest’. Yet not all link the defence of public interests and the existential survival of 
the Islamic Republic with actions that would involve broadening the definition of the enemy 
(or legitimate military targets) beyond that outlined in Qur’anic ontology.  
The state of exception is important when analysing religious views on nuclear weapons and 
other WMD for at least three reasons. First, it provides an avenue for exploring specific 
instances where clerics elect to invoke expediency or ‘dire necessity’ when they produce 
legal opinion on the permissibility of nuclear weapons. Second, the state of exception paints a 
more detailed picture of how clerics negotiate Islamic law with modern innovations in 
military technology and strategic doctrines. Third, it allows for us to consider Islamic law, 
and maslahah in particular, as a contemplative and subjective process dependent as much on 
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Muslim narratives – both popular, rooted in theology, and individual in the form of unique 
clerical engagement – about where the world is headed, as it does on either a strict 
assessment of Iran’s material interests, or religious dogma. Nuclear fatawa can therefore 
reveal how these states of exception conceived by Iran’s ulama are determined by their 
readings of divine scripture, as well as Islamic law, history and custom, and therefore exist 
within distinctive epistemic boundaries. 
Previous work from within the field of Islamic Studies has broadly considered the notion of a 
state of exception in shari’ah politics. For instance, Wael Hallaq has developed a critique in 
which he asks the following question: 
how can Muslims aspiring to build an Islamic state justify sacrifice for a state that could not 
and cannot subscribe to the moral, that could not and cannot commit except, at best, to an 
amoral way of being, to positivism, facticity, and Is-ness?
630
 
For Hallaq, the choice is a simple one between adhering to immutable laws rooted in 
transcendental Islamic ‘Truth’ – Qur’anic ontology – and adhering to laws which favour 
pragmatic action, devised to supersede what are conceived as out-dated or unrealistic 
corpuses of law in a spirit of utilitarianism. Here he uses the example of obligations to protect 
the poor and weak to underline his point: 
if it creates for them an inherently natural right against the wealth of the rich, then no 
economic development or capitalist principle can be allowed to override this will. If this 
morality dictates a humane treatment of others, then no political or scientific calculation 
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whatsoever can be permitted to reduce another’s humanity by any measure, to let her starve or 
send him to the gas chambers, simply in the name of science and rationality.
631
 
Through adopting a rationalist or modernist paradigm of Islamic law, Hallaq’s specific line of 
inquiry implies that the state of exception we are interested in – namely, exceptional 
circumstances where weapons capable of mass destruction can be legitimately acquired and 
used – is somehow inauthentic. Changing the focus slightly to effect rather than cause, it can 
certainly be conceded that Islamic law or opinions conceived from mysticism can certainly 
appear on the surface to conform to the logic of realism.  Clerics might find that their 
pronouncements on the impermissibility of nuclear weapons find their way into government 
policy, but that their ‘states of exceptions’ are also instrumentalised by realists with little 
awareness of (or interest in) the more metaphysical reasons to abandon traditional Islamic 
laws.  
In the area of maslahah specifically, we are already in the habit of assuming that law-making 
under its remit is premised on a cost-benefit analysis of what the existential interests of the 
Islamic Republic are compared to the harm incurred by suspending or abandoning other 
primary and secondary legislation. This cannot account for the foundational mystical 
underpinnings of maslahah as they are conceived in the Islamic Republic today. While 
Hallaq’s assumes a rationalist definition of the national interest, it is possible that a much 
more transcendental mystical definition is left under-examined. In this respect, Hallaq’s 
following observation regarding the incompatibility of Islam with the state of exception is 
problematic: 
Islamic governance cannot permit any sovereignty or sovereign will other than that of God. If 
morality is to guide human actions, if it be autonomous, then it must rest on universal and 
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eternal principles of truth and justice, principles that transcend the manipulation and whims of 
a positivist entity. It must determine the limits of human actions, drawing a line of separation 
between what can and cannot be done and curbing the domain of the rational when this leads 
to the violation of its own domain.
632
 
The predicament presented here by Hallaq recalls that of Khaled Abou el-Fadl, whose own 
problem centred on legal scope. There is on the one hand the basic prerequisite of stability 
necessary in order to maintain a space for religious discourse – particularly jurisprudential – 
to flourish and gain resonance.
633
 On the other hand, if the ethical and moral constraints 
provided by an Islamic paradigm of warfare can only apply without exception under 
circumstances where the Muslim community, Islamic state or ‘nation do not face an 
existential threat, this risks devaluing law. Khaled Abou el Fadl states this conundrum 
succinctly: “if jurists concede to the prosecution of war an unfettered autonomy from any 
rules […] the law becomes very pragmatic but also irrelevant”.634  
Mohammad Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr’s views are perhaps the most explicitly situated within 
the domain of maslahah and dire necessity. With reference to both Qur’anic ontology and 
secondary sources – namely, a hadith detailing the practise of the Prophet – al-Sadr places a 
clear limitation on the prohibition on ‘hazardous weaponry’. This limitation, while “rare”, is 
nevertheless that if it can be adduced that using such weapons would be in the public interest. 
Al-Sadr’s position invokes a distinct kind of utilitarianism in that it refers to the need to 
balance the deaths of civilians with the deaths of combatants.  
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There are real world examples of actual clerical engagement with this concept of maslahah at 
times of conflict. When deliberating on culpability for what would be incursions into Iranian 
territory, Khomeini’s insistence that the Iraqi people could not themselves be legitimately 
held responsible for the actions of the Saddam Hussein
635
 highlights his own attachment to 
Qur’anic ontologies prohibiting mass destruction and weapons (capable) of mass destruction, 
even in spite of dire necessity. Yet both Qur’anic ontology and theology are equally vital in 
understanding this aspect of how Iran behaves as an Islamic Republic when faced with 
existential threats. We may, for instance, consider the repeated attempts in Iran by military 
officials to obtain permission from Khomeini during the Iran-Iraq war to develop WMD as 
having been based on an ingrained assumption that conveying the urgent need to obtain and 
use these weapons through appealing to the logic of maslahah or ‘dire necessity’ could have 
convinced the Supreme Leader that Iran was at those precise moments in fact obliged to 
produce these weapons. Their efforts failed as Khomeini chose to mediate the social 
construction of the Iraqi military threat – regardless of situations of dire necessity – through 
the theology attached to his leadership as wali al-faqih, and emphasis of non-material 
incentives for Iran not to develop and use WMD. In this regard, it is more plausible that 
Khomeini as a Supreme Leader would have been reading the political and military 
leaderships of Islamic personalities dynamically in an esoteric or mystical sense, rather than 
as a literalist seeking military events which could legitimise going beyond Islamic parameters 
of action. 
Mesbah Yazdi’s views are also of note in the context of the position of Supreme Leader 
mediating between real world events and ‘hidden’ truths in the context of pragmatism and 
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maslahah. Yazdi’s insistence that pre-emptive attacks against nuclear arsenals are 
permissible if they are aimed at saving Iran from annihilation – even if this course of action 
would lead to the deaths of civilians – depends on permission being secured from the wali al-
faqih (i.e. the Supreme Leader). While this kind of opinion on its own would seemingly 
contradict those of Khamenei or Khomeini, it is nevertheless still confined to the same 
Islamic epistemic parameters demanding deference to the Supreme Leader in discerning 
states of exception (more of which in the next section). It is also a reminder that even during 
the social construction of this state of exception by the ulama, certain transcendent ethical, 
religious and mystical values remain central to threat assessment. None of these views are 
appear consistent with narrative of strategic agency found in the proliferation paradigm.
636
 
To fully comprehend how scholars in the Islamic Republic accommodate expediency and 
pragmatism in their military jurisprudence, we should assess the hybrid purpose of 
Khomeini’s conceptualisation of maslahah. Whilst on the one hand, maslahah is incorporated 
into Islamic legal theory as a mechanism to ensure that the conditions which allow the 
shari’ah to flourish are preserved, it is on the other hand also subsumed into the dominant 
Shi’i narrative of what the law represents (namely, deference to divine authority). Khomeini 
emphasises that a Muslim country is obligated to defend itself by any means available 
regardless of the presence of the Twelfth Imam, or even permission from his deputy.
637
 In 
theory, Khomeini’s position allows space both for all types of weapons to be used in defence 
of an Islamic Republic, and for such actions to be contained within the purview of Islamic 
law (hence its status as a state of exception rather than as an abrogation of Islamic law). 
Similar to the way in which Qur’anic ontology defined Islamic laws of warfare in Chapter 
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Four, Khomeini’s vision of warfare as a state of exception within Islamic law allows for 
actions that would be otherwise consider impermissible to become subsumed into Islamic 
totality. These states of exception rely on the social-construction of a ‘national interest’ and 
an ‘Islamic’ state peculiar to a specific time, place and indeed religious thinker envisioning 
them, and cannot therefore be linearly anticipated to produce outcomes of exceptional 
military behaviour in the event of military attack or use of WMD by another state. 
Broadening our understanding of the third element of the Islamic framework of analysis 
(theology), we should consider certain political developments in order to refine our 
understanding of what nuclear fatawa can tell us about religious agency, opinion and 
authority in contemporary Iran. Iran’s ulama were divided after 1979 into two informal 
camps: those who believed Iran should base its laws strictly on classical sources (fiqh-e 
sunnati), and those who believed it was necessary to “modify” the shari’ah based on careful 
ijtihad (fiqh-e pooya).
638
 While Azadeh Niknam rightly points out that accusations of 
juridical recourse to traditionally Sunni notions such as istislah and istihsan in Iran are often 
rejected by proponents of fiqh-e pooya,
639
 they nevertheless represent a strong pillar of 
religious legal thinking in the Islamic Republic. During the 1980’s, this extended to a debate 
between proponents of the rule of government law (hukm-e hukumati), led by Khomeini and 
his followers, and the rule of divine law (hukm-e shari’i).640  To this day, supporters and 
detractors of wilayat al-faqih among the ulama align more or less with their position on fiqh-
e sunnati versus fiqh-e pooya. There have however been notable instances where even 
scholars from within the nezam have differed on this issue. Volume 20 of Sahife-ye Nour 
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contains a letter from Khomeini to Khamenei where the former alleges that the latter 
misunderstood a point made by him on the accountability of government to the shari’ah: 
You said in your sermon that I said that “the government has authority only within the 
framework of Islamic law.” This is the absolute opposite of what I said […] The government 
can unilaterally abrogate any religious agreement made by it with the people if it believes that 
the agreement is against the interests of the country and Islam.
641
 
This inevitably places the Islamic Republic’s existential survival among those who believe in 
its legitimacy within a very specific teleology predating the Westphalian state system. In the 
eyes of many clerics and supporters of the revolution, or adherents of wilayat al-faqih 
worldwide, Iran’s survival is uniquely intertwined with both Islam’s past and its future. For 
this reason, strategic preferences in Iran – while potentially bearing the ephemeral 
characteristics of realism – cannot be adequately considered an outcome of Iran as a ‘like-
unit’. For Khomeini, the fate of the Islamic Republic and that of Islam itself were inextricably 
linked during Iran’s war with Iraq: "[y]ou are fighting to protect Islam and he [Saddam 
Hussein] is fighting to destroy it".
642
 Such a view can be interpreted ephemerally in support 
of a realist paradigm of Iranian foreign policy, or more accurately (given their clear overlap 
with debates inside Islam) as an antithesis to the view that Iranian behaviour is defined by 
sole reference to an anarchic international system or global military balances. As such, 
contrary to the dominant narrative of various Islamist projects confronting the shari’ah as a 
process of ‘Islamising’ (largely secular) law - orthopraxy as opposed to orthodoxy) 643 – 
fatawa concerning nuclear weapons in Iran today point to an opposite tendency in this 
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particular context: the legal reification of Islam by scholars. In determining certain states of 
exception for which an Islamic state may use WMD otherwise considered forbidden, clerics 
demand that these dire necessities still retain legal currency and are therefore not viewed as 
an aberration from Qur’anic ontology or the sunnan of the Prophet and Ahlulbayt. They 
ensure this today in the Islamic Republic by linking their proclamations implicitly to the 
theology associated with leadership and religious authority in the age of the occultation. This 
would insulate strategic preferences conceived in the Islamic Republic today, as far as they 
are shaped by the ulama, from rigid adherence to Islamic dogmas themselves while at the 
same time protect them from descending completely into the realm of secular realpolitik. 
Deference to the Wali al-Faqih 
As was touched upon in the previous section, a key component of strategic preference 
making from within an Islamic framework – particularly in the Islamic Republic of Iran today 
– is therefore the shari’ah being centralised in the agency of a single cleric, and this cleric 
possessing the mandate to define Iran as referent object of security and the circumstances 
where extraordinary actions can be taken. Since the Revolution, this cleric has been 
designated as wali al-faqih, and endowed with the more formal political office of Supreme 
Leader. Yet even prior to this however, the tendency towards have a single marja al-taqlid at 
the head of Islamic learning centres
644
 normalised the recognition of a unitary, ‘most-learned’ 
religious figure whose expertise put them in a position to determine the direction of scholarly 
consensus (ijma) on emerging legal issues. 
Both Western realist traditions and Islamic political thought – especially in Sunnism – have 
highlighted the importance of erecting and maintaining a sovereign authority at all costs in 
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order to avoid conditions of anarchy and disorder, with ibn Taymiyah’s earlier dictum that 
“sixty years of an unjust Imam are better than one night without a sultan”645 recognisable to 
students of Thomas Hobbes. Al-Ghazali, who we have seen was an early theoriser of 
maslahah, likewise conceived military power as being a prerequisite foundation upon which 
the office of the Caliph should be built. Government, in his eyes, could only be “in the hands 
of those who are backed by military force”. As such, “[t]he caliph is […] whom the wielder 
of force gives his allegiance. As long as the authority of the caliph is thus recognised, 
government is lawful”.646Al-Ghazali’s expresses his view even more clearly as follows: 
“Government in these days is a consequence solely of military power, and whosoever he may 
be to whom the possessor of military power gives his allegiance, that person is the caliph.”647 
What is notable about these conceptions of the sovereign in Sunni and realist traditions is that 
they do not conceive any requirement – or indeed pretence – that the sovereign authority 
should be ‘just’, or most knowledgeable. For both, it is necessary only that the sovereign 
possess (in Weberian terms)
648
 a monopoly on the use of physical force, and legitimacy 
stemming partially from pre-eminence in this area. The more modern acquiescence to this 
notion among the Shi’a in Iran runs seemingly diametrically opposed to its long history of 
having rejected the social compact with power in preference of its own theological construct 
of ‘just’ leadership.  
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This has ramifications for assessments of contemporary fatawa and other Islamic discourses 
concerning nuclear weapons inside Iran. Although ibn Taymiyah’s vision of a convergence of 
military authority and  political leadership is closely associated with schools of Sunni 
jurisprudence – of which, some running  antithetical and even hostile to Twelver Shi’ism – 
there are certain instances where the Shi’a have also embraced similar views. In one instance 
ibn Taymiyah even draws upon a hadith where the first Shi’i Imam – and fourth Sunni Caliph 
– is asked about the need to follow a leader who is unjust, to which he is said to have 
responded: “[because] thanks to it, highways are kept secure, canonical penalties are applied, 
holy war is fought against the enemy, and spoils are collected”.649 Khomeini would himself 
rely on a similar logic even while in exile and without political power, responding when 
asked by a seminary student whether it was permissible to leave an outstanding balance on 
postage stamps that this was impermissible “even if Stalin is in power […] [s]afeguarding the 
system is a priority."
650
 Ayatollah Yazdi likewise today regards the duties of government as 
being intertwined with obligations to protect first and foremost Islamic society: 
A government possessing brute force and sufficient power must be established so as to 
manage affairs, implement laws, defend beliefs and values, maintain internal and external 
security, prevent violations, thwart conspiracy, and hamper external aggression to Islamic 
society.
651
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Yazdi’s view is illustrative of the perception that the Islamic Republic must be emboldened 
militarily and politically if it is to secure the basic foundation of a healthy Islamic society.  
There are for instance implications for the debate concerning the importance of the Supreme 
Leader’s fatwa, given the possibility that other Islamic scholars could simply issue their own 
opposing verdicts. In this regard, criticism that the fatwa is unimportant wrongly conflate the 
political currency of the Supreme Leader’s beliefs in determining Iranian strategic 
preferences with the ‘authenticity’ of his views themselves, and thus obscures the greater 
relative importance of the structural relevance of the fatwa in the Islamic Republic: namely, 
who can authoritatively define Iran’s strategic preferences from among the ulama. Chapter 
One documented different opinions – in some instances based on technical aspects, and in 
others upon broader issues – concerning the types of conditions that would permit Iran to 
obtain or use nuclear weapons despite the existence of Islamic first principles forbidding this 
course of action. Among certain scholars – namely, Yazdi, Makarem Shirazi, and Javadi-
Amoli – there is a clear preference for deferring either to scholarly consensus (‘ijma), or the 
views of the Supreme Leader himself. Outside of these clerics, others can theoretically voice 
their religious opinions on nuclear weapons as a way of implicitly rejecting or supporting the 
case for the Islamic Republic as a ‘legitimate’ referent object of security. In doing so, their 
fatawa would be best viewed as a vehicle for addressing the question of who has the right to 
declare nuclear weapons permissible or not, rather than the permissibility of nuclear weapons 
themselves.  
Again, this additional layer to Islamic opinion-making reveals dimensions of social-
construction of threat, and in particular, who is being threatened, within Iran from among the 
religious scholars that is currently absent from  realist and orientalist accounts situated within 
the deterrence parameter. We may for instance consider Khomeini’s decision to transform the 
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role Supreme Leader into that of ‘absolute’ guardian jurist, having previously argued for a 
more limited role in governance for the wali al-faqih, as of utmost relevance to understanding 
the convergence of Qur’anic ontology with theology in the space of the Supreme Leader’s 
discourse concerning nuclear weapons. A recurring narrative suggests that as Khomeini 
became thoroughly acquainted with state-building at a time of war, his own perspective 
began to resemble that of secular realism and nationalism more than it did Islamic 
traditionalism or revolutionary ideology.
652
 In this regard, his abandonment of the initial 
requirement that the Supreme Leader be a marja al-taqlid, paving the way for a junior scholar 
but seasoned politician such as Ayatollah Khamenei to become his successor, is habitually 
projected as a microcosm of the transition - and ‘maturation’653 – from Iran’s ‘First Republic’ 
to ‘Second Republic’: from the Islamic utopianism of pre-war Khomeini, to the realism and 
pragmatism of cleric-politicians such as Khamenei and also Rafsanjani.
654
 Certainly 
Khomeini’s pre-Revolutionary opinion that “the government of Islam is not absolute” but 
rather “constitutional […] in that those who are entrusted with power are bound by the 
ensemble of conditions and rules revealed in the Qur’an and the Sunna […] Islamic 
government is the government of divine law”655 is at odds with his later belief in the 
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‘absolute’ authority of the guardian jurist (wilayat al-faqih al-mutlaq). In what has become an 
infamous letter from Khomeini to Khamenei in 1989, he states the following about the 
lengths to which the wali al-faqih can go in order to protect Iran, and ultimately Islam: 
government […] is one of Islam’s primary commandments and takes priority over all 
secondary commandments, even prayer, fasting, and hajj. The ruler may demolish a mosque 
or a home which is in the way of a road and compensate its owner with money. He may close 
mosques when necessary and demolish a mosque which is troublesome should it not be 
removable without demolition. The government may unilaterally dissolve legitimate treaties 
which it made with the people should they be contrary to the interests of the country and 
Islam. It may prevent anything which is contrary to the interests of Islam, whether it must be 
followed unquestionably or not, as long as this is the case. It may temporarily prevent the hajj, 
which is an important divine obligation, should it be against the interests of the Islamic 
country.
656
 
Khamenei later cited Khomeini in order to stress this point in a meeting with the Supreme 
Council of the Basij-e Mostazafin, urging coherence in the definitions inside Iran of what 
constituted ‘greater interests’:  
He said, "Preserving the Islamic Republic is one the most important obligations or the most 
important one". That is to say, all other issues are peripheral to this one. He showed us this 
direction. It is possible that you have a difference of opinion with your friend over a small or 
big issue, but when it comes to preserving the system, both of you are equally responsible.
657
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Yazdi shares such an assessment of the primacy of the ‘interests’ of Islam over laws which – 
according to traditionalist – cannot be circumvented: 
sometimes there appear two affairs: one, an important one and a more important one, and in 
order to ensure the interests of Islam, the faqih may sacrifice what is important for the sake of 
what is more important. For instance, if performing the Hajj pilgrimage has harmful effects 
on the Islamic society, the faqih has the right to order people not to go to Hajj.
658
 
Yazdi’s example of temporarily forbidding the Hajj in order to preserve other ‘interests’ 
considered to serve the Islamic Republic – and ultimately Islam – came to the fore in 1987 
when Khomeini prohibited
659
 Iranians from making the Hajj pilgrimage in the following year 
in response to the massacre of hundreds of pilgrims which included 275 Iranians (according 
to official Saudi numbers)
660
, and again in 2016 with Khamenei issuing an analogous 
prohibition.
661
 Yazdi uses another example of a child drowning in a next-door neighbour's 
swimming pool, arguing that it is obligatory within such a situation to disregard the usual 
Muslim prohibition against usurpation (ghasb) and enter the neighbour's property in order to 
save the child's life.
662
 Clerics supportive of wilayat al-faqih predictably view it as incumbent 
to follow not only the religious decrees of the wali al-faqih, but also all other injunctions 
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related to the governance of the affairs of Muslims worldwide. These clerics are convinced of 
the Islamic Republic’s cosmological significance within a narrative connecting religious 
leadership in Iran today with the occultation. Consequently, the act of defending the Islamic 
Republic through whatever means necessary potentially becomes something of an ends in 
itself in the context of just-leadership, but again, contingent on the individual agency of the 
scholar.
663
 Baqer Moin for instance asks whether Khomeini’s decision to transform the 
authority of the Guardian Jurist into that of the Absolute Guardian Jurist was made by a 
“Khomeini the jurisprudent” or “Khomeini the mystic”.664 There is therefore a mystical 
component to decision-making from among the clerics within Shi’ism.  
If deference to the wali al-faqih is yet another structure shaping expediency in its conception 
as an outcome of non-rationalist mystical traditions of Islamic thinking, Iran’s nuclear 
policies could reveal to us the expansive definition of Iran as a referent object of security, and 
how it views its wider obligations to the Muslim ummah. Khamenei for instance refers to the 
responsibility of the wali al-amr  – an official title levied unto him – for the “affairs of 
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Muslims”: a far greater referent object than merely Iranians, or citizens of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, and use this view to supplant his verdict that wali al-amr can declare jihad 
according to the consensus of religious scholars.
665
 Among his supporters there is little 
question of the scope of the wali al-amr. Deputy Secretary General of Hizbullah Naim 
Qassem for instance shares this official nezam view, and particularly regarding the issue of 
jihad. He cites Khamenei’s verdict contained in Ajwibat al-Istifa’t that “[i]t is a duty to obey 
the orders of the custodian of all Muslims on all general matters, of which defending Islam 
and Muslims against aggressors, tyrants and the blasphemous is one”,666 and goes on to also 
infer that is position constitutes an ijmaa among the ulama.  
The frequent reference to deference to the opinions of the wali al-faqih in Iranian 
proclamations on nuclear weapons and other WMD also highlight a difficulty in projecting 
Khamenei’s fatwa beyond Iran’s borders. Ahmad Vaezi for instance considers certain 
practical difficulties in proposing a form of religious authority transcending all simultaneous 
truth claims from among the Shi’i ulama. He identifies that while proponents of the broader 
concept of Islamic religious authority known wilayat al-amr al-muslimeen – guardianship of 
the jurist over all Muslims – would have no objections to recognising and obeying a religious 
verdict such as Khamenei’s pronouncement against nuclear weapons possession and use, 
those who reject this model of religious authority would not necessarily accept such a ruling 
if the views of their own marja al-taqlid on the subject were different.
667
 The majority of the 
Shi’a either do not believe Khamenei to be the wali al-amr or reject the concept outright, and 
therefore would not follow what he would consider to be a universally binding hukm 
concerning jihad, or the use of a weapon considered by other scholars to be impermissible. 
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Scholars that do not believe in the concept of wilayat al-faqih, or, as with the case of some 
Iraqi scholars, hold different interpretations, are therefore likely to disagree with the scope of 
this fatwa.  Ayatollah Mohammad Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr claimed not only the title of 
wali al-amr, but also most knowledgeable scholar alive
668. Fadl’Allah, while not making his 
own claim, denied that Khamenei could be considered wali al-amr,
669
 and Ayatollah Kazem 
al-Haeri – an Iranian born marja al-taqlid based in Iraq – is of the opinion that Khamenei 
does not even claim authority over the political affairs of Muslims in Iraq, let alone the rest of 
the world.
670
  
Given these practical difficulties of gaining acceptance as the wali al-amr, it cannot be said 
that any of the rulings provided by Khamenei related either to the possession/non-possession 
of WMD, or any other strategic military issues, could extend beyond the borders of Iran. 
Particularly as the question of the Islamic Republic and wilayat al-faqih has become a point 
of orientation among politically-oriented Shi’a worldwide, “the Iranian model is no longer 
the object of a consensus among the Shia Islamic movements but has become a debating 
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point and even an issue over which movements disagree”.671 Accordingly, it is not a given 
that Shi’a outside of Iran would accept Khamenei’s securitisation at a time of war, as 
evidenced by his difficulty in gaining traction as a legitimate political authority in Iraq. As 
such, the official designation of Ayatollah Khamenei as wali al-amr is more symbolic than it 
is a fully functioning office, denoting an epistemic space within which the Islamic Republic’s 
political system facilitates clerics and their followers to create a bring into being a theology 
of the state. The disagreement between Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Hassan Tabataba’i 
Qomi is a case in point. In 1985, under house arrest, Ayatollah Qomi issued a fatwa stating 
that the war had become “completely haram […] Large sums of money are wasted. Towns 
and villages are destroyed. Women are widowed and children are orphaned”.672 Again, this 
also has implications for the ‘reach’ of the Iranian Supreme Leader’s religious opinions 
beyond Iran’s borders, where the model of wilayat al-faqih is more contested. 
At the same time more substantively, it appears that within the Iranian political decision-
making apparatus, obedience to the fatawa of the Supreme Leader is well-understood. Former 
nuclear negotiator Hossein Mousavian claims in his memoirs of the nuclear crisis that the 
negotiation team believed wholeheartedly not only in the existence of a fatwa prohibiting 
nuclear proliferation in Iran, but that its existence was sufficient in order to prevent Iran from 
developing nuclear weapons. 
We trusted that the supreme leader’s fatwa banning the use or production of nuclear weapons 
as ensuring this, and hence we could confidently reject foreign claims that Iran was secretly 
pursuing nuclear weapons.
673
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Although the Islamic Republic therefore encourages and relies on the political engagement of 
many clerics as a means to exploit its own local and regional dynamics of religious authority 
for political purposes (such as the position of the Friday prayer leader), its most important 
decisions related to domestic and foreign affairs are impacted only by the country’s most 
‘senior’ clerics; the majority of which are designated as such due to their belief in the 
authority of the guardian jurist and their acquiescence to his transcendental mandate on 
matters of the state.  
In this regard, a contradictory fatwa concerning nuclear weapons cannot simply emerge and 
gain immediate traction in the Islamic Republic’s decision-making based on the emergence of 
tactical or strategic incentives for their acquisition or use. It is on this point that the profound 
theological differences between Sunni and Shi’i schools in their engagement with the ethics 
of warfare are at their most prominent.  Former CIA analyst Robert Baer’s reading of suicide 
bombing is here worthy of attention: 
[For the] Iranians […] it’s military. Once they have [sic] driven the Israelis out of Lebanon, 
that was the end of suicide bombings. You don’t see another one. […] the discipline is 
incredible. You don’t see young kids putting on vests, like in Pakistan, and walking into a 
crowded area, a crowded market, or in Iraq, blowing themselves up. You don’t see Shia in 
Iraq, for instance, putting on suicide vests and walking into a mosque.
674
 
Baer implies that it was the strict hierarchy of religious authority in Shi’ism which permitted 
the Shi’a to be much more predictable in the types of tactics they would employ. He contrasts 
the deference of Hizbullah members to Ayatollah Fadl’Allah in order to secure legal 
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permission to carry out the execution of hostages during the hijacking of Kuwait Airways 
Flight 422 in 1988, with the recourse of members of (Sunni) Hamas to their own judgement 
based on materials largely encountered on the internet to justify killing civilians in 
restaurants.
675
 Baer’s suggestion that these differences in structures of religious authority run 
concomitant with distinctive normative visions which underpin strategic preferences for the 
Sunnis and Shi’a respectively reflects a functionalist view of Islamic law and Shi’ism in the 
context of war. Yet despite falling into the trap of ascribing a wholly rationalist logic to the 
nature of knowledge production in Shi’ism within the context of military strategy and tactics, 
he is correct in locating certain outcomes for how to conduct warfare in conflicting structures 
of religious authority. As such, Baer  recognises that the absence of a formalised ‘clergy’ in 
Sunnism permits its adherents to seek legitimisation for a range of violent acts from a 
plurality of informal authority figures – with the threshold for Islamic scholarship at times set 
quite low . The Shi’a, by contrast, are obligated to acquire permission or legitimation for 
violent acts only from a narrow choice of authorities, making it much more unlikely that they 
will encounter verdicts which run counter to consensuses.
676
 In the specific context of the 
Islamic Republic, this hierarchy is even more solidified. There is not, as is perhaps the case 
within Sunnism,
677
 a truly ‘free-market’ of religious opinion on nuclear weapons. In this 
respect we may even consider the existence of the office of Supreme Leader a vital 
component of maintaining the non-proliferation regime with Iran, due to the resonance that 
his proclamations will have both strategically and tactically in the country. Even in the West, 
there is a relatively solid consensus that the Supreme Leader’s religious opinions remain the 
most important in terms of strategic policy formation in Iran today. At a Foreign Affairs 
Committee held in 2007, it was heard that subsequent to the Supreme Leader's fatwa 
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forbidding the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons that 
"discussion of any possible costs and benefits of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons [was] 
prohibited in official government institutions, even at the highest level of decision-making 
involving the Supreme National Security Council".
678
 
Certain diplomatic opportunities could even potentially emerge from global recognition of 
the Supreme Leader's fatwa forbidding nuclear weapons, particularly in enhancing US-Iran 
relations through implicit recognition of the political as well as theological legitimacy of the 
Islamic Republic, and the specific office and faculties of the wali al-faqih. This would also 
offer an opportunity for enhanced ‘signalling’ between the Islamic Republic and the West in 
the context of its nuclear policies, and other strategic issues, based upon Islamic institutions 
and traditions. As Hossein Mousavian argues, ‘globalising’ Khamenei’s fatwa could help 
redress fears concerning Iran’s commitment to non-proliferation based on reference to the 
language and concepts Iran itself uses within in its own political system.
679
 This would 
present an opportunity to reference and privilege non-secular constituents of Iran’s strategic 
preference and policies in serving goals that remain conceptually part of the ‘deterrence 
parameter’ (namely, curtailing Iranian nuclear proliferation). 
Analogical Reasoning 
Chapter Four established that mainstream traditions of Shi’i jurisprudence formally reject 
qiyas as a source of Islamic law, and refer instead to ‘aql (intellect). This represents a barrier 
for Shi’i ulama today in Iran to deduce the Islamic permissibility of nuclear weapons based 
solely on reference to the cases contained in Qur’anic ontology or secondary sources, or the 
case-studies examined in Chapter Four. In sum, it is insufficient according to orthodox Shi’i-
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Islamic legal methodology to rely upon similar yet distinct cases found in legal precedents as 
the sole basis for contemporary law-making concerning new weapon technologies or military 
doctrines. The Shi’i reasoning for rejecting qiyas furthermore provide some insight into the 
difficulty of associating modern clerical pronouncements concerning nuclear weapons 
explicitly with realpolitik on a reading of fatawa that is informed primarily by preconceived 
notions of deterrence logic or strategic preferences in a self-help anarchic system. Mutahhari 
describes qiyas as “based upon conjecture, surmise, and superficial similarities”. He 
continues: “if the foundations of the religion are to be laid on […] qiyas, surmise and guess-
work, it will lead to its destruction.”680 
Theoretically this should empower religious scholars to themselves engage in ijtihad in order 
to produce new positions on nuclear weapons based on reference to both contemporary 
circumstances and their own philosophical and theological outlooks. The outcomes of social-
construction within this particular legal and discursive process again cannot be adequately 
projected with reference to the deterrence parameter. Specifically, the process challenges the 
essentialist conceptualisation of Islam as an influence over Iranian strategic preferences given 
the centrality of ijtihad and ‘aql – rather than ahistorical Islamic precedents per-se – as the 
basis for fatawa concerning nuclear weapons. Here, even Qur’anic ontology cannot be 
considered a unitary, unmoving dogma incompatible with fluid definitions of interests and 
threats found within strategic thinking.  
The Shi’i ulama surveyed draw upon a range of considerations in addition to the presence of 
precedents found in Islamic history, and both Qur’anic ontology and secondary sources 
stimulate a far more complex process of securitisation in the fatwa-making process than what 
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is assumed in orientalist accounts. Neither Qur’anic ontology nor secondary sources alone are 
adequate for an assessment of what the influence of religion on Iran’s strategic preferences 
towards nuclear weapons can be so long as these aspects are divorced from a consideration of 
how individual scholars socially construct threat and referent objects of security within their 
own theological outlooks. Today, one cannot therefore consider the impact of Islam on 
Iranian strategic preferences with reference to previous instances of mass destruction being 
encountered in legal or historical sources unless they are assessed at all three levels of the 
analytical framework developed in Chapter Four.  
The fatawa surveyed in Chapter One indicate that some contemporary Iranian scholars have 
in fact engaged with what appear to be elements of analogical reasoning in the articulation of 
their views, but also the exercise of what appears to be ijtihad and therefore ‘aql. This makes 
the process of evoking precedents in Muslim history (or in legal scholarship) based on similar 
considerations related to prohibitions against mass destruction a more creative one, inviting 
scholars to subject historical incidents where weapons capable of mass destruction were used 
to contemporary theology. Recalling evidence surveyed in Chapter Four, a number of 
religious scholars reference previous cases – whether contained in secondary sources like 
ahadith or otherwise – of weapons associated with mass destruction in defining their own 
positions on jihad and nuclear weapons. Al-Sadr references ‘hazardous weapons’, and 
includes flooding, incendiary weaponry (namely, naft), deployment of poison, and “other 
means that might exist”. His fatwa is important as it points to the existence of a hadith 
referring to the deployment of these weapons in the “land of the polytheists” – territories 
likely at the time to be hostile to either Islam or the Muslim community.
681
 In spite of his 
later specification that his fatwa is contingent on there being no maslahah, al-Sadr appears to 
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conceive a scenario as closely associated with an ‘objective’ existential threat as possible 
from Qur’anic ontology in order to underline the impermissibility of using weapons capable 
of mass destruction. Similar to al-Sadr, Ayatollah Lankarani also cites previous instances 
found in secondary sources which refer to mass destruction when articulating his own views. 
While Lankarani unsurprisingly links the impermissibility of chemical weapons to the 
prohibition of poisons found in Qur’anic ontology, what is most of note however is that he 
specifically acknowledges that a too close fixation on new types of weapons – whether in the 
weapons themselves, or delivery systems that are used – distracts from what should be the 
primary concern of Islamic law-making on nuclear weapons, which we may now identify as 
rooted in ‘first principles’: the humanitarian impact of mass destruction itself. In this regard, 
we can also discern a parallel between Lankarani’s position and that of Khamenei, who also 
cites the example of prohibitions against the deployment of poisons in his reasoning. 
Elsewhere, Lankarani’s position that the prohibition of using poison in ahadith also 
encompasses the Islamic prohibition on nuclear weapons as it extends to the destruction of 
property points to a highly sophisticated argument based on the discernment of first-
principles contained in Islam related to mass destruction, rather than specific effects of 
different weapon types.  
Tactical and Strategic Modernity 
The views of Mutahhari most explicitly invoke a necessity to maintain modern tactical and 
strategic weapons of warfare. In Islamic discourse, such concerns centre not only upon the 
perceived need for the Muslim community to possess (and ultimately use) the most 
‘effective’ military means for securing itself from existential threats, but also the 
conceptualisation of a broad entitlement  that the ummah has to the most modern military 
capabilities. Mutahhari, Sadegh Shirazi, and Safi Golpayegani all cite the ‘steed’ verse of the 
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Qur’an682 in arguing for the need to maintain the most modern of weapons. Elsewhere, 
Khamenei believes that: 
[i]n the world of today where military weapons and techniques have developed so greatly and 
the enemies of Islam are equipped with the strongest weapons, it is not possible to defend 
Islam and Muslim countries without learning the military technology and techniques of 
today.
683
  
Within a realist paradigm, this would likely be read as legitimising the pursuit of a ‘Muslim 
bomb’. Iranian officials sometimes describe Iran’s own strategic doctrines using terminology 
and phraseology found in the discourse of deterrence theorists (see Chapter Three) of the 
1950’s and 1960’s,684 rationalising Iranian military policy in the same language used by 
secular states. After testing the Shahab-3 missile in 1998, Iran’s Defense Minister, Ali 
Shamkhani, stated that “we have prepared ourselves to absorb the first strike so that it inflicts 
the least damage on us. We have, however, prepared a second strike which can decisively 
avenge the first one, while preventing a third strike against us”.685 Nevertheless, orthodox 
strategic discourse associated with nuclear weapons is at other times relied upon in order to 
reinforce the case in Iran against nuclear weapons proliferation. Iran’s ambassador to the 
IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, stated in 2010 that Iran could not “compete in terms of the 
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numbers of warheads possessed by the nuclear-armed powers, so if it seeks to produce 
nuclear weapons, it will be in a disadvantageous position compared with these countries”.686 
Recalling Chapter Two which documented the situation of Iranian strategic preferences in 
orientalist accounts of both Iran and Islam, and Chapter Three which established the rise of a 
realist paradigm of nuclear proliferation (and namely, the assumption that universal insecurity 
under anarchy compelled states to obtain nuclear weapons and use them for deterrence 
purposes), it is worth challenging the basic assumption that nuclear weapons are perceived by 
the ulama in Iran as representing the most ‘modern’ or suitable weapons for securing the 
survival of the Islamic Republic. Indeed, although sentiments such as those presented by the 
likes of Ward Wilson
687
 concerning the relative backwardness of nuclear weapons today 
compared to other more precise and efficient alternatives could appear academic, there is 
some evidence which suggests that the Islamic Republic of Iran does not necessarily 
associate nuclear weapons with modernity.  In emphasising that each era has its own unique 
conceptualisation of ‘modern’ weaponry for instance, Mutahhari demonstrates his awareness 
of the contingency of our interpretation of the ‘steed verse’ on the social-construction of 
military modernity.  
Given the previous discussion in Chapter Four of the potential that Iran’s clerics may not 
view nuclear weapons as the most modern weapons for Iran, we should now consider how 
these counter-narratives of nuclear weapons as part of broader conceptions of tactical and 
strategic modernity – beyond Eurocentric definitions, and rooted in an Islamic framework – 
need not be taken on faith in the Supreme Leader’s fatwa alone. For example, in the area of 
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nuclear energy policy, the Revolution did not immediately cast nuclear technology and 
industry in light of a ‘third world’ perspective of development.688 The view of nuclear 
technology as an opportunity for Iran to break its dependency on the West was not automatic. 
Many early revolutionaries held a distinctly different view of nuclear technology – namely, 
that it was uneconomical, and would further encumber Iran and force it to remain reliant on 
Western states.
689
 For these reasons the first Prime Minister of Revolutionary Iran, Mehdi 
Bazargan, halted construction of two reactors in Bushehr, despite Iran having already paid 
Germany 6 billion Deutsch marks to build them,
690
 and Khomeini would declare that 
Bushehr’s silos be used to store wheat.691 Political factors would also come to impact 
strategic preferences concerning nuclear technology and weapons in Iran after the 
Revolution. Iran’s stark isolation in the middle of the war with Iraq certainly played a role in 
influencing Khomeini’s approval of the decision to authorise the resumption of the nuclear 
programme,
692
 and “quiet progress”693 made by Iran during the war – including it starting its 
gas centrifuge program in 1985, and its acquirement of P-1 centrifuge blueprints and designs 
for a gas centrifuge enrichment plant in 1987 from the A.Q. Khan network
694
 – could be 
interpreted as an indication of external international factors having influenced the Khomeini’s 
decision-making. 
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Yet there were certainly many discourses at play in Iran at the time of the Revolution which 
could have lent themselves to more pro-active attitudes among the ulama – in line with the 
steed verse cited by the likes of Mutahhari – towards both nuclear energy and weapons, but 
for various reasons did not. Jalal Al-e Ahmad is at times cited as a significant influence over 
contemporary nuclear policy in Iran, including how the ulama as well as politicians would 
come to view nuclear energy as a signifier of modernity and self-sufficiency.
695
 Born in 1923 
to a religious family that included one of the most prominent revolutionary clerics of the 
Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani,
696
 Al-e Ahmad came to channel Western 
materialist political philosophies through the discourse of Islam in the context of mid- to late- 
20
th
 century Iran. In many ways he represented a certain hybridity of Islamic and materialist 
epistemologies of the time, belonging to  
a generation that was once inspired by the West yet politically opposed to; […] xenophobic 
towards the West, yet drawing inspirations from the thoughts of its leading thinkers; […] 
dodging religion and traditionalism, yet pulled towards them; […] aspiring for such modernist 
goals as democracy, freedom, and social justice, yet sceptical of their historical precedents 
and contemporary problems; […] in need and in search of a definition of “self” and 
“other”.697 
Most renowned of the ideas contained in his political writings is his notion of ‘Gharbzadegi’: 
variously translated as ‘Westoxification’, or ‘Occidentosis’. It is also this idea that has been 
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linked most explicitly with Iran’s nuclear trajectory.698 In defining the concept in his work of 
the same name – written initially as a government report699 – Al-e Ahmad argues that Iran 
faced a cultural, industrial and scientific dependency on the West which subjugated the 
nation. “Our age is one of two worlds: one producing and exporting machines, the other 
importing and consuming them and wearing them out”.700  
Within Al-e Ahmad’s narrative Iran is imagined as lacking not only the physical possession 
of modern technology, but also a capacity to master and comprehend the “mysteries of their 
structure and construction”.701 In one example, Al-e Ahmad critiques Japan: a country which 
he considers to have far outstripped Iran and other nations in industrial capacity, but 
nevertheless being outstripped by Western states in this arena. Tellingly, he uses the example 
of the American atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a device to carry his 
argument that failure to master modern technology would keep Iran – like Japan – in a state 
of perpetual insecurity, and ultimately servitude:  
Let us concede that we did not have the initiative to familiarize ourselves with the machine a 
hundred years ago, as Japan did. Japan presumed to rival the West in mechanosis and to deal 
a blow to the czars (in 1905) and to America (in 1941) and, even earlier, to take markets from 
them. Finally the atom bomb taught them what a case of indigestion follows a feast of 
watermelons.
702
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In this context, Iran’s nuclear programme has more recently become constructed as a vehicle 
for Iran to achieve its self-sufficient utopia,
703
 as well as an ends in and of itself. By 
‘mastering the atom’, Iran is able to ensure that it is never forced to rely on the West (or 
‘East’) for its energy consumption or own development, or placed at the mercy of its superior 
technology. Professor Saied Reza Ameli, founder of the Faculty of World Studies at the 
University of Tehran – and an Islamic scholar in his own right – reinforces this view: "the 
West does not fear an Iranian nuclear bomb: they fear Iran’s bomb of the mind".704 In this 
reading of Iran’s political culture, military application of nuclear technology plays a 
secondary role to its symbolic stature as signifiers of economic and developmental 
independence for Iran.  
Al-e Ahmad’s ideas have influenced not just nationalists in Iran, but also clerics who today 
articulate the necessity of the country’s nuclear programme inside a narrative where Iran’s 
socio-economic and ultimately spiritual problems can be pinpointed to a sweeping 
technological and cultural dependency on the West. We may find significance of 
gharbzadegi, for instance, in the rhetoric of Ayatollah Jannati: 
Look how absentminded they are. They have gone fully insane. The Iranians work manly and 
mightily, leaving behind the entire hurdles in the way of their advancement and then, Israel, 
which is itself heading towards downfall and its weak days, having tasted the agony of defeat 
in confrontation with a small portion of Gaza residents and its will to suppress them, is now 
bragging we won't permit Iran to have access to nuclear technology.
705
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Ayatollah Noori Hamedani puts forth another comprehensive view succinctly: “almighty God 
has created nuclear energy in the nature, and it is all the humans' right to exploit and benefit 
from it. The West's propaganda [against the Iranian nuclear energy plans] is in the fear of 
Muslims' advancements."
706
Ayatollah Jannati elaborates further: 
[j]ust as the Westerners have confessed, after joining the nuclear club of the big powers, Iran 
has now entered the group of the eight industrial countries that are capable of launching 
satellites […] Those who observe a little justice in expressing their stands when they read 
such confessions admit that Iran is constructing its future today.
707
 
Again, we find that gharbzadegi is inset within the parameters set by Islamic theology for 
strategic preferences as much via more mystical Shi’i beliefs concerning justice as normative 
ideas about development and modernity, allowing Islamic discourses concerning ‘national 
security’ to overlap with legal views on property and entitlement. It is here that ‘resistance’ 
against foreign attempts at denying Iran its lawful entitlements become projected as a 
religious and not just civic duty, as exemplified perhaps most vividly in the dominant Shi’i 
narrative of Fadak,
708
 and the following sermon attributed to Imam Ali: 
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By Allah, even if I were to be given all the domains of the seven heavens with all that exists 
under the skies in order to disobey Allah to the extent of snatching one grain of barley from 
an ant, I would never do it.
 709
 
This more cosmic view of ‘rights’ in Islam, and particularly from within the Shi’i traditions, 
connects the trajectory of Iran’s nuclear programme to all three components of an Islamic 
episteme: Qur’anic ontology (i.e. revelation and pure divine authority), the sunnah of the 
Prophet and Imams, and theology. As an outcome, an Islamic view of Iran’s nuclear rights 
conflates entitlement to nuclear energy and technology with obedience to divine authority, 
and likewise the denial of this entitlement with taghut (transgression).
710
  
Today, we find that Iran’s ulama by and large speak of international laws, treaty 
arrangements, and other obligations as acceptable so long as they can be situated within this 
Islamic episteme, and that they therefore do not conflict with a dominant narrative of what 
the nuclear programme represents, and the grander, more mystical processes within which its 
trajectory is shaped. Implicitly, this conflates Iran’s rights as a state with rights and 
obligations rooted in Qur’anic ontology in that they both reflect a rigid legal standard 
governing Iran’s nuclear policies which transcend realism, salient for Iran even as the 
anarchic international system defines the strategic preferences of other states. It is for this 
reason that the right to enrichment has been a perennial source of controversy between Iran 
and the P5+1 in negotiations; Iran insisting that its right to enrich transcends the terms of the 
NPT, and the West insisting that this right is entirely dependent on a state being seen to have 
lived up to specific obligations within the Treaty. Iran sees itself as having this right 
regardless of its NPT membership, and this is where the ideas of Al-e Ahmad combine with 
traditional Shi’i-Islamic theology to form a poignant ‘national narrative’ in Iran. This 
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narrative goes some way towards explaining why the Islamic Republic as frequently 
proposed ‘nuclear ‘swap’ deals between 2005-15, where Iran would continue to enrich 
uranium at a level below 20%, export it to a third-party country for further enrichment, but 
finally be forced to import this fuel for its reactors. Indeed, Iran’s reference to both religion 
and its scepticism concerning the deterrent value of nuclear weapons while participating at 
various international forums centring on disarmament and non-proliferation do provide 
further evidence of the possibility that the steed verse may even contribute to case for non-
proliferation in Iran. In this regard, Iran’s envoy to the IAEA read an official statement at the 
2014 Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons conference held in Austria; citing both 
religious and strategy: 
Divine Religions are against the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 
particularly nuclear weapons. In our view the access to and use of WMDs is opposed to our 
religious and Islamic teachings. The Islamic Republic of Iran, being a victim of WMDs, is of 
strong belief that possession of nuclear weapons has not produced and does not ensure 
security for any country and the only absolute guarantee against the threat of these inhumane 
weapons is their total elimination under strict international control.
711
 
Such sentiments were also expressed earlier, albeit more crudely, by former President 
Ahmadinejad:  
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The period and era of using nuclear weapons is over [...] Nuclear bombs are not anymore 
helpful and those who are stockpiling nuclear weapons, politically they are backward, and 
they are mentally retarded.
712
 
Taken together, such sentiments point to an acceptance within Iran of its entitlement – both in 
line with the steed verse, and other potent national narratives (such as those developed by Al-
e Ahmad) – of Iran to the most modern military technologies beyond nuclear weapons.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has revealed elements of religious thinking about nuclear weapons which cannot 
be adequately confined to the deterrence parameter, and more specifically its realist and 
orientalist ontologies. These elements, first broadly identified in Chapter One, were narrowed 
down and discussed in the present chapter – based on the analytical framework developed in 
the previous chapter – as:  
1. Islamic ‘first principles’ on mass destruction. 
2. Maslahah and the ‘state of exception’. 
3. Deference to the Supreme Leader. 
4. Analogical reasoning.  
5. Tactical and strategic modernity. 
Concerning Islamic ‘first principles’, it was established that Qur’anic ontology does set forth 
some moral absolutes related to limiting and avoiding mass destruction (and specifically, the 
deaths of non-combatants) at times of war, and that this ontology can be seen in the views of 
religious scholars in Iran today concerning nuclear weapons. Though there are visible limits 
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to this Qur’anic ontology in the views of scholars like Khomeini and Yazdi, who justify any 
means necessary to protect Muslim territories from existential threats, the record of the 
Islamic Republic during the Iran-Iraq war shows enormous resolve on the part of Iran to not 
use WMD based on Khomeini’s own theology. This theology constructed Khomeini as a 
‘different’ leader to Saddam, and it was therefore ultimately his self-perception which pushed 
him away from a view that Iran was justified to use WMD reciprocally against Iraq.  This 
provides an avenue for understanding the complex role of Qur’anic ontology and theology in 
Iranian decision-making concerning nuclear weapons, beyond the notion that Iranian leaders 
– in being rational actors – are compelled to obtain nuclear weapons to secure the Islamic 
Republic from existential threats. 
This brought us to the issue of maslahah and the ‘state of exception’. It was argued that 
numerous clerics reference ‘public interest’ when articulating their views on nuclear weapons 
and other WMD, and that this could be an important avenue for understanding the social-
construction of both threat and threatened within an Islamic Republic, and in the context of 
the Imamate. Although both Wael Hallaq and Khaled Abou el-Fadl raise important questions 
regarding the extent to which an Islamic state can be considered truly ‘Islamic’ if it 
compromises Qur’anic ontology in the name of some national interest, the theological and 
even mystical dimension to clerical engagement with strategic policy in Iran presents a 
unique narrative of expediency. This narrative combines the mechanism of maslahah with the 
eschatology of the Imamate and just-rulership, and in effect gives way to a revolutionary 
form of ‘truth-making’ in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this regard, what may appear to be 
overtly realist policies are themselves steeped in a religious narrative which shapes when and 
where states of exception can emerge without causing the Islamic episteme to cave 
completely to competing ‘meta-narratives’ of strategic policy. 
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The issue of deference to the Supreme Leader is also a significant component. Given the 
centrality of a single cleric in the decision-making process of the Islamic Republic, and 
wilayat al-faqih more generally, certain pronouncements from clerics inside Iran on the issue 
of nuclear weapons and other WMD can be discerned as a form of legitimation. Here, there is 
a disparity between the orientalist narrative of competing fatawa and irrational clerics with 
the potential to change Iran’s nuclear course, and the structures of religious authority that 
operate in the strategic sphere.  Here, the pronouncements of Khamenei on strategic issues 
are taken to be authoritative regardless of the views of other clerics. In this regard, it is the 
place of other scholars in the Islamic Republic to either challenge the Supreme Leader’s anti-
nuclear fatwa from without the nezam – and therefore, outside the scope of political and 
strategic influence – or reinforce it from within.  
On analogical reasoning, it was established briefly that clerics today do refer to previous 
instances contained in both Qur’anic ontology and secondary sources of mass destruction in 
articulating contemporary views. Yet although it is tempting to therefore return completely to 
historical precedent in discerning the veracity of today’s scholars, we are reminded that this 
form of analogical reasoning is reliant upon ijtihad. This means that clerical views on nuclear 
weapons cannot be divorced from the specific time and place within which they are 
produced, and that orientalist accounts of the impact that religion could have on Iranian 
strategic preferences are therefore flawed due to their essentialism. 
Finally, there is a possibility– based on religious considerations, and the trajectory of popular 
narratives of nuclear energy more broadly in the country – that Iran may not even imbue 
nuclear weapons with the same deterrent value as other states. Although the steed verse is 
frequently cited by clerics in Iran today in their pronouncements on nuclear weapons and 
other WMD, this verse addresses tactical and strategic modernity in a non-linear fashion, 
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leaving a possibility for the ulama to emphasise the need to obtain (or not obtain) nuclear 
weapons, or master (or not master) nuclear energy technology based upon mystical concerns 
related to justice, entitlement and divine guidance. These go beyond a narrow interpretation 
of the steed verse, as applied by some Muslims surveyed in Chapter Four. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusions 
*** 
Nuclear weapons neither ensure security, nor do they consolidate political power, rather they 
are a threat to both security and political power. The events that took place in the 1990s 
showed that the possession of such weapons could not even safeguard a regime like the 
former Soviet Union. And today we see certain countries which are exposed to waves of 
deadly insecurity despite possessing atomic bombs.
713
 
Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, 2012 
*** 
This thesis began with an overarching question: what kind of impact can religious authority 
and Islamic belief have in the Islamic Republic of Iran upon its nuclear policies? With 
reference to existing literatures that have attempted to answer this question – or be used as a 
theoretical foundation answering this question – it was found that there are difficulties with 
attempting to immediately dissect clerical views on nuclear weapons and other WMD from 
within dominant (secular) epistemological frameworks of analysis. Attempts to portray the 
influence of religion – and Islamic belief specifically – on Iranian strategic preferences 
towards nuclear weapons have hinged on the social construction of Iran as either a ‘like-unit’, 
or a Muslim ‘other’, rather than a substantive engagement with Islamic discourse themselves 
from outside the narrow epistemological boundaries of the ‘deterrence parameter’. 
Commentators of both orientalist and realist persuasions by and large attempt to situate the 
trajectory of Iran’s nuclear programme within Eurocentric paradigms of security. For this 
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reason, a large portion of the literature and policy-oriented commentary purporting to narrate 
the strategic preferences of the Islamic Republic of Iran reveal more about the deterrence 
parameter and the social-construction of the ‘self’ in nuclear strategy than it does where 
Iran’s strategic preferences come from, and where they might go in the future, if we assume 
that religion does have an impact.  
The thesis proceeded to deconstruct two of the most dominant paradigms for interpreting 
Iran’s strategic preferences concerning nuclear weapons: the first being an orientalist 
paradigm, and the second being a realist paradigm of nuclear strategy. At task was not only 
the tendency to ‘orientalise’ Iran’s nuclear latency according to the discourse of the ‘mad 
mullah’, but how the opposite narrative that Iran’s strategic preferences are born from an 
unexceptional Hobbesian impetus for self-preservation in an anarchic international system 
(and not religious beliefs) can equally skew our view of Iranian strategic agency and foreign 
policy. This latter realist analysis has become much more prevalent in policy discourse as we 
approach – as of 2016 – what is looking to be a relaxation of political and military tensions 
between the United States and Iran over the latter’s nuclear programme. In sum, neither 
realist nor orientalist assessments of Iran’s nuclear programme can account for the depth of 
Islamic perspectives concerning laws of warfare, questions of the state, and existential 
threats. This is evidenced in the tendency of analysts promoting the either/or dichotomy of 
Iranian politics to refer to Iran’s Islamic revolutionary ideology and structures of religious 
authority in the policy realm only when underlining preconceived notions of how states 
behave in the nuclear era. 
Chapter Two assessed the tendency towards viewing Iranian nuclear policy as being driven 
by an irrational Islamic ontology. Many of the claims levied at Iran (i.e. that the Iranians are 
predisposed to strategies of ‘martyrdom’ given their Shi’i identity, and that that clerics are 
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irrational) were based on only a nominal awareness of religious and cultural practises in Iran. 
By far more influential than actual study of religious belief impacting Iran’s strategic 
preferences are a ream of orientalist motifs and images already in circulation about Iran and 
Islam which are used to reinforce the case that Iran a) cannot be trusted not to pursue nuclear 
weapons, and b) would not be deterred from using nuclear weapons once it obtained them.  
Consequently, the permanence of certain conclusions concerning the nature of Iran’s nuclear 
programme (namely, that it should be considered perpetual source of suspicion or and 
clandestine military activity) should be considered an outcome of a host of coalescent 
discourses and narratives related to Iran, Islam and the ‘other’. Assessments therefore do not 
reflect unambiguous ‘Truth’. On the level of epistemology, one can regard the International 
Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) view that it is “not in a position to provide credible 
assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material activities in Iran”714 as typifying 
the dangers of construing knowledge production in the context of nuclear proliferation as 
value-neutral. While it is empirically ‘true’ that the IAEA can never provide complete 
assurances about the non-military nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, a statement such as 
this depends on an assumption on the part of the audience that Iran is somehow exceptional in 
this respect. 
Chapter Three established that there exists a normative dimension of realist theory in the 
nuclear field that is especially conducive to understanding nuclear proliferation strategies 
(and ultimately the ‘threat’) of various countries – regardless of their own individual 
histories, cultures, and religions which inevitably have a bearing on strategic thinking – as an 
almost empirical science. As states other than Iran from the ‘global south’ choose whether or 
not to pursue nuclear technology themselves, there is a danger that theory could similarly fail 
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at drawing a complete picture of the impact that normative belief has on defence and foreign 
policy decisions in countries within which decision-making elites draw from a range of 
unique and competing cultural and religious ideas in informing their own notion of strategic 
military ‘modernity’. Over the course of this thesis, we have found that the very question of 
whether or not a state can be deterred – whether from obtaining or using nuclear weapons – is 
too narrow a lens for understanding the kind of unique impact that Islam could have on 
strategic preferences in Iran.  
The default framing of Iran’s nuclear intentions according to either orientalist or realist 
narratives of its strategic preferences has deeper roots than the recent emergence of the 
Iranian ‘nuclear crisis’ would suggest. These roots lie in the decades following the first use of 
nuclear weapons in 1945, and the emergence of nuclear strategy and deterrence theory in the 
United States. Chapter Three established that discourses surrounding nuclear deterrence and 
nuclear proliferation emerging during these post-war years (and the rise of theory to 
accompany them) would constitute today’s epistemic boundaries which situate the Iran 
nuclear question: referred to in this study as the deterrence parameter of nuclear weapons. 
Contrary to the now popular realist foundational myth of nuclear strategy, the transition from 
viewing the Soviet Union as an irrational actor to viewing it as a ‘like-unit’ was an outcome 
as much of social-construction as it was material conditions of insecurity, or a more 
‘enlightened’ defence policy-making process. This shift determined how intelligence and 
seemingly ‘objective’ metrics of insecurity (and ultimately drivers of nuclear proliferation) 
were read and interpreted. In line with what Pelopidas has identified as the ‘proliferation 
paradigm’, this realist approach – while accepting the premise that the Iranians are rational – 
nevertheless treats nuclear proliferation as an almost inevitable outcome and global process. 
Attempts at reviving the realist approach to understanding Iran’s nuclear programme as a 
counter-narrative to orientalism ultimately negates the impact of religion on Iranian strategic 
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preferences. As a result, even attempts at defending Iran against the normative charge that its 
leadership are irrational simply move Iranian strategic preferences from one set of 
Eurocentric ontological definitions (i.e. orientalism) to another (i.e. realism). Both these 
approaches to Iran were found to be unsatisfactory if we consider the real impact that 
normative ideas have on security and defence policies. The dichotomous view of Iran 
highlights a disconcerting reality that despite Iran being a constitutional Islamic Republic, 
with many areas of policy being under the purview of scholars of Islam, interdisciplinary 
scholarship on religious belief systems, law and ideology are considered largely superfluous 
in the discussion over where its nuclear programme might go in the future. 
The development of an analytical framework for understanding the social-construction of 
strategic thinking from both outside and within Iran has been at the core of my attempt at 
answering the initial research question. This de-secularised framework for analysis can 
highlight the blind-spots of the deterrence parameter, and point to opportunities for more a 
closer appreciation of Iranian strategic preferences on their own terms. Beyond these 
theoretical opportunities, the framework may also provide avenues for understanding where 
Iran’s strategic preferences towards nuclear weapons could go in the future if we assume that 
religion impacts policy-making in the country. The framework for analysis, capable of 
providing some historical and theological context to how religious scholars might view 
Islamic Republic of Iran’s own strategic preferences, was structured according to three levels: 
Qur’anic ontology, secondary sources, and theology. These three levels were used to dissect a 
range of religious sources, scholarly opinions, and military experiences that can potentially 
shed light on Iranian strategic preferences today. These related to previous doctrines which 
addressed weapons capable of mass destruction (including tactical postures) which jeopardise 
the lives of non-combatants during times of war, and other wider considerations shared by 
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nuclear weapons use, or that flavour Western debates over why nuclear proliferation happens, 
and the normative underpinnings of a successful nuclear deterrence dynamic.  
The alleged Shi’i ‘penchant for martyrdom’, Shi’ism as a ‘religion of protest’, and other 
orientalist or romantic frameworks for conceptualising its jurisprudence, do not account for 
the broad spectrum of Muslim experiences and rationales that clerics in Iran today are 
compelled to consider when developing their own military jurisprudence. This thesis has 
found that analysing some of the roots and points of reference for contemporary religious 
opinions concerning nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction can benefit 
from the study of some Sunni experiences and legal concepts. This problematises the claim 
that Iran’s strategic preferences are rooted in essentialist constructions of ‘Shi’ism’ and 
‘Islam’. Although perhaps a cornerstone of Shi’i legal scholarship today in Iran, especially on 
issues related to the state and war and interrelated international security issues, discourses 
concerning nuclear weapons as espoused by Iran’s ulama are also linked to ways of 
understanding war, and methodologies for developing military jurisprudence, found in Sunni 
legal theory. In characterising Shi’ism as a ‘religion of protest’ or revolution against temporal 
authority, we may lose sight of crucial transformations within the sect that took place in the 
20
th
 century. Specifically, an essentialist view of Shi’i thinking about war and the state cannot 
account for the fusion of a Sunni legal mechanism for pragmatism – maslahah – with a 
characteristically Shi’i theology associated with ‘just leadership’ and vicegerency to the 
Twelfth Imam. This tendency has, in turn, de-historicised Islamic legal theory and given the 
impression that as far as the Islamic Republic of Iran actually does enact policy in line with a 
religious belief system, this belief system is static and not subject to change. We can observe 
this kind of thinking emerging with the debate over the relevance of the Supreme Leader’s 
fatwa concerning nuclear weapons today.  
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This theological-legal-political fusion of Shi’ism with maslahah has not, however, simply 
resulted simply in the abandonment of Shi’i orthodoxy in search of the hitherto allusive 
Islamic nation-state. It has by contrast created a new orthodoxy, discernible in the process of 
securitisation. The introduction of concepts related to expediency and pragmatism to the 
lexicon of Shi’i legal theory by Ayatollah Khomeini meant that both Sunni and Shi’i schools 
are conjoined in their views about the need to preserve attempts at an Islamic ‘state’ by any 
means necessary in the face of existential threat. Within the nezam, the Supreme Leader and 
other members of the ulama consulted in matters of policy in Iran remain legatees of the 
Twelfth Imam in a both narrow legal sense as well as mystical one. This imbues all Islamic 
‘pragmatism’ with a teleology that goes beyond the material survival of the Islamic State and 
legalism. 
This has notable consequences for our understanding of religious discourses behind Iran’s 
nuclear options. Chapter Three confirmed that in the context of Iran’s nuclear programme, 
commentators, analysts and academics alike regularly appropriate Islamic terminology and 
motifs in order to explain Iran’s agency in light of the premise of clerical involvement with 
politics. These ‘experts’ are aware that Iran’s official Shi’i identity facilitates certain 
doctrines, and consequently introduce Shi’i concepts such as taqiyah and the Imamate to the 
debate. Despite the awareness of Islamic and Iranian cultural concepts, this kind of literature 
that is produced on Iran’s nuclear programme is superficial, incapable offering insights into 
how the normative-religious factors could contribute to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s policy 
agenda in the area of strategic affairs and in particular its nuclear programme. That this 
literature often depends on the silence of Islamic legal theory and theorists – especially that 
of the ulama in Iran – should not come as a surprise to students of Said: “[w]ithout significant 
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exception the universalizing discourses of modern Europe and the United States assume the 
silence, willing or otherwise, of the non-European world”.715 
Chapter Five reappraised the contemporary views of clerics in Iran concerning nuclear 
weapons and other WMD using an Islamic framework for analysis. This analysis was 
widened slightly to include reference to the cultural and historical context within which 
contemporary scholars have voiced their opinions on nuclear weapons. The chapter 
concluded that including religious definitions of pragmatism and expediency on their own 
terms can provide an alternative type of analysis of how Iran’s nuclear intentions are shaped 
and developed. This is of relevance as much to those wishing to broaden the study of Iranian 
foreign policy-making and national security strategies as it is those from within the field of 
Islamic Studies attempting to discern how the state and military strategy can impact Shi’i 
jurisprudence. In this regard, a more genealogical reading of the use and non-use of certain 
weapons for Muslims goes some way towards underlining that there can never be a single 
tactical or strategic doctrine of warfare within Islam, but rather many that compete in the 
minds of jurisprudents, based on changing circumstances, for the status of objective ‘Truth’. 
These doctrines are capable of retaining their ‘Islamicity’ due to the proximity of maslahah 
within a mystical tradition of Islam, and are therefore not overtly presented as being the 
outcome of subjective scholarly opinion, or situated within a specific time and space. It is for 
this reason that neither realist nor orientalist accounts are adequate. 
Contributions and Further Research 
This thesis has offered a critical option for understanding Iranian strategic preferences 
towards nuclear weapons, based on a closer analysis of Islamic sources and discourse. It has 
contributed a modest attempt at linking the concerns of IR scholarship related to nuclear 
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proliferation and deterrence with more rigorous qualitative analysis drawn from the fields of 
Iranian Studies and Islamic Studies – evidence which could permit assessments of Iranian 
strategic agency to reveal more about a range of directions Iran’s nuclear programme could 
go in the future, depending on how its security situation changes. As a corollary to this third 
way, the thesis has taken into consideration certain primary sources of the contemporary 
realist view of Iran’s nuclear programme. This has been done in order to highlight the pitfalls 
of situating Iran within the worldviews of realism or deterrence theory in order to identify the 
roots of its strategic preferences, and project the future of its nuclear programme. This third 
way has avoided the debate over whether or not Iranian policy-making is in fact influenced 
by religion at all. Rather than attempting to prove or disprove the ‘rationality’ of Iran’s 
clerics, the thesis has offered insight into the types of constitutive logic and epistemic 
parameters which Iran’s ulama would engage with when encountering questions related to 
nuclear weapons. Indeed, there are inherent difficulties associated with attempting to quantify 
with any degree of precision – or objectivity – the exact normative foundation of policy-
outcomes. Instead, I have taken as a foundational assumption (quite modestly) that religious 
belief and religious authorities can have an impact on the policy-making process, but 
challenged contemporary assessments of what the implications of this are.  
The ‘vertical’ critique of realist nuclear discourse offered in Chapter Three contributes a 
deconstruction of a growingly prevalent representation of Iranian strategic agency based on 
the terms of critical theory rather than ontological orientalism. For this reason, it is unique in 
that its conclusions are not that Iran is an inherently irrational actor by virtue of religious 
scholars taking part in the policy-making process, but that this path in the nuclear debate is 
fraught with its own problems that will become increasingly apparent as other states in the 
‘Global South’ – each with their own unique cultural and religious underpinnings for foreign, 
defence, and development policies – adopt nuclear technology. This chapter also gives further 
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justification for the subsequent analysis of Islamic military jurisprudence and the concoction 
of an analytical framework, given that those accepting the ‘horizontal’ critique of orientalism 
in Chapter Two could justifiably argue that recourse to a more ‘objective’ realist 
interpretation of Iranian strategic preferences would be a sufficient remedy to the problems 
outlined in Chapter Two.  
In theoretical terms, the framework developed in this thesis in Chapters Four and Five for 
understanding how clerics view nuclear weapons can be seen as a contribution to a growing 
critical and post-positivist approach to understanding the impact of religion on the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s policy-making processes. With this in mind, the analytical framework 
could potentially open up other areas of strategic policy-making in Iran to a reappraisal, 
especially given that we are presented with very little insight in the West to the worldviews of 
scholars like Khamenei.  
While the framework for analysis developed in this thesis provides a guide for academics 
when attempting to critically assess the contemporary views of scholars – or simply 
understand these views in context – more views should be considered in the coming decades. 
Given the advanced age of some of the scholars whose views were surveyed in Chapter One, 
and dissected in Chapter Five, it would be pertinent to continue to document and trace the 
types of religious thinking towards nuclear weapons and other WMD which emerge in the 
coming years from new religious scholars. A more exhaustive study of Arabic and Farsi 
language sources by scholars with a mastery of both these languages would also be an 
important part of developing the research put forth in this thesis. 
With the advanced age of the Supreme Leader especially, although it is unlikely – based on 
assessments in Chapter Five – that a new Supreme Leader would introduce a diametrically 
opposed fatwa on nuclear weapons, it will be necessary to reassess the structural implications 
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of religious opinion in Iran concerning this issue after the installation of a new wali al-faqih. 
This will be particularly important if the office of Supreme Leader is altered in any way (for 
example, turned into a council of senior clerics, or shura al-fuqaha al-maraja). Furthermore, 
and in accordance with the findings of this thesis in Chapter Five, it will be necessary to 
continue to monitor the evolution of religious thinking in Iran on nuclear weapons in order to 
gain insight into how these scholars view international affairs, and the place of the Islamic 
Republic in the international system. Whether or not the JCPOA signed between the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and the P5+1 in 2015 will be conducive or not to a more open and free 
conversation about these views inside the former country, and a more effective 
communication of the views to outsiders, remains to be seen. Additionally, in the coming 
years as Iraq considers developing its own nuclear industry,
716
 it may be pertinent to revisit 
the framework developed in this thesis in assessing the views of Iraqi scholars concerning 
nuclear weapons, and perhaps even contrast these views with those found in Iran.   
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Appendix 
Glossary of Arabic and Farsi Terms 
 
‘Alim: Religious scholar. Plural: ulama. 
‘Aql: Intellect. 
‘Ilm: Knowledge. 
‘Irfan: Islamic mysticism. 
Adab: Islamic etiquette. 
Ahadith: See Hadith. 
Ahkam: See Hukm. 
Ahlulbayt: Family or progeny of the Prophet. 
Akhira: The next world. 
Akhlaq: Manners. 
Ayat: Verse of the Qur’an. 
Bid’ah: Innovation. 
Dar al-Harb: Abode of war. 
Dar al-Islam: Abode of Islam. 
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Dunya: This world. 
Falsafa: Philosophy. 
Fatwa: Islamic edict, usually applying only to the followers of a particular Islamic scholar. 
Plural: Fatawa. 
Fiqh: Jurisprudence. 
Hadith: Narrated tradition of the Prophet or Twelve Imams. Plural: Ahadith. 
Hawza ‘ilmiyya: Shi’i seminary. Shorthand: Hawza. 
Hijrah: Migration of the Prophet and his followers from Makkah to Madina. 
Hujjat al-Islam: Literally ‘Sign’ or ‘proof’ of Islam, a rank of cleric below that of Ayatollah. 
Hukm: In the Shi’i context, an Islamic edict applying to all Muslims, regardless of whom 
their marja al-taqlid is. Plural: Ahkam. See also Taqlid and Fatwa. 
Ijtihad: Law-making based on individual interpretation rooted in rational and logical 
faculties. 
Jahiliyah: Pre-Islamic times. 
Jihad: Literally ‘struggle’, often denoting war. 
Madhab: Islamic school of thought. Plural: Madhahib. 
Manjaniq: Trébuchet, or catapult. 
Marja al-Taqlid/Marja e-Taqlid: Source of emulation. Plural: Maraji. 
Maslahah: Public interest. 
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Masoom: Without sin or fallibility. Plural: masoomin. 
Mujtahid: One who has attained a sufficient level of religious education that they can 
interpret Islamic texts and law on their own. Plural: mujtahidin. 
Muqalid: One who emulates. 
Naft: Greek fire, thermal weaponry. 
Qisas: Like-for-like retaliation. 
Qiyas: Analogical reasoning in the interpretation of the Qur’an and Islamic law. 
Shari’ah: Literally ‘the way’, used frequently to denote an Islamic legal system. 
Shi’i: An adherent of the Shi’ism, a sect of Islam which believes Ali ibn Abi Talib to have 
been the rightful successor to the Prophet.  Plural: Shi’a. 
Sunnah: Practise of the Prophet or Twelve Imams. Plural: sunnan. 
Surah: Chapter of the Qur’an. 
Taghut: Transgression. 
Taqiyah: Dissimulation. 
Taqlid: Practise of emulation, often of a religious scholar. See also Marja al-Taqlid. 
Usul al-Fiqh: Principles of Islamic jurisprudence. 
Wali al-Faqih/Vali-ye Faqih: Guardian jurist. See Wilayat al-Faqih. 
Wilayat al-Faqih/Velayat-e Faqih: Literally Guardianship of the Jurisprudent, a theory of 
religious governance rooted in Shi’i theology. The official system of governance in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran today. 
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